que lindo o Rio
theotonio
domingo, 31 de maio de 2009
sábado, 30 de maio de 2009
Una quijotada suculenta recorre a Venezuela
vale a pena divulgar pois é verdade. Um milhão de exemplares do Don Quixote e outro milhão dos Miseráveis. Modestos 60.000 exemplares do meu Conceito de Classes Sociais e não sei quantos do meu Do Terror à Esperança. Parece impossível mas é verdade.
abraços
theotonio
----- Original Message -----
From: Fernando Buen Abad Domínguez
Subject: Una quijotada suculenta recorre a Venezuela
Una quijotada suculenta recorre a Venezuela. Los libros toman las plazas
Fernando Buen Abad Domínguez - Rebelión/Fundación Federico Engels/Universidad de la Filosofía
¿Están locos?
Chavistas y no chavistas han de saber que hubo, en la Plaza Bolívar de Caracas y en todo el país, una fiesta excepcional, un poema social de nuevo género, una audacia de quijotadas suculentas que recorre el mundo. Esta vez, un Ministerio, resultado de la voluntad democrática que gobierna mandando, puso en manos de su pueblo, en forma de libros, un hecho cultural que aquí no es nuevo y que a muchos nos enamora. Sin volvernos a-críticos.
Este Ministerio de Cultura venezolano puso en manos de su pueblo miles de libros, miles y miles de libros a cambio de abrazos fraternales, sonrisas a mares y millones de destellos que en los ojos caribeños tienen certeza de futuro socialista. Un regalo con sello emancipador. Saltaba a la vista. Bajo un sol intenso y un calor revolucionario, sonaba la música que mueve las caderas y los corazones, sonaban las frases alegres, los augurios y los compromisos de lucha. Estaban ahí los ministros de Cultura de Cuba y Venezuela que, a pleno sol, sudaron la “gota gorda” y pusieron en manos del pueblo los chorros caudalosos de tintas objetivados en una biblioteca fenomenal que sigue ensanchando las lecturas que, ahora, puede hacer un pueblo liberado del analfabetismo. Esto no debe ser silenciado.
Son millones y millones los libros editados por Venezuela para ser distribuidos gratuitamente. Y desde luego que con eso no basta y desde luego que ya es un ejemplo mundial. Y, desde luego muchos esperan más... mucho más. Sin ser apologistas del gobierno y siendo socialistas comprometidos. Esta tarea de entregar gratuitamente títulos editoriales muy diversos, como muchas otras, es una estrategia sistemática para democratizar la cultura. Es una de las tantas maneras en que se expresa un compromiso revolucionario pactado democráticamente por un pueblo que ha probado, una y otra vez, que está decidido a tomar la dirección de su futuro rumbo a otro mundo mejor que es posible... y que es urgente.
Miles de manos se llevaron miles de libros. Ni uno solo fue producto de una transacción mercantil, ni uno solo se fue a las casas de los venezolanos como trampa alienante pergeñada por mafias editoriales. Ni uno solo, entre esos miles y miles de libros fue impreso para llenar sólo bodegas o para adornar la currícula de algún santón intelectual. Los libros se fueron en manos de mujeres, hombres y niños que, esta vez, tienen en su poder condiciones nuevas para ser libres porque serán cultos. ¿Cuántos gobiernos pueden presumir semejante compromiso? Muy pocos. Por ahora.
No son pocos los ingeniosos que tiran frases para sembrar sospechas y plantar canalladas. Disfrazados de “exquisitos”, algunos “críticos” arquean las cejas y se convencen de que de nada sirve proveer con libros el trabajo de revolucionar las conciencias... que los pueblos son ignorantes incorregibles, que irán de inmediato a vender los libros, que los usarán para envolver cualquier cosa o que simplemente los harán servir, en cualquier momento, para encender hogueras. Algunos dicen que son libros repartidos para ideologizar a los ignorantes. La desconfianza y el odio tienen gran imaginación cuando se trata de calumniar a los pueblos. Odio burgués.
En esas plazas de Venezuela había madres y padres que llevaban libros. Llevaban la certeza de que son un patrimonio valiosísimo para sus hijos. Había niños hojeando libros producidos para ellos y con eso se convirtieron en usuarios y protagonistas de un derecho humano fundamental que casi ningún otro niño, ni otro padre, puede gozar cabal y libremente en Latinoamérica. Había abuelos con las manos llenas de letras y con la mirada puesta en un hecho jamás antes visto por un pueblo, hoy en revolución, que mucho tiempo ha sido ignorado, explotado, maltratado y hundido en la ignorancia más aberrante. Había estudiantes, trabajadores... muchachas y muchachos que entre bailes y frescura arrimaron a su casa un bastión del pensamiento que promete saberes y sabores florecientes entre los libros. Un derecho cumplido, una responsabilidad en marcha. ¿Cómo explicamos en México que esto si existe, que no es una alucinación dogmática, que es verdad, que si es posible, que lo ordena un pueblo y lo obedecen los Ministros, que ocurre muchas veces, que es un derecho respetado y que está en marcha su perfeccionamiento? ¿Cómo contar esto sin que algún payaso lo descalifique diciendo que es pura “propaganda chavista?
Esta noche millones de libros ya duermen en las casas de millones de venezolanos. Cosa nunca antes vista. Esta noche las condiciones y las posibilidades indican que, de esos millones, alguna parte, ojala muy grande, paseará sus ojos entre las líneas de esos libros que ya no son negocio exclusivo de las corporaciones editoriales. Paseará sus ojos y sus ideas entre las ideas de algún autor que, dicho sea, jamás imagino ver multiplicada su obra en las proporciones en que se ha multiplicado gracias a la Revolución venezolana.
Esta noche millones de libros nuevos ya se imprimen para que salgan a las calles y a las casas muy pronto. Esta noche los Ministros de Cuba y Venezuela reposarán, sus no pocas horas de trabajo bajo el sol caribeño, sobre la responsabilidad de seguir, en cantidad y calidad, enriqueciéndose con la riqueza cultural que está sembrada y ya anuncia frutos. Los veremos al Alba, ni duda cabe. Mientras, algunos privilegiados que estuvimos y vimos semejante fiesta de libros, iremos por el mundo a contar cómo un pueblo en Revolución es capaz de regalarse los libros que necesita su libertad sin dejar de romper otras tantas cadenas iguales o peores que la ignorancia. Contar cómo éste pueblo en Revolución se gana el derecho de garantizarse sus derechos a fuerza de organizarse y dar la batalla de las ideas. Y, por si fuese poco, regalarnos el ejemplo.
abraços
theotonio
----- Original Message -----
From: Fernando Buen Abad Domínguez
Subject: Una quijotada suculenta recorre a Venezuela
Una quijotada suculenta recorre a Venezuela. Los libros toman las plazas
Fernando Buen Abad Domínguez - Rebelión/Fundación Federico Engels/Universidad de la Filosofía
¿Están locos?
Chavistas y no chavistas han de saber que hubo, en la Plaza Bolívar de Caracas y en todo el país, una fiesta excepcional, un poema social de nuevo género, una audacia de quijotadas suculentas que recorre el mundo. Esta vez, un Ministerio, resultado de la voluntad democrática que gobierna mandando, puso en manos de su pueblo, en forma de libros, un hecho cultural que aquí no es nuevo y que a muchos nos enamora. Sin volvernos a-críticos.
Este Ministerio de Cultura venezolano puso en manos de su pueblo miles de libros, miles y miles de libros a cambio de abrazos fraternales, sonrisas a mares y millones de destellos que en los ojos caribeños tienen certeza de futuro socialista. Un regalo con sello emancipador. Saltaba a la vista. Bajo un sol intenso y un calor revolucionario, sonaba la música que mueve las caderas y los corazones, sonaban las frases alegres, los augurios y los compromisos de lucha. Estaban ahí los ministros de Cultura de Cuba y Venezuela que, a pleno sol, sudaron la “gota gorda” y pusieron en manos del pueblo los chorros caudalosos de tintas objetivados en una biblioteca fenomenal que sigue ensanchando las lecturas que, ahora, puede hacer un pueblo liberado del analfabetismo. Esto no debe ser silenciado.
Son millones y millones los libros editados por Venezuela para ser distribuidos gratuitamente. Y desde luego que con eso no basta y desde luego que ya es un ejemplo mundial. Y, desde luego muchos esperan más... mucho más. Sin ser apologistas del gobierno y siendo socialistas comprometidos. Esta tarea de entregar gratuitamente títulos editoriales muy diversos, como muchas otras, es una estrategia sistemática para democratizar la cultura. Es una de las tantas maneras en que se expresa un compromiso revolucionario pactado democráticamente por un pueblo que ha probado, una y otra vez, que está decidido a tomar la dirección de su futuro rumbo a otro mundo mejor que es posible... y que es urgente.
Miles de manos se llevaron miles de libros. Ni uno solo fue producto de una transacción mercantil, ni uno solo se fue a las casas de los venezolanos como trampa alienante pergeñada por mafias editoriales. Ni uno solo, entre esos miles y miles de libros fue impreso para llenar sólo bodegas o para adornar la currícula de algún santón intelectual. Los libros se fueron en manos de mujeres, hombres y niños que, esta vez, tienen en su poder condiciones nuevas para ser libres porque serán cultos. ¿Cuántos gobiernos pueden presumir semejante compromiso? Muy pocos. Por ahora.
No son pocos los ingeniosos que tiran frases para sembrar sospechas y plantar canalladas. Disfrazados de “exquisitos”, algunos “críticos” arquean las cejas y se convencen de que de nada sirve proveer con libros el trabajo de revolucionar las conciencias... que los pueblos son ignorantes incorregibles, que irán de inmediato a vender los libros, que los usarán para envolver cualquier cosa o que simplemente los harán servir, en cualquier momento, para encender hogueras. Algunos dicen que son libros repartidos para ideologizar a los ignorantes. La desconfianza y el odio tienen gran imaginación cuando se trata de calumniar a los pueblos. Odio burgués.
En esas plazas de Venezuela había madres y padres que llevaban libros. Llevaban la certeza de que son un patrimonio valiosísimo para sus hijos. Había niños hojeando libros producidos para ellos y con eso se convirtieron en usuarios y protagonistas de un derecho humano fundamental que casi ningún otro niño, ni otro padre, puede gozar cabal y libremente en Latinoamérica. Había abuelos con las manos llenas de letras y con la mirada puesta en un hecho jamás antes visto por un pueblo, hoy en revolución, que mucho tiempo ha sido ignorado, explotado, maltratado y hundido en la ignorancia más aberrante. Había estudiantes, trabajadores... muchachas y muchachos que entre bailes y frescura arrimaron a su casa un bastión del pensamiento que promete saberes y sabores florecientes entre los libros. Un derecho cumplido, una responsabilidad en marcha. ¿Cómo explicamos en México que esto si existe, que no es una alucinación dogmática, que es verdad, que si es posible, que lo ordena un pueblo y lo obedecen los Ministros, que ocurre muchas veces, que es un derecho respetado y que está en marcha su perfeccionamiento? ¿Cómo contar esto sin que algún payaso lo descalifique diciendo que es pura “propaganda chavista?
Esta noche millones de libros ya duermen en las casas de millones de venezolanos. Cosa nunca antes vista. Esta noche las condiciones y las posibilidades indican que, de esos millones, alguna parte, ojala muy grande, paseará sus ojos entre las líneas de esos libros que ya no son negocio exclusivo de las corporaciones editoriales. Paseará sus ojos y sus ideas entre las ideas de algún autor que, dicho sea, jamás imagino ver multiplicada su obra en las proporciones en que se ha multiplicado gracias a la Revolución venezolana.
Esta noche millones de libros nuevos ya se imprimen para que salgan a las calles y a las casas muy pronto. Esta noche los Ministros de Cuba y Venezuela reposarán, sus no pocas horas de trabajo bajo el sol caribeño, sobre la responsabilidad de seguir, en cantidad y calidad, enriqueciéndose con la riqueza cultural que está sembrada y ya anuncia frutos. Los veremos al Alba, ni duda cabe. Mientras, algunos privilegiados que estuvimos y vimos semejante fiesta de libros, iremos por el mundo a contar cómo un pueblo en Revolución es capaz de regalarse los libros que necesita su libertad sin dejar de romper otras tantas cadenas iguales o peores que la ignorancia. Contar cómo éste pueblo en Revolución se gana el derecho de garantizarse sus derechos a fuerza de organizarse y dar la batalla de las ideas. Y, por si fuese poco, regalarnos el ejemplo.
sexta-feira, 29 de maio de 2009
Seminário Portos e cidades
SEMINÁRIO:
PORTOS E CIDADES: Economia, Sociedade e as Articulações do Brasil com o Mundo Atlântico
Organização: Polis – Laboratório de História Econômico-Social da UFF
ESTRUTURA DO SEMINÁRIO
22 e 26 de junho - Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Filosofia - Universidade Federal Fluminense
Na parte da manhã teremos as sessões de comunicação e mesas redondas e às tardes, oficinas de trabalho e conferências.
INSCRIÇÕES
Os interessados deverão enviar a ficha de inscrição constante no final desta convocatória para o endereço eletrônico portosecidades@ gmail.com constando o resumo da comunicação, caso vá apresentar trabalho( especialmente alunos de Graduação e Pós-Graduação). No primeiro dia do Seminário, os inscritos confirmarão a presença através do pagamento da taxa de R$20,00 (vinte reais) junto à secretaria do seminário e receberão os certificados.
Até o dia 05 de junho, os inscritos que forem apresentar comunicação, deverão enviar por e-mail a versão final do trabalho completo a ser publicado em formato de cd-rom.
O RESUMO NÃO DEVERÁ EXCEDER A CINCO LINHAS. O TRABALHO COMPLETO ½ E TER NO MÁXIMO 20 PÁGINAS INCLUINDO BIBLIOGRAFIA E ANEXOS.
Algumas as comunicações a serem apresentadas serão selecionadas pela Comissão Organizadora e comporão futuramente um livro onde também serão incluidos os textos das conferências
CONFERÊNCIAS CONFIRMADAS
PROF. catedrático Miguel Suarez Bosa (ULPGC-Espanha); pROF tITULAR Geraldo de Beauclair Mendes de Oliveira(História/UFF), Profa titular Ana Fani Paulo (Geografia UFF ), Profa Doutora Ismênia de Lima Martinsm.
OFICINA DE TRABALHO (Coordenadores confirmados)
Antonio Edmilson Rodrigues (UERJ/PUC); Beatriz Kuchner (AGCRJ/UFF),Bernardo Kocher (PPGH/UFF), Carlos Gabriel Guimarães (PPGH/UFF), Cezar Honorato (PPGH/UFF), Fernando Sergio Dumas dos Santos (FIOCRUZ:), Flávio Gonçalves dos Santos (UESC), Gizlene Neder (PPGH/UFF), Gladys Sabina Ribeiro (PPGH/UFF), Luiz Cláudio Ribeiro (UFES), Marcelo Badaró Mattos (PPGH/UFF), Maria Fernanda Bicalho (PPGH/UFF), Marcelo Bittencourt (PPGH/UFF), Maria da Penha S. Siqueira (UFES:), Martha Abreu (PPGH/UFF), Monica Martins (UFRRJ), Romyr Conde Garcia (UNEMAT/UFF), Suely Gomes Costa (UFF); Tania Maria de Castro Netto (Fac.Educação/UERJ), Theo Lombarinhas Piñeiro (PPGH/UFF) Ricardo Holanda (FCS/UERJ) Tâmara Tânia Cohen Egler (IPPUR/UFRJ) e Frédéric Monié (GEO/UFRJ)
PORTOS E CIDADES: Economia, Sociedade e as Articulações do Brasil com o Mundo Atlântico
Organização: Polis – Laboratório de História Econômico-Social da UFF
ESTRUTURA DO SEMINÁRIO
22 e 26 de junho - Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Filosofia - Universidade Federal Fluminense
Na parte da manhã teremos as sessões de comunicação e mesas redondas e às tardes, oficinas de trabalho e conferências.
INSCRIÇÕES
Os interessados deverão enviar a ficha de inscrição constante no final desta convocatória para o endereço eletrônico portosecidades@ gmail.com constando o resumo da comunicação, caso vá apresentar trabalho( especialmente alunos de Graduação e Pós-Graduação). No primeiro dia do Seminário, os inscritos confirmarão a presença através do pagamento da taxa de R$20,00 (vinte reais) junto à secretaria do seminário e receberão os certificados.
Até o dia 05 de junho, os inscritos que forem apresentar comunicação, deverão enviar por e-mail a versão final do trabalho completo a ser publicado em formato de cd-rom.
O RESUMO NÃO DEVERÁ EXCEDER A CINCO LINHAS. O TRABALHO COMPLETO ½ E TER NO MÁXIMO 20 PÁGINAS INCLUINDO BIBLIOGRAFIA E ANEXOS.
Algumas as comunicações a serem apresentadas serão selecionadas pela Comissão Organizadora e comporão futuramente um livro onde também serão incluidos os textos das conferências
CONFERÊNCIAS CONFIRMADAS
PROF. catedrático Miguel Suarez Bosa (ULPGC-Espanha); pROF tITULAR Geraldo de Beauclair Mendes de Oliveira(História/UFF), Profa titular Ana Fani Paulo (Geografia UFF ), Profa Doutora Ismênia de Lima Martinsm.
OFICINA DE TRABALHO (Coordenadores confirmados)
Antonio Edmilson Rodrigues (UERJ/PUC); Beatriz Kuchner (AGCRJ/UFF),Bernardo Kocher (PPGH/UFF), Carlos Gabriel Guimarães (PPGH/UFF), Cezar Honorato (PPGH/UFF), Fernando Sergio Dumas dos Santos (FIOCRUZ:), Flávio Gonçalves dos Santos (UESC), Gizlene Neder (PPGH/UFF), Gladys Sabina Ribeiro (PPGH/UFF), Luiz Cláudio Ribeiro (UFES), Marcelo Badaró Mattos (PPGH/UFF), Maria Fernanda Bicalho (PPGH/UFF), Marcelo Bittencourt (PPGH/UFF), Maria da Penha S. Siqueira (UFES:), Martha Abreu (PPGH/UFF), Monica Martins (UFRRJ), Romyr Conde Garcia (UNEMAT/UFF), Suely Gomes Costa (UFF); Tania Maria de Castro Netto (Fac.Educação/UERJ), Theo Lombarinhas Piñeiro (PPGH/UFF) Ricardo Holanda (FCS/UERJ) Tâmara Tânia Cohen Egler (IPPUR/UFRJ) e Frédéric Monié (GEO/UFRJ)
quinta-feira, 28 de maio de 2009
O autêntico socialismo renascerá sobre as cinzas do capitalismo - por Mario Bunge
O artigo "El auténtico socialismo renacerá sobre las cenizas del capitalismo
Mario Bunge" é a conclusão de uma palestra realizada recentemente em Lima por Mario Bunge, o maior filósofo latino-americano, reconhecido internacionalmente no século XX.
O texto foi cedido pelo seu autor a redação do Sin Permiso. O texto integral, "Socialismo, ontem, hoje e amanhã", que também está na base das duas palestras que fez em Barcelona e Madrid, vai ser publicado na versão em papel do SinPermiso semestre.
[ leia na íntegra ]
Mario Bunge" é a conclusão de uma palestra realizada recentemente em Lima por Mario Bunge, o maior filósofo latino-americano, reconhecido internacionalmente no século XX.
O texto foi cedido pelo seu autor a redação do Sin Permiso. O texto integral, "Socialismo, ontem, hoje e amanhã", que também está na base das duas palestras que fez em Barcelona e Madrid, vai ser publicado na versão em papel do SinPermiso semestre.
[ leia na íntegra ]
sábado, 23 de maio de 2009
Atílio Borón ganha prêmio Martí da UNESCO
mi querido Atilio,
Nada más bello que tener tu nombre asociado a Martí. Es un premio importante y es un paso a más en la consagración de tu obra intelectual y de tu trabajo de organizador y difusor de cultura.
mis congratulaciones,
Theotonio
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boron escreveu:
Buenos Aires, 19.5.09
Estimad@s:
Con gran satisfacción les re-envío la carta en donde se me comunica que la UNESCO me ha otorgado el Premio Internacional José Martí, mismo que, según rezan las bases del concurso, se le confiere a "una persona, un grupo de personas, una institución o una organización no gubernamental, de cualquier región del mundo, que haya contribuido de manera fundamental con sus acciones, tanto a la unidad y la integración de los países de América Latina y el Caribe, así como a la preservación de las identidades, tradiciones culturales y valores históricos de estos países." Los ganadores de las ediciones anteriores de este premio fueron Hugo Chávez Frías (2005), Pablo González Casanova (2003) y Osvaldo Guayasamín, (laureado póstumamente en 1999).
La ceremonia de entrega del premio tendrá lugar en La Habana el día 17 de Julio del corriente año, en coincidencia con el 32º aniversario de la creación del Centro de Estudios Martianos que preside don Armando Hart.
Quería compartir con todos mis amig@s y colegas la gran felicidad que me embarga en este momento (sobre todo luego del duro trance por el que junto a mi familia pasamos hace escasamente un mes) y asegurarles que el reconocimiento que implica este premio me dará más fuerzas para seguir trabajando sin desmayos en la promoción y la difusión del pensamiento crítico y las ideas y los valores emancipatorios sintetizados en la figura del Apóstol de la Revolución Cubana, hoy más actuales y necesarios que nunca.
Nada más por ahora. Va un emocionado abrazo de
Atilio
ps: sigue la carta de la Secretaria del Jurado y, en el anexo, la del Director General de la UNESCO y mi carta de aceptación del Premio.
___________________________________________________________________________________
De: Von Furstenberg, Christina
Asunto: FELICITACIONES!
Para: "Atilio A. Boron"
Fecha: viernes, 15 de mayo de 2009, 11:52 am
*Muy Estimado Atilio:*
* *
*Es mi privilegio entregarte, en forma electrónica en anexo, la
carta oficial que acaba de finalizar y firmar el Director General
de la UNESCO: por favor, recibe mis más _cordiales felicitaciones
por tu nombramiento como laureado de la quinta edición del Premio
Internacional UNESCO José Martí!! _Se juntan a estas
felicitaciones todos mis colegas del Sector de Ciencias sociales
de la UNESCO! *
* *
*Favor confirma me tu dirección postal en la cual podemos mandar
el original - con certidumbre absoluta que llegue bien -, para
hacerte presente las felicitaciones del Director General y la
invita a Cuba para la ceremonia.*
* *
*Cuando habrás reaccionado a la carta del Director general, -¡si
aceptas recibir el premio!, el servicio de prensa de la
organización se encargará de la comunicación oficial de estas
buenas noticias!*
* *
*Aprovecho la ocasión para reiterarte todos mis buenos deseos y
felicitaciones!*
* *
*Christina von Furstenberg*
*A cargo del Secretariado del Premio Internacional UNESCO José Martí*
*Dr. Atilio A. Boron*
Director del PLED, Programa Latinoamericano de
Educación a Distancia en Ciencias Sociales
http://www.centrocultural.coop/pled
http://www.centrocultural.coop/pled
http://www.atilioboron.com/
Nada más bello que tener tu nombre asociado a Martí. Es un premio importante y es un paso a más en la consagración de tu obra intelectual y de tu trabajo de organizador y difusor de cultura.
mis congratulaciones,
Theotonio
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boron escreveu:
Buenos Aires, 19.5.09
Estimad@s:
Con gran satisfacción les re-envío la carta en donde se me comunica que la UNESCO me ha otorgado el Premio Internacional José Martí, mismo que, según rezan las bases del concurso, se le confiere a "una persona, un grupo de personas, una institución o una organización no gubernamental, de cualquier región del mundo, que haya contribuido de manera fundamental con sus acciones, tanto a la unidad y la integración de los países de América Latina y el Caribe, así como a la preservación de las identidades, tradiciones culturales y valores históricos de estos países." Los ganadores de las ediciones anteriores de este premio fueron Hugo Chávez Frías (2005), Pablo González Casanova (2003) y Osvaldo Guayasamín, (laureado póstumamente en 1999).
La ceremonia de entrega del premio tendrá lugar en La Habana el día 17 de Julio del corriente año, en coincidencia con el 32º aniversario de la creación del Centro de Estudios Martianos que preside don Armando Hart.
Quería compartir con todos mis amig@s y colegas la gran felicidad que me embarga en este momento (sobre todo luego del duro trance por el que junto a mi familia pasamos hace escasamente un mes) y asegurarles que el reconocimiento que implica este premio me dará más fuerzas para seguir trabajando sin desmayos en la promoción y la difusión del pensamiento crítico y las ideas y los valores emancipatorios sintetizados en la figura del Apóstol de la Revolución Cubana, hoy más actuales y necesarios que nunca.
Nada más por ahora. Va un emocionado abrazo de
Atilio
ps: sigue la carta de la Secretaria del Jurado y, en el anexo, la del Director General de la UNESCO y mi carta de aceptación del Premio.
___________________________________________________________________________________
De: Von Furstenberg, Christina
Asunto: FELICITACIONES!
Para: "Atilio A. Boron"
Fecha: viernes, 15 de mayo de 2009, 11:52 am
*Muy Estimado Atilio:*
* *
*Es mi privilegio entregarte, en forma electrónica en anexo, la
carta oficial que acaba de finalizar y firmar el Director General
de la UNESCO: por favor, recibe mis más _cordiales felicitaciones
por tu nombramiento como laureado de la quinta edición del Premio
Internacional UNESCO José Martí!! _Se juntan a estas
felicitaciones todos mis colegas del Sector de Ciencias sociales
de la UNESCO! *
* *
*Favor confirma me tu dirección postal en la cual podemos mandar
el original - con certidumbre absoluta que llegue bien -, para
hacerte presente las felicitaciones del Director General y la
invita a Cuba para la ceremonia.*
* *
*Cuando habrás reaccionado a la carta del Director general, -¡si
aceptas recibir el premio!, el servicio de prensa de la
organización se encargará de la comunicación oficial de estas
buenas noticias!*
* *
*Aprovecho la ocasión para reiterarte todos mis buenos deseos y
felicitaciones!*
* *
*Christina von Furstenberg*
*A cargo del Secretariado del Premio Internacional UNESCO José Martí*
*Dr. Atilio A. Boron*
Director del PLED, Programa Latinoamericano de
Educación a Distancia en Ciencias Sociales
http://www.centrocultural.coop/pled
http://www.centrocultural.coop/pled
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sexta-feira, 22 de maio de 2009
América Latina, um continente agnóstico? - uma outra resposta a Fiori - por Adrián Sotelo Valencia
Mais um artigo de polêmica em resposta ao artigo (artigo na Carta Maior) do cientista social brasileiro José Luís Fiori, do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia Política Internacional da UFRJ. Dessa vez, o artigo de resposta foi escrita pelo professor Prof. Adrián Sotelo Valencia, do Centro de Estudos Latino-Americanos da UNAM.
A polêmica - só para lembrar leia aqui o texto de Fiori e a resposta de Nildo Ouriques - é se existe uma teoria social latino-americana e se ela explica a realidade da região mesmo após as recentes transformações capitalistas. A posição de Fiori é que não existe um pensamento latino-americano - todas as correntes que aqui existiram/existem são/eram versões das correntes do pensamento existente na Europa Ocidental e América do Norte e não conseguiram oferecer um alternativa a esquerda da região.
Adrián Sotelo Valencia segue a mesma linha de Nildo Ouriques e a aperfeiçoa, destacando o fato percebido por ambos, que José Luís Fiori segue a lógica do chamado pensamento "paulista", que ignora deliberadamente a Teoria Marxista da dependência e seus autores, e incorre na armadilha de vários deles, que ou se renderam à esparrela neoliberal ou estão aprisionados à ilusão do projeto de desenvolvimento nacional por dentro do capitalismo.
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América Latina, ¿un continente agnóstico?
por Adrián Sotelo, para Rebelión
En un artículo reciente: "América Latina, um continente sem teoría" José Luís Fiori postula que "ya no existe una teoría que sea capaz de leer e interpretar la historia del continente, y fundamentar una estrategia coherente de construcción del futuro…" Para ello hace un somero repaso de la teoría liberal, después identifica tres corrientes del pensamiento latinoamericano inmersas en la llamada teoría de la dependencia para, por último, sustentar esa tesis central a partir de la conversión al neoliberalismo de los principales pensadores e intelectuales de una de esas corrientes encabezada por el sociólogo Fernando Herique Cardoso y su escuela de la dependencia.
En un acto que ya no sabe uno si es de prestidigitación o de mala fe el profesor Fiori nos cuenta y descubre que "América Latina carece de una teoría", es decir, de un pensamiento propio en el que apoyarse para pensar, entender y analizar la inserción del continente en el concierto internacional. Borra de un plumazo toda la tradición intelectual y teórica latinoamericana construida en los últimos ochenta años para informaros que se desencadenó un "apagón mental" que dejó en tinieblas la comprensión teórica y crítica de nuestro continente latinoamericano. Para ello nos recuerda lo obvio: que históricamente la teoría liberal (ahora neoliberal, agregamos nosotros) nunca construyó ─ni le interesó hacerlo─ un pensamiento propio sobre América Latina, simplemente porque no lo necesitaba y por el hecho de que bastaba su propia dominación económica, política y militar para imponer su visión del mundo de acuerdo con los postulados e intereses imperiales. Y evidentemente Fiori tiene toda la razón: desde la colonia, pasando por la independencia política de nuestros países latinoamericanos y la formación de sus Estados nacionales, hasta su conformación en modernos sistemas económicos capitalistas, dependientes, subdesarrollados y atrasados hasta le fecha (2009), los liberales de toda estirpe, desde la derecha hasta la ultraderecha y las vertientes socialdemócratas de moda, se dieron a la tarea de legitimar y justificar las relaciones de dominación económicas y políticas entre el llamado "centro", es decir, el imperialismo" y los países de la periferia subordinados estructuralmente a él, o sea, los países dependientes.
No hay que ser muy "letrados" para entender que el mejor tratado ultraliberal que consagra esta "amnesia epistemológica" con evidentes objetivos políticos, es el libro del norteamericano Walt Whitman Rostow 1 que , por cierto, tiene un subtitulo curioso pero significativo: un manifiesto no comunista . El objetivo fundamental del libro (como el de todos los liberales) es el de justificar teórica e ideológicamente la dominación que ejerce el imperialismo norteamericano sobre los países del (mal) llamado "tercer mundo" y de América Latina, en particular, sobre todo después de la segunda guerra mundial, con un afán estratégico: opacar el esfuerzo y el significado histórico que para los pueblos y la humanidad representó la gesta de la Revolución Cubana, que rompió con el "paradigma" del desarrollo capitalista impuesto por las potencias hegemónicas y por la misma CEPAL. Aquí, en este libro que comentamos, la historia del desarrollo en general es una sucesión y repetición de cinco etapas que, indefectiblemente asegura su autor, todos los países tienen que recorrer para "alcanzar" su "desarrollo". 2
Es obvio que el "modelo" ideal de economía y sociedad que está detrás de las formulaciones liberales y reaccionarias del desarrollo capitalista, es el representado por Estados Unidos y su american way of life , así como por algunos países imperialistas como Inglaterra o Francia, en el contorno del cual los subdesarrollados y, en particular, los de América Latina, se tienen irremediablemente que encuadrar. Toda la economía neoclásica conservadora, en distintos niveles de abstracción metodológica, repite este esquema lineal, idealista, descriptivo y a-histórico del desarrollo, lo mismo que la sociología funcionalista que floreció en Europa y Estados Unidos y que fue utilizada como marco teórico en América Latina por autores como, por ejemplo, Gino Germani. Aunque debemos reconocer que este autor la retoma de una manera crítica para formular una teoría de la transición y del cambio social a partir de la construcción de un modelo dicotómico de economía y de sociedad. 3 Otros autores como Aldo Solari o José Medina Echevarría avanzaron por la misma senda, aunque el último bajo el prisma teórico de Max Weber.
Para "sustentar" su afirmación de que América es un continente "sin teoría" (es decir: un "continente agnóstico"), Fiori identifica tres corrientes o vertientes de la teoría de la dependencia que, supuestamente, surgieron tanto del "desencanto" del "modelo" de industrialización por sustitución de importaciones pregonado por la CEPAL como "vía" del desarrollo, así como de la crítica de las tesis que desde la III Internacional bajo la hegemonía de Moscú ─y después de la segunda guerra mundial─ levantaron los Partidos Comunistas Latinoamericanos sustentadas en una caracterización de América Latina a partir de la articulación de los modos de producción y de una alianza estratégica antiimperialista de las "burguesías preventivas" con las fuerzas populares y progresistas que afianzaran la transición al socialismo.4 Como se sabe esta estrategia hizo trizas con el golpe militar de 1973 en Chile que depuso al gobierno constitucional de la Unidad Popular y fortaleció y extendió el ciclo de las dictaduras militares en América Latina que, por cierto, contribuyeron para acelerar y difundir el "apagón mental" a que hace referencia Fiori.
Las críticas no se hicieron esperar y autores como Ruy Mauro Marini, creador de la vertiente marxista de la teoría de la dependencia, junto con otros como Theotónio Dos Santos y Vania Bambirra en Brasil, las caracterizaron de endogenistas , en virtud del predominio que este tipo de análisis le otorga a los "factores internos" en la determinación del subdesarrollo y del atraso, tales como la acumulación originaria del capital, las estructuras de clase, la naturaleza del modo de producción o la dinámica de los mercados internos, colocando el mercado mundial y la división internacional del trabajo como "factores secundarios y externos".5
Otro autor que se abocó a la crítica del endogenismo en la versión del marxismo ortodoxo y de las tesis de la supuesta existencia del feudalismo en América Latina, fue André Gunder Frank en obras capitales donde demostró la existencia y continuidad del desarrollo capitalista en América Latina desde la temprana expansión colonial de las potencias ibéricas.6 De aquí su fórmula del desarrollo (capitalista) del subdesarrollo (también capitalista).
Las tres vertientes de la dependencia que identifica Fiori —y que para él representa "l a última tentativa de teorización latinoamericana del siglo XX"— que surgieron, además, al calor de acontecimientos históricos como el estallido y triunfo de la Revolución Cubana en enero de 1959, la crisis capitalista y la sucesión de golpes militares que se extenderán a lo largo de las décadas de los sesenta y setenta del siglo pasado en América Latina, las identifica como: a) la marxista que, según él, consideraba que el imperialismo y el desarrollo capitalista de los países centrales "impedían" el desarrollo del capitalismo dependiente, tesis que resulta completamente falsa en los que respecta a los autores marxistas de la dependencia; b) la "cepalina" que postulaba la industrialización por sustitución de importaciones, la expansión de los mercados internos y la implementación de reformas estructurales para "afianzar" el desarrollo. Por último, c) la "cepalino-marxista" que comanda el sociólogo y luego presidente del Brasil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso 7 , y que Fiori considera que es la que "tuvo más larga vida y efectos más "sorprendentes" debido a tres razones fundamentales: 1) porque defiende la viabilidad del capitalismo, 2) porque sustenta una estrategia de desarrollo "dependiente y asociado" con los países centrales (¿?), y 3) porque de esta corriente salieron algunos líderes e intelectuales de la "restauración neoliberal" como el mismo FHC, Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira o Guido Mantega, actual Secretario de Hacienda de Brasil del gobierno lulista.
Hay que aclarar que tanto Bresser como Mantega mantienen la misma opinión que Fiori, el primero cuando habla de la "nueva dependencia" y del "social-desarrollismo" y el segundo cuando se encuadra en autores que, dice, pertenecen a la "nueva izquierda" de los años sesenta y setenta del siglo pasado. Lo sustancial en los tres (Bresser, Mantega y Fiori) radica en que le atribuyen a esta corriente de pensamiento 8 , indebidamente, la paternidad de la teoría de la dependencia, escondiendo que ésta representa sólo una de sus vertientes, al lado de la teoría marxista de la dependencia que es la que trasciende el universo teórico-ideológico del reformismo.
En un importante ensayo 9 Marini crítica y desnuda las tesis sociologistas y socialdemócratas de Fernando Henrique Cardoso y José Serra —y, por ende, las del grupo de representan― y las caracteriza como un "neo-desarrollismo vergonzante" (p. 103) que, en al ámbito brasileño, filtra las tesis de la "interdependencia" y ubica al Brasil frente a un desarrollo al estilo norteamericano y europeo que lo coloca en el mismo rango que los países desarrollados borrando todas las diferencias estructurales en materia de dependencia (económica, financiera, científica y tecnológica). Por eso no extraña en absoluto que Fiori capte el momento predominante del "apagón mental" que, según él, ocurre en América Latina con el abandono del "latinoamericanismo" por parte de uno de los más prominentes representantes de esta corriente de pensamiento: Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira ─ que por cierto caracterizó el golpe militar de 1964 en su país como "la revolución del 64" 10 ─ cuando éste se adhiere al liberalismo a secas. Lo que ocurre, y oculta Fiori, es que efectivamente se apagó y dejó de existir esa corriente weberiana y reformista de la dependencia, y con mayor fuerza, con la conversión y la praxis neoliberal de Cardoso como presidente del Brasil11 —junto a otras como las endogenistas que desaparecieron de la faz de la tierra con la extinción de los partidos comunistas y de la Unión Soviética—. Pero de ninguna manera se sofocó o se acabaron las teorías latinoamericanas como piensa Fiori. Por el contrario estas fueron víctimas del neoliberalismo y del pensamiento único, sobre todo en las décadas de los ochenta y noventa del siglo pasado, cuando se les impusieron los marcos teórico-ideológicos de las formulaciones eurocéntricas y neoliberales sustentadas en las reformas del Estado y del mercado. En la actualidad asistimos a un gran esfuerzo de resurrección del marxismo, del pensamiento crítico y de la teoría de la dependencia frente a la crisis global del capitalismo y de sus principales formas dominantes de pensamiento. El objetivo consiste en renovar nuestro pensamiento, reformular categorías y conceptos y paralelamente, buscar los caminos y estrategias de la transición que transciendan radicalmente el orden civilizatorio del capitalismo en crisis.
Por otro lado, la vertiente marxista de la dependencia nunca postuló, como afirma Fiori (recordando y asumiendo las tesis de Cardoso y de su escuela), que el desarrollo capitalista quedará bloqueado debido a la existencia del imperialismo y de su dinámica de desarrollo en los centros. Esta es una mala interpretación de todo un debate que ocurrió en América Latina en el curso de las décadas de los sesenta y setenta del siglo pasado. Cardoso achaca a la teoría de la dependencia, en particular a la vertiente marxista, ser portadora de “tesis estancacionistas”, pero el mismo Marini se encargó en varias ocasiones de aclarar el tema al respecto y enfatizar que la teoría de la dependencia nunca postuló una concepción estancacionista del desarrollo capitalista en América Latina y en general en los países dependientes. Por el contrario, demostró que fueron precisamente autores como Celso Furtado y el mismo Cardoso, así como el chileno Aníbal Pinto, quienes asumieron las tesis del estancamiento económico latinoamericano pidiendo a gritos la intervención del Estado para "salvar" al sistema. Por ejemplo, el enfoque estructuralista de Celso Furtado le permite inferir una tendencia hacia el estancamiento económico de América Latina, debido, entre otros factores, al estrangulamiento del crecimiento que provocan tanto la propensión a la concentración del progreso técnico en las unidades productivas más eficientes y rentables como la aguda concentración del ingreso. Es así como expresa Celso Furtado que "En el caso más general, la declinación en la eficiencia económica provoca directamente el estancamiento económico"12 y más adelante concluye: "En este sentido se puede atribuir al problema del estancamiento económico un carácter estructural".13
En cambio en Marini abundan pasajes en sus obras donde se puede inferir que para él, el capitalismo se desarrolla (no se estanca) en conjunción con su carácter dependiente del capitalismo mundial. Por ejemplo cuando afirma que: "La economía exportadora es, pues, algo más que el producto de una economía internacional fundada en la especialización productiva: es una formación social basada en el modo capitalista de producción, que acentúa hasta el límite las contradicciones que le son propias. Al hacerlo, configura de manera específica las relaciones de explotación en que se basa, y crea un ciclo de capital que tiende a reproducir en escala ampliada la dependencia en que se encuentra frente a la economía internacional".14
La economía industrial latinoamericana emerge —sobre las bases socio-económicas y políticas de la vieja economía exportadora que se desarrolló entre 1850 y 1930-50, según los países— en el período de la industrialización por sustitución de importaciones para el mercado interno que ocurre entre 1930-1950 y finales de la década de los setenta del siglo pasado profundizando el capitalismo, el atraso y la dependencia.15 Por lo tanto, concluimos que las tesis de Marini son exactamente el anverso de las que postulan el estancamiento del capitalismo y que, por el contrario, demuestran fehacientemente que el desarrollo del modo de producción capitalista universal con eje en los centros, y comandado por el imperialismo norteamericano, genera desarrollo capitalista en las periferias, pero dependiente, profundizando los fenómenos de dependencia, subdesarrollo y atraso para los países y la población. A lo que coadyuva, contrariamente a los postulados de la economía neoclásica y del neo-estructuralismo, como el de Fiori16, el desarrollo tecnológico, la aplicación de la ciencia a los procesos productivos y la inversión extranjera directa que se aplica en las economías dependientes de América Latina y que históricamente no han hecho más que acelerar las transferencias de valor y de plusvalor (en una suerte de afirmación y profundización del intercambio desigual) hacia las economías del capitalismo desarrollado y engrosar el endeudamiento externo de la región.17
Estas reflexiones eran necesarias para mostrar que el tema de la dependencia no está acabado; por el contrario requiere desarrollar la teoría ciertamente, creando nuevas categorías y conceptos analíticos sobre la base de la recuperación de nuestro extenso y rico pensamiento teórico y crítico latinoamericano. América Latina tiene pueblos e intelectuales comprometidos con el quehacer de nutrir un pensamiento propio y autónomo en función de la crítica de todas las teorías dominantes del orden capitalista existente con el afán de trascenderlo.
Finalmente, frente al anuncio soberano de Fiori en relación con el hecho de que "en el caso de los intelectuales progresistas del continente, es una mala noticia saber que ya no existe una teoría capaz de leer e interpretar la historia del continente, y fundamentar una estrategia coherente de construcción del futuro", la buena consiste en comunicar que los pueblos, las comunidades, los intelectuales progresistas y de izquierda y los movimientos populares se están dando a la tarea de construir sus propias teorías, con fuerte raigambre en el marxismo y en el pensamiento crítico, para forjar sus propias concepciones acerca del cambio social y la transición de América Latina en el contexto de la crisis estructural y civilizatoria del modo capitalista de producción y de sus marcos teóricos e ideológicos que construyó el capitalismo y el imperialismo en los últimos 200 años.
1 Walt Whitman Rostow, Las etapas del crecimiento económico, publicado originalmente en 1960, en castellano el Fondo de Cultura Económica lo editó en México en 1974.
2En este proceso el "desarrollo" se divide en cinco etapas lineales y sucesivas: a) la sociedad tradicional, b) las condiciones previas para el impulso inicial o despegue c) el impulso inicial propiamente dicho, ch) la madurez y, por último, e) el consumo de masas de bienes y servicios por la población, Rostow, op. cit., p. 16. Realizamos una crítica a esta formulación en nuestro libro: América Latina, de crisis y paradigmas: la teoría de la dependencia en siglo XXI, coedición Editorial Plaza y Valdés-FCPyS-UOM, México, 2005 . Existe edición en portugués: Teoria da Dependência e Desenvolvimento do Capitalismo na América Latina, Editora Praxis, Londrina, Parana, Brasil, 2008. Al respecto véase también la respuesta de André Gunder Frank a dos ultraliberales, "Carta abierta acerca de Chile a Arnold Harberger y Milton Friedman", Bogotá, Ideología y Sociedad , enero-marzo de 1977, pp. 61-90.
3 Véase: Gino Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 1968, así como sus libros: La sociología en la América Latina, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1964 y Sociología de la modernización, Buenos Aires, Paidós. 1969.
4 Al respecto véanse de Agustín Cueva, "Itinerario del marxismo latinoamericano", en Nexos, núm. 102, México, 1986, pp. 25-37; El desarrollo de capitalismo en América Latina, México, Siglo xxi, 1993,14ª edición y " Problemas y perspectivas de la teoría de la dependencia", en revista Historia y Sociedad, núm. 3, México otoño de 1974, pp. 55-77.
5 V éase: Ruy Mauro Marini, América Latina: dependência e integração, Sao Paulo, Brasil Urgente, 1992.
6 Capitalismo y subdesarrollo en América Latina, Buenos Aires, Siglo xxi, 1974 y El subdesarrollo del desarrollo. Un ensayo autobiográfico, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad, 1991, sin olvidar su libro: Lumpenburguesía : lumpendesarrollo , Santiago de Chile, Ediciones Periferia, 1973. Publicada en 1949, con su categoría de capitalismo colonial , consideramos la obra de Sergio Bagú, Economía de la sociedad colonial. Ensayo de historia comparada de América Latina, México, 1992, coedición, Grijalbo-Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, como pionera de los estudios sobre la naturaleza del capitalismo en América Latina.
7 Fernando Henrique Cardoso y Enzo Faletto, Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina, México, Siglo xxi, 1969. Esta obra sirve de marco teórico a la corriente reformista y weberiana de los autores de la dependencia como es el caso, por ejemplo, de Lidia Goldenstein, Repensando a dependencia, Paz e Terra, 1994, donde sostiene que la "salida" de la crisis y la recuperación del crecimiento en Brasil radica en profundizar el modelo capitalista, y no en superarlo, como sería, en consecuencia, el planteamiento clásico de la vertiente marxista de la dependencia.
8 Para una crítica de estos autores véase: Carlos Eduardo Martins y Adrián Sotelo Valencia, "La teoría de la dependencia y el pensamiento crítico brasileño, crítica a Luiz Carlos Bresser y a Guido Mantega", en Aportes, núm. 7, México, Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, enero-abril de 1998, pp. 73-93. Hay versión en portugués: "A teoria da dependencia e o pensamento economico brasileiro-critica a Bresser e Mantega", en la Memoria del III Encontro Nacional de Economia Politica, Volumen I, Universidad Federal Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, junio de 1998, pp. 416-431.
9 Ruy Mauro Marini, "Las razones del neo-desarrollismo" (respuesta a Fernando Enrique Cardoso y José Serra), Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Año XL/VOL. XL, Núm. Extraordinario (E), México, IIS-UNAM, pp. 1978: 57-106.
10 Cf. Carlos Eduardo Martins y Adrián Sotelo, op. cit., p. 74.
11 Para ubicar las tesis neoliberales de la interdependencia de Cardoso, se puede consultar su: A arte da política. A história que vivi, C ivilização Brasileira, RJ, 2006.
12 Celso Furtado, Subdesarrollo y estancamiento en América Latina, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1966, p. 97.
13 Ibíd., p. 100.
14 Ruy Mauro Marini, Dialéctica de la dependencia, ERA, México, 1973, p. 53.
15 Debemos aclarar que en el caso de Brasil el proceso industrializador se extiende hasta los primeros años de la década de los noventa, especialmente, hasta el final del gobierno de José Sarney (marzo de 1985-marzo de 1990). El neoliberalismo se va a profundizar con el gobierno de Fernando Collor de Melo (marzo de 1990-diciembre de 1992) cuando, por ejemplo, en México ya llevaba por lo menos una década de imposición. Para un análisis del proceso neoliberal en Brasil a través de gobiernos aparentemente diferentes como los de FHC y de Lula, consúltese el libro de Ricardo Antunes, A desertificação neoliberal no Brasil (Collor, FHC e Lula), Autores Associados, São Paulo, 2004.
16 De este Autor véase su O Vôo da Coruja. Para reler o desenvolvimentismo brasileiro, Editora Record, RJ- São Paulo, 2003. Versión neo-estructuralista del desarrollo apoyada en la teoría de la larga duración de F. Braudel para analizar la articulación entre estructura y coyuntura en el marco de la democratización del Estado (capitalista) brasileño.
17 Esta tesis la desarrolla Marini en: “El ciclo del capital en la economía dependiente”, en Úrsula Oswald (coord.), Mercado y dependencia, México, Nueva Imagen, 1979, pp. 37-55.
A polêmica - só para lembrar leia aqui o texto de Fiori e a resposta de Nildo Ouriques - é se existe uma teoria social latino-americana e se ela explica a realidade da região mesmo após as recentes transformações capitalistas. A posição de Fiori é que não existe um pensamento latino-americano - todas as correntes que aqui existiram/existem são/eram versões das correntes do pensamento existente na Europa Ocidental e América do Norte e não conseguiram oferecer um alternativa a esquerda da região.
Adrián Sotelo Valencia segue a mesma linha de Nildo Ouriques e a aperfeiçoa, destacando o fato percebido por ambos, que José Luís Fiori segue a lógica do chamado pensamento "paulista", que ignora deliberadamente a Teoria Marxista da dependência e seus autores, e incorre na armadilha de vários deles, que ou se renderam à esparrela neoliberal ou estão aprisionados à ilusão do projeto de desenvolvimento nacional por dentro do capitalismo.
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América Latina, ¿un continente agnóstico?
por Adrián Sotelo, para Rebelión
En un artículo reciente: "América Latina, um continente sem teoría" José Luís Fiori postula que "ya no existe una teoría que sea capaz de leer e interpretar la historia del continente, y fundamentar una estrategia coherente de construcción del futuro…" Para ello hace un somero repaso de la teoría liberal, después identifica tres corrientes del pensamiento latinoamericano inmersas en la llamada teoría de la dependencia para, por último, sustentar esa tesis central a partir de la conversión al neoliberalismo de los principales pensadores e intelectuales de una de esas corrientes encabezada por el sociólogo Fernando Herique Cardoso y su escuela de la dependencia.
En un acto que ya no sabe uno si es de prestidigitación o de mala fe el profesor Fiori nos cuenta y descubre que "América Latina carece de una teoría", es decir, de un pensamiento propio en el que apoyarse para pensar, entender y analizar la inserción del continente en el concierto internacional. Borra de un plumazo toda la tradición intelectual y teórica latinoamericana construida en los últimos ochenta años para informaros que se desencadenó un "apagón mental" que dejó en tinieblas la comprensión teórica y crítica de nuestro continente latinoamericano. Para ello nos recuerda lo obvio: que históricamente la teoría liberal (ahora neoliberal, agregamos nosotros) nunca construyó ─ni le interesó hacerlo─ un pensamiento propio sobre América Latina, simplemente porque no lo necesitaba y por el hecho de que bastaba su propia dominación económica, política y militar para imponer su visión del mundo de acuerdo con los postulados e intereses imperiales. Y evidentemente Fiori tiene toda la razón: desde la colonia, pasando por la independencia política de nuestros países latinoamericanos y la formación de sus Estados nacionales, hasta su conformación en modernos sistemas económicos capitalistas, dependientes, subdesarrollados y atrasados hasta le fecha (2009), los liberales de toda estirpe, desde la derecha hasta la ultraderecha y las vertientes socialdemócratas de moda, se dieron a la tarea de legitimar y justificar las relaciones de dominación económicas y políticas entre el llamado "centro", es decir, el imperialismo" y los países de la periferia subordinados estructuralmente a él, o sea, los países dependientes.
No hay que ser muy "letrados" para entender que el mejor tratado ultraliberal que consagra esta "amnesia epistemológica" con evidentes objetivos políticos, es el libro del norteamericano Walt Whitman Rostow 1 que , por cierto, tiene un subtitulo curioso pero significativo: un manifiesto no comunista . El objetivo fundamental del libro (como el de todos los liberales) es el de justificar teórica e ideológicamente la dominación que ejerce el imperialismo norteamericano sobre los países del (mal) llamado "tercer mundo" y de América Latina, en particular, sobre todo después de la segunda guerra mundial, con un afán estratégico: opacar el esfuerzo y el significado histórico que para los pueblos y la humanidad representó la gesta de la Revolución Cubana, que rompió con el "paradigma" del desarrollo capitalista impuesto por las potencias hegemónicas y por la misma CEPAL. Aquí, en este libro que comentamos, la historia del desarrollo en general es una sucesión y repetición de cinco etapas que, indefectiblemente asegura su autor, todos los países tienen que recorrer para "alcanzar" su "desarrollo". 2
Es obvio que el "modelo" ideal de economía y sociedad que está detrás de las formulaciones liberales y reaccionarias del desarrollo capitalista, es el representado por Estados Unidos y su american way of life , así como por algunos países imperialistas como Inglaterra o Francia, en el contorno del cual los subdesarrollados y, en particular, los de América Latina, se tienen irremediablemente que encuadrar. Toda la economía neoclásica conservadora, en distintos niveles de abstracción metodológica, repite este esquema lineal, idealista, descriptivo y a-histórico del desarrollo, lo mismo que la sociología funcionalista que floreció en Europa y Estados Unidos y que fue utilizada como marco teórico en América Latina por autores como, por ejemplo, Gino Germani. Aunque debemos reconocer que este autor la retoma de una manera crítica para formular una teoría de la transición y del cambio social a partir de la construcción de un modelo dicotómico de economía y de sociedad. 3 Otros autores como Aldo Solari o José Medina Echevarría avanzaron por la misma senda, aunque el último bajo el prisma teórico de Max Weber.
Para "sustentar" su afirmación de que América es un continente "sin teoría" (es decir: un "continente agnóstico"), Fiori identifica tres corrientes o vertientes de la teoría de la dependencia que, supuestamente, surgieron tanto del "desencanto" del "modelo" de industrialización por sustitución de importaciones pregonado por la CEPAL como "vía" del desarrollo, así como de la crítica de las tesis que desde la III Internacional bajo la hegemonía de Moscú ─y después de la segunda guerra mundial─ levantaron los Partidos Comunistas Latinoamericanos sustentadas en una caracterización de América Latina a partir de la articulación de los modos de producción y de una alianza estratégica antiimperialista de las "burguesías preventivas" con las fuerzas populares y progresistas que afianzaran la transición al socialismo.4 Como se sabe esta estrategia hizo trizas con el golpe militar de 1973 en Chile que depuso al gobierno constitucional de la Unidad Popular y fortaleció y extendió el ciclo de las dictaduras militares en América Latina que, por cierto, contribuyeron para acelerar y difundir el "apagón mental" a que hace referencia Fiori.
Las críticas no se hicieron esperar y autores como Ruy Mauro Marini, creador de la vertiente marxista de la teoría de la dependencia, junto con otros como Theotónio Dos Santos y Vania Bambirra en Brasil, las caracterizaron de endogenistas , en virtud del predominio que este tipo de análisis le otorga a los "factores internos" en la determinación del subdesarrollo y del atraso, tales como la acumulación originaria del capital, las estructuras de clase, la naturaleza del modo de producción o la dinámica de los mercados internos, colocando el mercado mundial y la división internacional del trabajo como "factores secundarios y externos".5
Otro autor que se abocó a la crítica del endogenismo en la versión del marxismo ortodoxo y de las tesis de la supuesta existencia del feudalismo en América Latina, fue André Gunder Frank en obras capitales donde demostró la existencia y continuidad del desarrollo capitalista en América Latina desde la temprana expansión colonial de las potencias ibéricas.6 De aquí su fórmula del desarrollo (capitalista) del subdesarrollo (también capitalista).
Las tres vertientes de la dependencia que identifica Fiori —y que para él representa "l a última tentativa de teorización latinoamericana del siglo XX"— que surgieron, además, al calor de acontecimientos históricos como el estallido y triunfo de la Revolución Cubana en enero de 1959, la crisis capitalista y la sucesión de golpes militares que se extenderán a lo largo de las décadas de los sesenta y setenta del siglo pasado en América Latina, las identifica como: a) la marxista que, según él, consideraba que el imperialismo y el desarrollo capitalista de los países centrales "impedían" el desarrollo del capitalismo dependiente, tesis que resulta completamente falsa en los que respecta a los autores marxistas de la dependencia; b) la "cepalina" que postulaba la industrialización por sustitución de importaciones, la expansión de los mercados internos y la implementación de reformas estructurales para "afianzar" el desarrollo. Por último, c) la "cepalino-marxista" que comanda el sociólogo y luego presidente del Brasil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso 7 , y que Fiori considera que es la que "tuvo más larga vida y efectos más "sorprendentes" debido a tres razones fundamentales: 1) porque defiende la viabilidad del capitalismo, 2) porque sustenta una estrategia de desarrollo "dependiente y asociado" con los países centrales (¿?), y 3) porque de esta corriente salieron algunos líderes e intelectuales de la "restauración neoliberal" como el mismo FHC, Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira o Guido Mantega, actual Secretario de Hacienda de Brasil del gobierno lulista.
Hay que aclarar que tanto Bresser como Mantega mantienen la misma opinión que Fiori, el primero cuando habla de la "nueva dependencia" y del "social-desarrollismo" y el segundo cuando se encuadra en autores que, dice, pertenecen a la "nueva izquierda" de los años sesenta y setenta del siglo pasado. Lo sustancial en los tres (Bresser, Mantega y Fiori) radica en que le atribuyen a esta corriente de pensamiento 8 , indebidamente, la paternidad de la teoría de la dependencia, escondiendo que ésta representa sólo una de sus vertientes, al lado de la teoría marxista de la dependencia que es la que trasciende el universo teórico-ideológico del reformismo.
En un importante ensayo 9 Marini crítica y desnuda las tesis sociologistas y socialdemócratas de Fernando Henrique Cardoso y José Serra —y, por ende, las del grupo de representan― y las caracteriza como un "neo-desarrollismo vergonzante" (p. 103) que, en al ámbito brasileño, filtra las tesis de la "interdependencia" y ubica al Brasil frente a un desarrollo al estilo norteamericano y europeo que lo coloca en el mismo rango que los países desarrollados borrando todas las diferencias estructurales en materia de dependencia (económica, financiera, científica y tecnológica). Por eso no extraña en absoluto que Fiori capte el momento predominante del "apagón mental" que, según él, ocurre en América Latina con el abandono del "latinoamericanismo" por parte de uno de los más prominentes representantes de esta corriente de pensamiento: Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira ─ que por cierto caracterizó el golpe militar de 1964 en su país como "la revolución del 64" 10 ─ cuando éste se adhiere al liberalismo a secas. Lo que ocurre, y oculta Fiori, es que efectivamente se apagó y dejó de existir esa corriente weberiana y reformista de la dependencia, y con mayor fuerza, con la conversión y la praxis neoliberal de Cardoso como presidente del Brasil11 —junto a otras como las endogenistas que desaparecieron de la faz de la tierra con la extinción de los partidos comunistas y de la Unión Soviética—. Pero de ninguna manera se sofocó o se acabaron las teorías latinoamericanas como piensa Fiori. Por el contrario estas fueron víctimas del neoliberalismo y del pensamiento único, sobre todo en las décadas de los ochenta y noventa del siglo pasado, cuando se les impusieron los marcos teórico-ideológicos de las formulaciones eurocéntricas y neoliberales sustentadas en las reformas del Estado y del mercado. En la actualidad asistimos a un gran esfuerzo de resurrección del marxismo, del pensamiento crítico y de la teoría de la dependencia frente a la crisis global del capitalismo y de sus principales formas dominantes de pensamiento. El objetivo consiste en renovar nuestro pensamiento, reformular categorías y conceptos y paralelamente, buscar los caminos y estrategias de la transición que transciendan radicalmente el orden civilizatorio del capitalismo en crisis.
Por otro lado, la vertiente marxista de la dependencia nunca postuló, como afirma Fiori (recordando y asumiendo las tesis de Cardoso y de su escuela), que el desarrollo capitalista quedará bloqueado debido a la existencia del imperialismo y de su dinámica de desarrollo en los centros. Esta es una mala interpretación de todo un debate que ocurrió en América Latina en el curso de las décadas de los sesenta y setenta del siglo pasado. Cardoso achaca a la teoría de la dependencia, en particular a la vertiente marxista, ser portadora de “tesis estancacionistas”, pero el mismo Marini se encargó en varias ocasiones de aclarar el tema al respecto y enfatizar que la teoría de la dependencia nunca postuló una concepción estancacionista del desarrollo capitalista en América Latina y en general en los países dependientes. Por el contrario, demostró que fueron precisamente autores como Celso Furtado y el mismo Cardoso, así como el chileno Aníbal Pinto, quienes asumieron las tesis del estancamiento económico latinoamericano pidiendo a gritos la intervención del Estado para "salvar" al sistema. Por ejemplo, el enfoque estructuralista de Celso Furtado le permite inferir una tendencia hacia el estancamiento económico de América Latina, debido, entre otros factores, al estrangulamiento del crecimiento que provocan tanto la propensión a la concentración del progreso técnico en las unidades productivas más eficientes y rentables como la aguda concentración del ingreso. Es así como expresa Celso Furtado que "En el caso más general, la declinación en la eficiencia económica provoca directamente el estancamiento económico"12 y más adelante concluye: "En este sentido se puede atribuir al problema del estancamiento económico un carácter estructural".13
En cambio en Marini abundan pasajes en sus obras donde se puede inferir que para él, el capitalismo se desarrolla (no se estanca) en conjunción con su carácter dependiente del capitalismo mundial. Por ejemplo cuando afirma que: "La economía exportadora es, pues, algo más que el producto de una economía internacional fundada en la especialización productiva: es una formación social basada en el modo capitalista de producción, que acentúa hasta el límite las contradicciones que le son propias. Al hacerlo, configura de manera específica las relaciones de explotación en que se basa, y crea un ciclo de capital que tiende a reproducir en escala ampliada la dependencia en que se encuentra frente a la economía internacional".14
La economía industrial latinoamericana emerge —sobre las bases socio-económicas y políticas de la vieja economía exportadora que se desarrolló entre 1850 y 1930-50, según los países— en el período de la industrialización por sustitución de importaciones para el mercado interno que ocurre entre 1930-1950 y finales de la década de los setenta del siglo pasado profundizando el capitalismo, el atraso y la dependencia.15 Por lo tanto, concluimos que las tesis de Marini son exactamente el anverso de las que postulan el estancamiento del capitalismo y que, por el contrario, demuestran fehacientemente que el desarrollo del modo de producción capitalista universal con eje en los centros, y comandado por el imperialismo norteamericano, genera desarrollo capitalista en las periferias, pero dependiente, profundizando los fenómenos de dependencia, subdesarrollo y atraso para los países y la población. A lo que coadyuva, contrariamente a los postulados de la economía neoclásica y del neo-estructuralismo, como el de Fiori16, el desarrollo tecnológico, la aplicación de la ciencia a los procesos productivos y la inversión extranjera directa que se aplica en las economías dependientes de América Latina y que históricamente no han hecho más que acelerar las transferencias de valor y de plusvalor (en una suerte de afirmación y profundización del intercambio desigual) hacia las economías del capitalismo desarrollado y engrosar el endeudamiento externo de la región.17
Estas reflexiones eran necesarias para mostrar que el tema de la dependencia no está acabado; por el contrario requiere desarrollar la teoría ciertamente, creando nuevas categorías y conceptos analíticos sobre la base de la recuperación de nuestro extenso y rico pensamiento teórico y crítico latinoamericano. América Latina tiene pueblos e intelectuales comprometidos con el quehacer de nutrir un pensamiento propio y autónomo en función de la crítica de todas las teorías dominantes del orden capitalista existente con el afán de trascenderlo.
Finalmente, frente al anuncio soberano de Fiori en relación con el hecho de que "en el caso de los intelectuales progresistas del continente, es una mala noticia saber que ya no existe una teoría capaz de leer e interpretar la historia del continente, y fundamentar una estrategia coherente de construcción del futuro", la buena consiste en comunicar que los pueblos, las comunidades, los intelectuales progresistas y de izquierda y los movimientos populares se están dando a la tarea de construir sus propias teorías, con fuerte raigambre en el marxismo y en el pensamiento crítico, para forjar sus propias concepciones acerca del cambio social y la transición de América Latina en el contexto de la crisis estructural y civilizatoria del modo capitalista de producción y de sus marcos teóricos e ideológicos que construyó el capitalismo y el imperialismo en los últimos 200 años.
1 Walt Whitman Rostow, Las etapas del crecimiento económico, publicado originalmente en 1960, en castellano el Fondo de Cultura Económica lo editó en México en 1974.
2En este proceso el "desarrollo" se divide en cinco etapas lineales y sucesivas: a) la sociedad tradicional, b) las condiciones previas para el impulso inicial o despegue c) el impulso inicial propiamente dicho, ch) la madurez y, por último, e) el consumo de masas de bienes y servicios por la población, Rostow, op. cit., p. 16. Realizamos una crítica a esta formulación en nuestro libro: América Latina, de crisis y paradigmas: la teoría de la dependencia en siglo XXI, coedición Editorial Plaza y Valdés-FCPyS-UOM, México, 2005 . Existe edición en portugués: Teoria da Dependência e Desenvolvimento do Capitalismo na América Latina, Editora Praxis, Londrina, Parana, Brasil, 2008. Al respecto véase también la respuesta de André Gunder Frank a dos ultraliberales, "Carta abierta acerca de Chile a Arnold Harberger y Milton Friedman", Bogotá, Ideología y Sociedad , enero-marzo de 1977, pp. 61-90.
3 Véase: Gino Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 1968, así como sus libros: La sociología en la América Latina, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1964 y Sociología de la modernización, Buenos Aires, Paidós. 1969.
4 Al respecto véanse de Agustín Cueva, "Itinerario del marxismo latinoamericano", en Nexos, núm. 102, México, 1986, pp. 25-37; El desarrollo de capitalismo en América Latina, México, Siglo xxi, 1993,14ª edición y " Problemas y perspectivas de la teoría de la dependencia", en revista Historia y Sociedad, núm. 3, México otoño de 1974, pp. 55-77.
5 V éase: Ruy Mauro Marini, América Latina: dependência e integração, Sao Paulo, Brasil Urgente, 1992.
6 Capitalismo y subdesarrollo en América Latina, Buenos Aires, Siglo xxi, 1974 y El subdesarrollo del desarrollo. Un ensayo autobiográfico, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad, 1991, sin olvidar su libro: Lumpenburguesía : lumpendesarrollo , Santiago de Chile, Ediciones Periferia, 1973. Publicada en 1949, con su categoría de capitalismo colonial , consideramos la obra de Sergio Bagú, Economía de la sociedad colonial. Ensayo de historia comparada de América Latina, México, 1992, coedición, Grijalbo-Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, como pionera de los estudios sobre la naturaleza del capitalismo en América Latina.
7 Fernando Henrique Cardoso y Enzo Faletto, Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina, México, Siglo xxi, 1969. Esta obra sirve de marco teórico a la corriente reformista y weberiana de los autores de la dependencia como es el caso, por ejemplo, de Lidia Goldenstein, Repensando a dependencia, Paz e Terra, 1994, donde sostiene que la "salida" de la crisis y la recuperación del crecimiento en Brasil radica en profundizar el modelo capitalista, y no en superarlo, como sería, en consecuencia, el planteamiento clásico de la vertiente marxista de la dependencia.
8 Para una crítica de estos autores véase: Carlos Eduardo Martins y Adrián Sotelo Valencia, "La teoría de la dependencia y el pensamiento crítico brasileño, crítica a Luiz Carlos Bresser y a Guido Mantega", en Aportes, núm. 7, México, Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, enero-abril de 1998, pp. 73-93. Hay versión en portugués: "A teoria da dependencia e o pensamento economico brasileiro-critica a Bresser e Mantega", en la Memoria del III Encontro Nacional de Economia Politica, Volumen I, Universidad Federal Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, junio de 1998, pp. 416-431.
9 Ruy Mauro Marini, "Las razones del neo-desarrollismo" (respuesta a Fernando Enrique Cardoso y José Serra), Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Año XL/VOL. XL, Núm. Extraordinario (E), México, IIS-UNAM, pp. 1978: 57-106.
10 Cf. Carlos Eduardo Martins y Adrián Sotelo, op. cit., p. 74.
11 Para ubicar las tesis neoliberales de la interdependencia de Cardoso, se puede consultar su: A arte da política. A história que vivi, C ivilização Brasileira, RJ, 2006.
12 Celso Furtado, Subdesarrollo y estancamiento en América Latina, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1966, p. 97.
13 Ibíd., p. 100.
14 Ruy Mauro Marini, Dialéctica de la dependencia, ERA, México, 1973, p. 53.
15 Debemos aclarar que en el caso de Brasil el proceso industrializador se extiende hasta los primeros años de la década de los noventa, especialmente, hasta el final del gobierno de José Sarney (marzo de 1985-marzo de 1990). El neoliberalismo se va a profundizar con el gobierno de Fernando Collor de Melo (marzo de 1990-diciembre de 1992) cuando, por ejemplo, en México ya llevaba por lo menos una década de imposición. Para un análisis del proceso neoliberal en Brasil a través de gobiernos aparentemente diferentes como los de FHC y de Lula, consúltese el libro de Ricardo Antunes, A desertificação neoliberal no Brasil (Collor, FHC e Lula), Autores Associados, São Paulo, 2004.
16 De este Autor véase su O Vôo da Coruja. Para reler o desenvolvimentismo brasileiro, Editora Record, RJ- São Paulo, 2003. Versión neo-estructuralista del desarrollo apoyada en la teoría de la larga duración de F. Braudel para analizar la articulación entre estructura y coyuntura en el marco de la democratización del Estado (capitalista) brasileño.
17 Esta tesis la desarrolla Marini en: “El ciclo del capital en la economía dependiente”, en Úrsula Oswald (coord.), Mercado y dependencia, México, Nueva Imagen, 1979, pp. 37-55.
Novo site sobre Marini
O CEME (Centro de Estudos Miguel Enríquez) entidade chilena, acabou de organizar um portal (O Archivo Chile - www.archivochile.com) com banco de informações sobre autores latino-americanos, entre eles destaca-se Ruy Mauro Marini, com um site próprio, pensador cuja obra vem sendo recuperada nos últimos tempos. Lá se encontram vários textos disponíveis (a maioria em espanhol).
quinta-feira, 21 de maio de 2009
Participação na I Jornada Latino-americana de Pensamento Crítico, da UNRC
Na terça-feira, 12 de maio, ocorreu um debate com a presença de Theotonio dos Santos, como parte dos eventos I Jornadas Latinoamericanas de Pensamiento Crítico: Economía y política em la crisis general del capitalismo, realizada em Río Cuarto, Argentina. Estas jornadas dão um passo à frente num renascimento do pensamento crítico em toda a região.
A jornada foi organizada pela Facultad de Ciencias Económicas e Programa Pensamiento Crítico Latinoamerciano da UNRC (Universidade Nacional de Río Cuarto, Argentina) e do Postgrado en Estudios Latinoamericanos de la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales da UNAM (Universidade Nacional Autônoma do México, México).
Na mesa junto a Theotonio dos Santos, estavam Julio Gambina e Pedro Brieger.Foram discutidos os elementos estruturais e conjunturais da presente crise internacional e o seu desdobramento econômicos, sociais, políticos e teóricos.
sábado, 16 de maio de 2009
El mundo en que vivimos es el mundo del mercado monopolista - Vídeo
Theotonio Dos Santos - discurso - "El mundo en que vivimos es el mundo no es el mundo del libro mercado, el mundo en que vivimos es el mundo del mercado monopolista"
filmagem de conferência pronunciada durante o X "Encuentro Internacional de Economistas Globalización y problemas del desarrollo" - ocorrido de 3 a 7 de março de 2008 - no Palacio de Convenciones, La Habana, Cuba.
filmagem de conferência pronunciada durante o X "Encuentro Internacional de Economistas Globalización y problemas del desarrollo" - ocorrido de 3 a 7 de março de 2008 - no Palacio de Convenciones, La Habana, Cuba.
sexta-feira, 15 de maio de 2009
A Economia Venezuela frente à Crise Mundial, por Luciano Wexell Severo
almir
divulgar este trabalho com uma advertencia:
PODE PARECER PROPAGANDA QUANDO COMPARADO ÀS INVENCIONICES DA CHAMADA GRANDE IMPRENSA, MAS É UM ARTIGO SERIO E MUITO BEM FUNDAMENTADO.
theotonio
***
A Economia Venezuelana frente à Crise Mundial
Luciano Wexell Severo[1]
A maioria das análises sobre a situação atual da economia venezuelana se sustenta essencialmente em três idéias: 1) que o governo Chávez recebeu uma chuva de dólares durante os últimos anos, como resultado dos elevados preços internacionais do petróleo, 2) que o governo Chávez não soube investir esses volumosos recursos no estímulo da diversificação produtiva, aplicando uma política econômica desastrosa e assistencialista, através das Missões Sociais e 3) que agora, com o barril de petróleo tipo Brent custando cerca de 50 dólares, a Venezuela e a sua estatal petroleira (PDVSA) estão “quebradas”. Trataremos de demonstrar neste artigo que essas três afirmações são bastante imprecisas.
Vale dizer que entre 1999 e 2008 a economia venezuelana viveu cinco etapas diferentes e claramente definidas: 1) A posse, em fevereiro de 1999, frente a um cenário econômico, político e institucional adverso (o país amargava a herança dos períodos de desinvestimento e desindustrialização dos anos oitenta e noventa, e o preço do barril de petróleo estava no seu nível mais baixo desde 1973); 2) A adoção de medidas intervencionistas e políticas mais desenvolvimentistas, a partir do segundo semestre de 1999; 3) O golpe de Estado e a “sabotagem econômica”, aplicados pela oposição, entre o quarto trimestre de 2001 e o terceiro de 2003, como reação ao aumento da intervenção estatal na economia; 4) A reativação econômica a partir do quarto trimestre de 2003, desde um patamar bastante superior em relação à situação anterior: o Estado passou a interferir de forma mais decisiva nas questões econômicas (especialmente na PDVSA); 5) A política de “semear o petróleo” e o avanço rumo ao “socialismo bolivariano”, o esforço pela diversificação produtiva, por um novo processo de industrialização, pelo pagamento da elevada dívida social acumulada durante décadas e a expansão do poder estatal e popular sobre os setores estratégicos da economia (Severo, 2009, p.4).
Um estudo desenvolvido pelo então denominado Ministério de Finanças (Venezuela, 2004, p.5) demonstra que o valor em dólares per capita recebido pelo atual governo através das exportações petroleiras foi, pelo menos até a metade de 2005, inferior ao recebido durante as cinco administrações anteriores: 26% do valor recebido pelo primeiro governo de Andrés Pérez (1974-79); 35% do recebido por Herrera Campins (1979-84); 56% do recebido por Lusinchi (1984-89); 49% do recebido pelo segundo mandato de Pérez (1989-93); e 85% do recebido pelo segundo mandato de Caldera (1994-98). É necessário tomar em conta dois fatores: 1) que os preços de comparação devem ser expressados em valores constantes, não constantes e 2) que a população da Venezuela mais que dobrou entre os anos 1973 e 2005. Por isso se conclui que até 2005 o governo Chávez não contou com uma “chuva” de petrodólares, muito pelo contrário. Apesar disso, o gasto social aumentou de 8,2% do PIB em 1998 para 13,6% do PIB em 2006. Tomando em conta as contribuições realizadas pela PDVSA, os gastos sociais alcançaram 20,9% do PIB e em termos per capita aumentaram quatro vezes em relação a 1998 (Weisbrot & Sandoval, 2008, p.14).
A efervescência da economia da Venezuela tem sido resultado direto, mas não exclusivo, da expansão dos preços do petróleo até alcançar 135,2 dólares por barril tipo Brent em julho de 2008 (em dezembro os preços tinham desmoronado para 43,4 dólares; atualmente já estão na casa dos 56 dólares). O petróleo é e continuará sendo por muito tempo o suporte da economia venezuelana. Entretanto, há duas novidades: 1) em 2003, o Estado venezuelano recuperou o controle sobre a indústria petroleira, reduzindo a drenagem de recursos para o exterior e também a concentração interna da renda; e 2) desde então, o país está depositando parcelas crescentes dos recursos petroleiros nos setores produtivos, na estruturação e fortalecimento do mercado interno, em um processo de industrialização soberana (com capitais majoritariamente venezuelanos, aquisição de tecnologia, capacitação de mão de obra local e crescente incorporação de valor agregado nacional). Por esse motivo, é equivocada a idéia de que na Venezuela se adota uma economia artificial e miseravelmente assistencialista.
Os principais mecanismos utilizados pelo governo venezuelano para estimular o crescimento econômico e a diversificação produtiva foram, entre outros: 1) o resgate da PDVSA para o controle estatal, já que desde sua criação em 1976 a empresa funcionou como um estado dentro do Estado. Esta primeira ação possibilitou em grande medida a aplicação das demais; 2) o controle de câmbio, de capitais e de preços, que têm sido eficientes para frear a deterioração da moeda nacional e as fugas de capital, seja através da especulação internacional com o bolívar, de remessas de lucros ao exterior ou de importações supérfluas; 3) a nacionalização via pagamento de indenizações de empresas estratégicas dos setores de comunicações, eletricidade, alimentação e construção, além de instituições financeiras; e 4) a reforma da Lei do Banco Central da Venezuela, que estabeleceu um teto anual para as reservas internacionais; os valores que superem o teto determinado devem ser transferidos para o Fundo de Desenvolvimento Nacional –FONDEN, cujo objetivo é financiar setores como indústrias pesadas, indústrias de transformação, agricultura, petroquímica, gás, infra-estrutura, transportes e habitação, entre outros. Desde sua criação, em 2005, foram repassados somente pela PDVSA ao FONDEN cerca de 21,8 bilhões de dólares (Chávez, 2009, p.23).
A Venezuela não somente desenhou e pôs em prática iniciativas para “semear o petróleo” como inclusive tornou-se um dos países do mundo que mais investe atualmente: a participação da Formação Bruta de Capital Fixo (FBKF) no PIB chega perto dos 30%; segundo a CEPAL, a média latino-americana é de 20%. Há diversas obras de grande porte em plena execução neste momento: novas refinarias de petróleo, fábricas de cimento, de laminação de alumínio, de papel e celulose, siderúrgicas para a produção de aços navais, especiais e inoxidável, fábricas de tubos petroleiros, de trilhos e vagões, de concentração de mineral de ferro, produtos linha branca, carros e tratores, processadoras de leite, serrarias de madeira, planos agrícolas, assim como mega-projetos de infra-estrutura: portos, aeroportos, pontes, linhas de metrô, ferrovias, estradas, termoelétricas, hidrelétricas, gasodutos, redes de fibra óptica (para telefonia e Internet), redes de distribuição de água, entre outros. Essas iniciativas estão distribuídas geograficamente por todos os estados, com o objetivo de desconcentrar a população que vive essencialmente no litoral caribenho e de ocupar o território nacional. As empresas criadas serão financiadas tanto por capitais públicos quanto privados, tanto de venezuelanos quanto de estrangeiros (especialmente de China, Índia, Rússia, Bielorússia, Irã, Cuba e Brasil, mas também Estados Unidos e Japão, entre outros).
Na maioria dessas iniciativas, o Estado conservará pelo menos 51% da participação acionária. Apesar da queda do preço do petróleo, o governo tem reafirmado seu compromisso pela continuidade de algumas dessas obras, assim como pela manutenção dos programas sociais, do baixo índice desemprego (cerca de 7,3%, em março) e do rendimento salarial dos trabalhadores. Veremos, a seguir, como isso seria possível.
Alguns “analistas” liberais, ostentando uma suposta preocupação com o desempenho fiscal, sustentaram nos últimos anos que o aumento do gasto público na Venezuela apresenta uma tendência “insustentável”. Na realidade, os dados demonstram o contrário. Enquanto o gasto público passou de 21,4% do PIB em 1998 para 30,0% em 2006, o aumento das receitas do Estado foi ainda maior: de 17,4% para 30,0% do PIB. Quer dizer, apesar da ocorrência de déficits fiscais, as receitas aumentaram a um ritmo maior do que as despesas; o que garante a sustentabilidade fiscal. Para alcançar esses resultados, foi decisiva a aplicação da Lei de Hidrocarbonetos (que aumentou a arrecadação estatal sobre as petroleiras estrangeiras) e tem sido importante o papel do Serviço Nacional Integrado de Administração Aduaneira e Tributária –SENIAT. Além disso, os Orçamentos Anuais foram calculados utilizando como base um preço do petróleo muito inferior ao preço real. Por exemplo, em 2005 foi usado o preço de 23 dólares por barril, quando custava 41 dólares; em 2007, foi utilizada a base de 29 dólares, quando o preço real era de 65 dólares. Em 2008, apesar dos elevados preços, se estimou em 35 dólares. Em 2009, se utilizou como base 60 dólares e depois, frente à crise, foi reconsiderado para 40 dólares. Desta forma se acumularam elevadas receitas extraordinárias, que foram usadas para alimentar as reservas internacionais e conseqüentemente o FONDEN.
Por isso, as bases utilizadas para profetizar a “quebra da PDVSA” e a “falência da economia venezuelana” soam exageradamente simplórias. Essas análises partem de duas observações verdadeiras, mas culminam em duas conclusões equivocadas: é certo que 1) a Venezuela depende da exportação do petróleo, responsável por mais de 90% das vendas totais ao exterior e que 2) os preços internacionais do petróleo caíram de quase 140 para menos de 40 dólares em cinco meses. Entretanto, tais constatações não têm relação com as conclusões: 1) que a Venezuela desperdiçou novamente, assim como havia feito durante os anos setenta, a chance de diversificar a sua economia e de romper com a excessiva dependência do petróleo e 2) que não haverá dólares suficientes para manter os compromissos assumidos com as Missões Sociais, a única medida do governo “populista”.
Para fundamental tomar em conta que o país obteve elevados superávits comerciais com o mundo entre 2004 e 2008: totalizaram mais de 155 bilhões de dólares. Por sua vez, o saldo positivo em conta corrente também acumulou mais de 100 bilhões de dólares nos últimos três anos. Se durante a “sabotagem petroleira” de 2002-2003, as reservas internacionais caíram até chegar perto dos 13 bilhões de dólares, atualmente superam os 80 bilhões (incluem as reservas oficiais do BCV –30 bilhões, recursos do FONDEN, da PDVSA, da Tesouraria Nacional e do Fundo Conjunto China-Venezuela).
Nos últimos anos, a Venezuela construiu um “colchão” de recursos e adotou medidas para proteger a economia da especulação financeira internacional, como o controle de câmbio e de capitais. Essas medidas serão muito importantes para enfrentar a atual conjuntura internacional. A orientação atual do governo é fazer frente à crise através do aumento dos gastos, dos investimentos e do endividamento público. Isso é possível porque as dívidas públicas externa e interna foram bastante reduzidas como porcentagem do PIB desde 1998, quando representaram 25,5% e 5%, respectivamente. Em 2003, no epicentro da crise política e econômica promovida pela oposição, alcançaram níveis estratosféricos: 29,7% e 17,9% do PIB, respectivamente. Em 2007, já se via a redução de ambas: a externa (de cerca de 52,9 bilhões de dólares, segundo a CEPAL) representou 12,0% e a interna 7,3% do PIB. Em 2008, a dívida pública total representou 14,3% do PIB, bastante inferior aos níveis de 1989 (83,6%), 1995 (69,2%), 1999 (29,5%) e 2003 (47,6%). O nível atual é o mais baixo dos últimos trinta anos e um dos menores da região (Severo, 2009, p.28).
Entre o quarto trimestre de 2003 e o quarto de 2008, o PIB cresceu 94,7%: a economia da Venezuela acumulou 21 trimestres de permanentes elevações, a uma taxa média de 13,5% (Weisbrot, 2009, p.6). Desde 2004, o PIB não petroleiro cresceu a taxas significativamente maiores que o PIB petroleiro. Também foi expressiva a aceleração do PIB manufatureiro entre 2004 e 2008, verificada especialmente no aumento do consumo de eletricidade, nas vendas de veículos, cimento, produtos longos para a construção civil, ferro, aço e alumínio, entre outros. Dentro da indústria manufatureira, as áreas da atividade econômica que mais cresceram foram: elaboração de alimentos, bebidas e tabaco, couro e calçado, edição e impressão, minerais não metálicos, pneumáticos e produtos plásticos, fabricação de veículos automotores, e fabricação de máquinas e equipamentos. Esses resultados devem melhorar ainda mais quando se façam sentir plenamente os impactos de importantes medidas governamentais dirigidas ao estímulo das empresas privadas nacionais. Segundo Weisbrot (2009, p.9), “apesar da expansão do setor público durante os anos de Chávez, o setor privado cresceu mais rapidamente”. O atual nível dos preços do petróleo tem gerado uma redução no ritmo de crescimento da economia de aproximadamente 8% anuais para cerca de 4% –recentemente a CEPAL previu alta de 1% do PIB venezuelano em 2009, ainda acima da média regional (-0,3%). Segundo Weisbrot & Sandoval (2008, p.4), “a um preço inferior aos 45 dólares por barril para o petróleo venezuelano [atualmente está cotado um pouco acima desse valor], o país começaria a registrar resultados deficitários em sua conta corrente. Entretanto, dado que a Venezuela tem aproximadamente 82 bilhões de dólares em reservas, poderia financiar um modesto déficit em conta corrente por algum tempo –por exemplo, mesmo que o preço do petróleo se mantivesse nos baixos níveis atuais durante os próximos dois anos”. Ambos autores interpretam que a maioria dos prognósticos negativos sobre a economia da Venezuela se sustentam em argumentos bastante frágeis.
No caso da PDVSA, muitos “analistas” desconhecem ou se esqueceram que em 2007 a empresa terminou o ano como a estatal petroleira mais sólida da América Latina. Naquele momento contava com 107 bilhões de ativos totais e um patrimônio consolidado mundial de 53,8 bilhões, que garantiam uma relação dívida/ativos de 14,96% e uma relação dívida/patrimônio de 29,72%. Até setembro passado (antes da crise), os indicadores financeiros da empresa haviam melhorado: os ativos totais aumentaram em 32,7%, o patrimônio consolidado mundial cresceu 29,9% e a dívida caiu -7,4%. Com isso, a relação dívida/ativos diminuiu para 10,45% e a relação dívida/patrimônio, para 20,36% (PDVSA, 2008, p.13). Ainda não foram divulgados os dados referentes ao quarto trimestre de 2008, que devem indicar uma piora com relação à situação anterior, mas não a “falência” da empresa. É importante desmistificar a idéia difundida pelos grandes meios de comunicação –estreitamente relacionados com as transnacionais petroleiras, com os bancos privados e com a meritocracia corrupta que dirigiu a PDVSA até 2003– de que o governo Chávez debilitou a empresa. Muito pelo contrário, além da PDVSA ter sido colocada a serviço dos interesses da Venezuela e dos venezuelanos, foi robustecida a partir de então. As atuais negociações de dívidas com fornecedores nacionais e estrangeiros, tão insistentemente divulgadas nos últimas semanas, não refletem nem a “falência” nem uma grande debilidade da estatal, mas sim a utilização da crise como uma oportunidade para fazer o que todas as empresas do mundo estão tentando fazer: renegociar suas dívidas.
Além de esforçar-se para depositar os recursos do petróleo na diversificação produtiva, o governo venezuelano tem investido nas chamadas Missões Sociais. Segundo dados do Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas (INE) e da CEPAL, a pobreza continua diminuindo na Venezuela, um dos países que mais se destaca no cumprimento das “Metas do Milênio”. O Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano (IDH) melhorou muito nos dez anos de governo Chávez. O último resultado divulgado pelo PNUD, referente ao ano 2006, demonstra que na Venezuela o IDH alcançou 0,826, enquanto em 2004 foi de 0,810 e em 2000 foi de 0,776 (Severo, 2007). É interessante observar que o IDH da Venezuela cresceu bem mais que o de outros países exportadores de petróleo com IDH semelhante. Outra informação relevante: o Informe de Desenvolvimento Humano 2007-2008 do PNUD demonstra que entre 1975 e 1980 –período de altos preços do petróleo– o IDH da Venezuela aumentou somente de 0,723 para 0,737. Ou seja, os resultados atuais são expressivos: cerca de 2.733.108 venezuelanos abandonaram a condição de pobreza. Por outro lado, o coeficiente Gini caiu de 0,4865 em 1998 para 0,4200 em 2007, representando a diminuição nas disparidades da concentração de renda na sociedade venezuelana (Severo, 2009, p.32).
Concluímos com algumas considerações do atual ministro de Economia e Finanças da Venezuela, Alí Rodríguez Araque (2008): “A Revolução Bolivariana não surgiu porque os preços do petróleo estavam muito altos, nem se manteve principalmente porque estivessem altos. Precisamente, o governo do presidente Hugo Chávez começou em um momento de profunda depressão dos preços do petróleo. De maneira que a Revolução Bolivariana nem começa com preços altos do petróleo nem vai terminar porque baixaram esses preços”.
BIBLIOGRAFIA UTILIZADA:
CEPAL. Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (1999-2008). Estudio Económico de América Latina y el Caribe y Balance preliminar de las economías de América Latina y el Caribe. Página: http://www.cepal.org
CHÁVEZ, Hugo (2009). Mensaje anual a la Nación del Presidente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, el 13 de enero de 2009 [Cadena nacional de radio y televisión].
PDVSA. Información Financiera y Operacional de PDVSA, al 31 de septiembre de 2008. Ministerio de Energía y Petróleo, Caracas, 2008.
RODRÍGUEZ ARAQUE, Alí. “El petróleo y la Revolución Bolivariana”. Argenpress, 23 dic 2008. [Entrevista concedida a Ernesto Carmona].
SEVERO, Luciano Wexell. “Desafíos de la Venezuela Saudita”. Le Monde Diplomatique, El dipló. Bogotá: año V, 54 ed., mar 2007.
______. “Sembrando petróleo, La economía venezolana, 1999-2008”. Desde Abajo, Bogotá, 20 feb - 20 mar 2009.
VENEZUELA. Ministerio de Finanzas. “La fábula de los ‘enormes’ ingresos petroleros”, Caracas, jun 2004.
WEISBROT, Mark & SANDOVAL, Luis. “Actualización: La economía venezolana en tiempos de Chávez”. Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington, D.C., feb 2008.
WEISBROT, Mark; RAY, Rebecca & SANDOVAL, Luis. “El gobierno de Chávez después de 10 años: Evolución de la economía e indicadores sociales. Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington, D.C., feb 2009.
[1] Economista. Aluno de mestrado do Programa de Economia Política Internacional (PEPI), do Núcleo de Estudos Internacionais (NEI) da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). lws@ufrj.br. Publicado na Revista Eletrônica Data Venia, do Curso de Relações Internacionais do Centro Universitário Belas Artes de São Paulo, Ano V, Nº.25, fev-abr/2009.
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***
A Economia Venezuelana frente à Crise Mundial
Luciano Wexell Severo[1]
A maioria das análises sobre a situação atual da economia venezuelana se sustenta essencialmente em três idéias: 1) que o governo Chávez recebeu uma chuva de dólares durante os últimos anos, como resultado dos elevados preços internacionais do petróleo, 2) que o governo Chávez não soube investir esses volumosos recursos no estímulo da diversificação produtiva, aplicando uma política econômica desastrosa e assistencialista, através das Missões Sociais e 3) que agora, com o barril de petróleo tipo Brent custando cerca de 50 dólares, a Venezuela e a sua estatal petroleira (PDVSA) estão “quebradas”. Trataremos de demonstrar neste artigo que essas três afirmações são bastante imprecisas.
Vale dizer que entre 1999 e 2008 a economia venezuelana viveu cinco etapas diferentes e claramente definidas: 1) A posse, em fevereiro de 1999, frente a um cenário econômico, político e institucional adverso (o país amargava a herança dos períodos de desinvestimento e desindustrialização dos anos oitenta e noventa, e o preço do barril de petróleo estava no seu nível mais baixo desde 1973); 2) A adoção de medidas intervencionistas e políticas mais desenvolvimentistas, a partir do segundo semestre de 1999; 3) O golpe de Estado e a “sabotagem econômica”, aplicados pela oposição, entre o quarto trimestre de 2001 e o terceiro de 2003, como reação ao aumento da intervenção estatal na economia; 4) A reativação econômica a partir do quarto trimestre de 2003, desde um patamar bastante superior em relação à situação anterior: o Estado passou a interferir de forma mais decisiva nas questões econômicas (especialmente na PDVSA); 5) A política de “semear o petróleo” e o avanço rumo ao “socialismo bolivariano”, o esforço pela diversificação produtiva, por um novo processo de industrialização, pelo pagamento da elevada dívida social acumulada durante décadas e a expansão do poder estatal e popular sobre os setores estratégicos da economia (Severo, 2009, p.4).
Um estudo desenvolvido pelo então denominado Ministério de Finanças (Venezuela, 2004, p.5) demonstra que o valor em dólares per capita recebido pelo atual governo através das exportações petroleiras foi, pelo menos até a metade de 2005, inferior ao recebido durante as cinco administrações anteriores: 26% do valor recebido pelo primeiro governo de Andrés Pérez (1974-79); 35% do recebido por Herrera Campins (1979-84); 56% do recebido por Lusinchi (1984-89); 49% do recebido pelo segundo mandato de Pérez (1989-93); e 85% do recebido pelo segundo mandato de Caldera (1994-98). É necessário tomar em conta dois fatores: 1) que os preços de comparação devem ser expressados em valores constantes, não constantes e 2) que a população da Venezuela mais que dobrou entre os anos 1973 e 2005. Por isso se conclui que até 2005 o governo Chávez não contou com uma “chuva” de petrodólares, muito pelo contrário. Apesar disso, o gasto social aumentou de 8,2% do PIB em 1998 para 13,6% do PIB em 2006. Tomando em conta as contribuições realizadas pela PDVSA, os gastos sociais alcançaram 20,9% do PIB e em termos per capita aumentaram quatro vezes em relação a 1998 (Weisbrot & Sandoval, 2008, p.14).
A efervescência da economia da Venezuela tem sido resultado direto, mas não exclusivo, da expansão dos preços do petróleo até alcançar 135,2 dólares por barril tipo Brent em julho de 2008 (em dezembro os preços tinham desmoronado para 43,4 dólares; atualmente já estão na casa dos 56 dólares). O petróleo é e continuará sendo por muito tempo o suporte da economia venezuelana. Entretanto, há duas novidades: 1) em 2003, o Estado venezuelano recuperou o controle sobre a indústria petroleira, reduzindo a drenagem de recursos para o exterior e também a concentração interna da renda; e 2) desde então, o país está depositando parcelas crescentes dos recursos petroleiros nos setores produtivos, na estruturação e fortalecimento do mercado interno, em um processo de industrialização soberana (com capitais majoritariamente venezuelanos, aquisição de tecnologia, capacitação de mão de obra local e crescente incorporação de valor agregado nacional). Por esse motivo, é equivocada a idéia de que na Venezuela se adota uma economia artificial e miseravelmente assistencialista.
Os principais mecanismos utilizados pelo governo venezuelano para estimular o crescimento econômico e a diversificação produtiva foram, entre outros: 1) o resgate da PDVSA para o controle estatal, já que desde sua criação em 1976 a empresa funcionou como um estado dentro do Estado. Esta primeira ação possibilitou em grande medida a aplicação das demais; 2) o controle de câmbio, de capitais e de preços, que têm sido eficientes para frear a deterioração da moeda nacional e as fugas de capital, seja através da especulação internacional com o bolívar, de remessas de lucros ao exterior ou de importações supérfluas; 3) a nacionalização via pagamento de indenizações de empresas estratégicas dos setores de comunicações, eletricidade, alimentação e construção, além de instituições financeiras; e 4) a reforma da Lei do Banco Central da Venezuela, que estabeleceu um teto anual para as reservas internacionais; os valores que superem o teto determinado devem ser transferidos para o Fundo de Desenvolvimento Nacional –FONDEN, cujo objetivo é financiar setores como indústrias pesadas, indústrias de transformação, agricultura, petroquímica, gás, infra-estrutura, transportes e habitação, entre outros. Desde sua criação, em 2005, foram repassados somente pela PDVSA ao FONDEN cerca de 21,8 bilhões de dólares (Chávez, 2009, p.23).
A Venezuela não somente desenhou e pôs em prática iniciativas para “semear o petróleo” como inclusive tornou-se um dos países do mundo que mais investe atualmente: a participação da Formação Bruta de Capital Fixo (FBKF) no PIB chega perto dos 30%; segundo a CEPAL, a média latino-americana é de 20%. Há diversas obras de grande porte em plena execução neste momento: novas refinarias de petróleo, fábricas de cimento, de laminação de alumínio, de papel e celulose, siderúrgicas para a produção de aços navais, especiais e inoxidável, fábricas de tubos petroleiros, de trilhos e vagões, de concentração de mineral de ferro, produtos linha branca, carros e tratores, processadoras de leite, serrarias de madeira, planos agrícolas, assim como mega-projetos de infra-estrutura: portos, aeroportos, pontes, linhas de metrô, ferrovias, estradas, termoelétricas, hidrelétricas, gasodutos, redes de fibra óptica (para telefonia e Internet), redes de distribuição de água, entre outros. Essas iniciativas estão distribuídas geograficamente por todos os estados, com o objetivo de desconcentrar a população que vive essencialmente no litoral caribenho e de ocupar o território nacional. As empresas criadas serão financiadas tanto por capitais públicos quanto privados, tanto de venezuelanos quanto de estrangeiros (especialmente de China, Índia, Rússia, Bielorússia, Irã, Cuba e Brasil, mas também Estados Unidos e Japão, entre outros).
Na maioria dessas iniciativas, o Estado conservará pelo menos 51% da participação acionária. Apesar da queda do preço do petróleo, o governo tem reafirmado seu compromisso pela continuidade de algumas dessas obras, assim como pela manutenção dos programas sociais, do baixo índice desemprego (cerca de 7,3%, em março) e do rendimento salarial dos trabalhadores. Veremos, a seguir, como isso seria possível.
Alguns “analistas” liberais, ostentando uma suposta preocupação com o desempenho fiscal, sustentaram nos últimos anos que o aumento do gasto público na Venezuela apresenta uma tendência “insustentável”. Na realidade, os dados demonstram o contrário. Enquanto o gasto público passou de 21,4% do PIB em 1998 para 30,0% em 2006, o aumento das receitas do Estado foi ainda maior: de 17,4% para 30,0% do PIB. Quer dizer, apesar da ocorrência de déficits fiscais, as receitas aumentaram a um ritmo maior do que as despesas; o que garante a sustentabilidade fiscal. Para alcançar esses resultados, foi decisiva a aplicação da Lei de Hidrocarbonetos (que aumentou a arrecadação estatal sobre as petroleiras estrangeiras) e tem sido importante o papel do Serviço Nacional Integrado de Administração Aduaneira e Tributária –SENIAT. Além disso, os Orçamentos Anuais foram calculados utilizando como base um preço do petróleo muito inferior ao preço real. Por exemplo, em 2005 foi usado o preço de 23 dólares por barril, quando custava 41 dólares; em 2007, foi utilizada a base de 29 dólares, quando o preço real era de 65 dólares. Em 2008, apesar dos elevados preços, se estimou em 35 dólares. Em 2009, se utilizou como base 60 dólares e depois, frente à crise, foi reconsiderado para 40 dólares. Desta forma se acumularam elevadas receitas extraordinárias, que foram usadas para alimentar as reservas internacionais e conseqüentemente o FONDEN.
Por isso, as bases utilizadas para profetizar a “quebra da PDVSA” e a “falência da economia venezuelana” soam exageradamente simplórias. Essas análises partem de duas observações verdadeiras, mas culminam em duas conclusões equivocadas: é certo que 1) a Venezuela depende da exportação do petróleo, responsável por mais de 90% das vendas totais ao exterior e que 2) os preços internacionais do petróleo caíram de quase 140 para menos de 40 dólares em cinco meses. Entretanto, tais constatações não têm relação com as conclusões: 1) que a Venezuela desperdiçou novamente, assim como havia feito durante os anos setenta, a chance de diversificar a sua economia e de romper com a excessiva dependência do petróleo e 2) que não haverá dólares suficientes para manter os compromissos assumidos com as Missões Sociais, a única medida do governo “populista”.
Para fundamental tomar em conta que o país obteve elevados superávits comerciais com o mundo entre 2004 e 2008: totalizaram mais de 155 bilhões de dólares. Por sua vez, o saldo positivo em conta corrente também acumulou mais de 100 bilhões de dólares nos últimos três anos. Se durante a “sabotagem petroleira” de 2002-2003, as reservas internacionais caíram até chegar perto dos 13 bilhões de dólares, atualmente superam os 80 bilhões (incluem as reservas oficiais do BCV –30 bilhões, recursos do FONDEN, da PDVSA, da Tesouraria Nacional e do Fundo Conjunto China-Venezuela).
Nos últimos anos, a Venezuela construiu um “colchão” de recursos e adotou medidas para proteger a economia da especulação financeira internacional, como o controle de câmbio e de capitais. Essas medidas serão muito importantes para enfrentar a atual conjuntura internacional. A orientação atual do governo é fazer frente à crise através do aumento dos gastos, dos investimentos e do endividamento público. Isso é possível porque as dívidas públicas externa e interna foram bastante reduzidas como porcentagem do PIB desde 1998, quando representaram 25,5% e 5%, respectivamente. Em 2003, no epicentro da crise política e econômica promovida pela oposição, alcançaram níveis estratosféricos: 29,7% e 17,9% do PIB, respectivamente. Em 2007, já se via a redução de ambas: a externa (de cerca de 52,9 bilhões de dólares, segundo a CEPAL) representou 12,0% e a interna 7,3% do PIB. Em 2008, a dívida pública total representou 14,3% do PIB, bastante inferior aos níveis de 1989 (83,6%), 1995 (69,2%), 1999 (29,5%) e 2003 (47,6%). O nível atual é o mais baixo dos últimos trinta anos e um dos menores da região (Severo, 2009, p.28).
Entre o quarto trimestre de 2003 e o quarto de 2008, o PIB cresceu 94,7%: a economia da Venezuela acumulou 21 trimestres de permanentes elevações, a uma taxa média de 13,5% (Weisbrot, 2009, p.6). Desde 2004, o PIB não petroleiro cresceu a taxas significativamente maiores que o PIB petroleiro. Também foi expressiva a aceleração do PIB manufatureiro entre 2004 e 2008, verificada especialmente no aumento do consumo de eletricidade, nas vendas de veículos, cimento, produtos longos para a construção civil, ferro, aço e alumínio, entre outros. Dentro da indústria manufatureira, as áreas da atividade econômica que mais cresceram foram: elaboração de alimentos, bebidas e tabaco, couro e calçado, edição e impressão, minerais não metálicos, pneumáticos e produtos plásticos, fabricação de veículos automotores, e fabricação de máquinas e equipamentos. Esses resultados devem melhorar ainda mais quando se façam sentir plenamente os impactos de importantes medidas governamentais dirigidas ao estímulo das empresas privadas nacionais. Segundo Weisbrot (2009, p.9), “apesar da expansão do setor público durante os anos de Chávez, o setor privado cresceu mais rapidamente”. O atual nível dos preços do petróleo tem gerado uma redução no ritmo de crescimento da economia de aproximadamente 8% anuais para cerca de 4% –recentemente a CEPAL previu alta de 1% do PIB venezuelano em 2009, ainda acima da média regional (-0,3%). Segundo Weisbrot & Sandoval (2008, p.4), “a um preço inferior aos 45 dólares por barril para o petróleo venezuelano [atualmente está cotado um pouco acima desse valor], o país começaria a registrar resultados deficitários em sua conta corrente. Entretanto, dado que a Venezuela tem aproximadamente 82 bilhões de dólares em reservas, poderia financiar um modesto déficit em conta corrente por algum tempo –por exemplo, mesmo que o preço do petróleo se mantivesse nos baixos níveis atuais durante os próximos dois anos”. Ambos autores interpretam que a maioria dos prognósticos negativos sobre a economia da Venezuela se sustentam em argumentos bastante frágeis.
No caso da PDVSA, muitos “analistas” desconhecem ou se esqueceram que em 2007 a empresa terminou o ano como a estatal petroleira mais sólida da América Latina. Naquele momento contava com 107 bilhões de ativos totais e um patrimônio consolidado mundial de 53,8 bilhões, que garantiam uma relação dívida/ativos de 14,96% e uma relação dívida/patrimônio de 29,72%. Até setembro passado (antes da crise), os indicadores financeiros da empresa haviam melhorado: os ativos totais aumentaram em 32,7%, o patrimônio consolidado mundial cresceu 29,9% e a dívida caiu -7,4%. Com isso, a relação dívida/ativos diminuiu para 10,45% e a relação dívida/patrimônio, para 20,36% (PDVSA, 2008, p.13). Ainda não foram divulgados os dados referentes ao quarto trimestre de 2008, que devem indicar uma piora com relação à situação anterior, mas não a “falência” da empresa. É importante desmistificar a idéia difundida pelos grandes meios de comunicação –estreitamente relacionados com as transnacionais petroleiras, com os bancos privados e com a meritocracia corrupta que dirigiu a PDVSA até 2003– de que o governo Chávez debilitou a empresa. Muito pelo contrário, além da PDVSA ter sido colocada a serviço dos interesses da Venezuela e dos venezuelanos, foi robustecida a partir de então. As atuais negociações de dívidas com fornecedores nacionais e estrangeiros, tão insistentemente divulgadas nos últimas semanas, não refletem nem a “falência” nem uma grande debilidade da estatal, mas sim a utilização da crise como uma oportunidade para fazer o que todas as empresas do mundo estão tentando fazer: renegociar suas dívidas.
Além de esforçar-se para depositar os recursos do petróleo na diversificação produtiva, o governo venezuelano tem investido nas chamadas Missões Sociais. Segundo dados do Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas (INE) e da CEPAL, a pobreza continua diminuindo na Venezuela, um dos países que mais se destaca no cumprimento das “Metas do Milênio”. O Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano (IDH) melhorou muito nos dez anos de governo Chávez. O último resultado divulgado pelo PNUD, referente ao ano 2006, demonstra que na Venezuela o IDH alcançou 0,826, enquanto em 2004 foi de 0,810 e em 2000 foi de 0,776 (Severo, 2007). É interessante observar que o IDH da Venezuela cresceu bem mais que o de outros países exportadores de petróleo com IDH semelhante. Outra informação relevante: o Informe de Desenvolvimento Humano 2007-2008 do PNUD demonstra que entre 1975 e 1980 –período de altos preços do petróleo– o IDH da Venezuela aumentou somente de 0,723 para 0,737. Ou seja, os resultados atuais são expressivos: cerca de 2.733.108 venezuelanos abandonaram a condição de pobreza. Por outro lado, o coeficiente Gini caiu de 0,4865 em 1998 para 0,4200 em 2007, representando a diminuição nas disparidades da concentração de renda na sociedade venezuelana (Severo, 2009, p.32).
Concluímos com algumas considerações do atual ministro de Economia e Finanças da Venezuela, Alí Rodríguez Araque (2008): “A Revolução Bolivariana não surgiu porque os preços do petróleo estavam muito altos, nem se manteve principalmente porque estivessem altos. Precisamente, o governo do presidente Hugo Chávez começou em um momento de profunda depressão dos preços do petróleo. De maneira que a Revolução Bolivariana nem começa com preços altos do petróleo nem vai terminar porque baixaram esses preços”.
BIBLIOGRAFIA UTILIZADA:
CEPAL. Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (1999-2008). Estudio Económico de América Latina y el Caribe y Balance preliminar de las economías de América Latina y el Caribe. Página: http://www.cepal.org
CHÁVEZ, Hugo (2009). Mensaje anual a la Nación del Presidente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, el 13 de enero de 2009 [Cadena nacional de radio y televisión].
PDVSA. Información Financiera y Operacional de PDVSA, al 31 de septiembre de 2008. Ministerio de Energía y Petróleo, Caracas, 2008.
RODRÍGUEZ ARAQUE, Alí. “El petróleo y la Revolución Bolivariana”. Argenpress, 23 dic 2008. [Entrevista concedida a Ernesto Carmona].
SEVERO, Luciano Wexell. “Desafíos de la Venezuela Saudita”. Le Monde Diplomatique, El dipló. Bogotá: año V, 54 ed., mar 2007.
______. “Sembrando petróleo, La economía venezolana, 1999-2008”. Desde Abajo, Bogotá, 20 feb - 20 mar 2009.
VENEZUELA. Ministerio de Finanzas. “La fábula de los ‘enormes’ ingresos petroleros”, Caracas, jun 2004.
WEISBROT, Mark & SANDOVAL, Luis. “Actualización: La economía venezolana en tiempos de Chávez”. Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington, D.C., feb 2008.
WEISBROT, Mark; RAY, Rebecca & SANDOVAL, Luis. “El gobierno de Chávez después de 10 años: Evolución de la economía e indicadores sociales. Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington, D.C., feb 2009.
[1] Economista. Aluno de mestrado do Programa de Economia Política Internacional (PEPI), do Núcleo de Estudos Internacionais (NEI) da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). lws@ufrj.br. Publicado na Revista Eletrônica Data Venia, do Curso de Relações Internacionais do Centro Universitário Belas Artes de São Paulo, Ano V, Nº.25, fev-abr/2009.
quinta-feira, 14 de maio de 2009
ECONOMIA POLÍTICA MARXISTA:UM BALANÇO
por Theotonio Dos Santos
Por toda parte vemos hoje fortes críticas à economia como ciência ou como
fundamento válido para as políticas econômicas (1). Estes ataques questionam a
legitimidade e as pretensões científicas da teoria econômica. Este ceticismo é, de fato,conseqüência do desvio da chamada teoria econômica para uma temática e uma
metodologia que restringem drasticamente seu alcance e sua relevância. E isto ocorre num momento em que se amplia, em vez de restringir-se, o campo dos fenômenos estudados pela economia política em suas origens e suas interações.
A ECONOMIA POLÍTICA E A ECONOMIA NACIONAL
De fato, nas suas origens, ela foi Economia Política. Ou seja, ela tinha a pretensão
de analisar o ciclo econômico, e o esquema da produção e da circulação no interior de um Estado Nacional e suas relações com outras economias nacionais. As principais questões econômicas foram, assim, confinadas ao nível nacional. Os economistas clássicos propunham-se a romper com as preocupações dos mercantilistas, para os quais o fenômeno comercial e a relação da nação com a economia internacional apareciam como fundadores da análise econômica. Quesnay voltou-se para o processo produtivo e para a produção e a circulação da riqueza no interior de cada nação. A partir deste momento, a economia política clássica seguiu o mesmo caminho. Adam Smith e Ricardo vão encontrar o fundamento da riqueza nacional no processo de trabalho e no valor que vincula o trabalho ao processo de circulação. Eles desenvolveram uma análise científica do processo de produção e de circulação.
[ Clique aqui para ler o restante ]
Por toda parte vemos hoje fortes críticas à economia como ciência ou como
fundamento válido para as políticas econômicas (1). Estes ataques questionam a
legitimidade e as pretensões científicas da teoria econômica. Este ceticismo é, de fato,conseqüência do desvio da chamada teoria econômica para uma temática e uma
metodologia que restringem drasticamente seu alcance e sua relevância. E isto ocorre num momento em que se amplia, em vez de restringir-se, o campo dos fenômenos estudados pela economia política em suas origens e suas interações.
A ECONOMIA POLÍTICA E A ECONOMIA NACIONAL
De fato, nas suas origens, ela foi Economia Política. Ou seja, ela tinha a pretensão
de analisar o ciclo econômico, e o esquema da produção e da circulação no interior de um Estado Nacional e suas relações com outras economias nacionais. As principais questões econômicas foram, assim, confinadas ao nível nacional. Os economistas clássicos propunham-se a romper com as preocupações dos mercantilistas, para os quais o fenômeno comercial e a relação da nação com a economia internacional apareciam como fundadores da análise econômica. Quesnay voltou-se para o processo produtivo e para a produção e a circulação da riqueza no interior de cada nação. A partir deste momento, a economia política clássica seguiu o mesmo caminho. Adam Smith e Ricardo vão encontrar o fundamento da riqueza nacional no processo de trabalho e no valor que vincula o trabalho ao processo de circulação. Eles desenvolveram uma análise científica do processo de produção e de circulação.
[ Clique aqui para ler o restante ]
quarta-feira, 13 de maio de 2009
Em cerimônia Theotonio recebe comenda da Ordem do Rio Branco
Theotonio Dos Santos, professor emérito da Universidade Federal Fluminense (do Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciência Política e do Departamento de Economia) e presidente da REGGEN (Rede e Cátedra em Economia Global da Unesco e UNU), recebeu a comenda da Ordem do Rio Branco oferecida pelo Ministério das Relações Exteriores no último dia 7 de maio, quinta-feira, às 11h, no Hall do Palácio Itamaraty, em Brasília.
A cerimônia de condecoração de insígnias e medalhas da Ordem do Rio Branco, contou com a presença do presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na qual foram condecoradas também várias autoridades e personalidades da sociedade civil, inclusive foi um dos homenageados o ator Tony Ramos e postumamente o Marechal Rondon.
A comenda ao professor Dos Santos foi oferecida em reconhecimento às contribuições teóricas ao campo das pesquisas sociais na área das relações internacionais e na formulação de uma política exterior ao Brasil autonomista e que se preza pela solidariedade aos países latino-americanos e periféricos.
Grande encontro na Espanha
Entre os dias 25 a 29 de maio, enquanto presidente da REGGEN, e Carlos Eduardo Martins, como diretor científico, participaremos de encontro na Espanha Dynamic of Global Crisis and anti-system movement - uma homenagem a Giovanni Arrighi,
Segundo seu organizador Carlos Pietro da Universidade Nomade, pretende desenvolver suas atividades a nível global. A conferência se realizará no Museu Nacional Rainha Sofia, um dos mais importantes museus da UE. Deverá ser o acontecimento intelectual mais importante da Espanha e da Europa dos últimos tempos.
Segundo seu organizador Carlos Pietro da Universidade Nomade, pretende desenvolver suas atividades a nível global. A conferência se realizará no Museu Nacional Rainha Sofia, um dos mais importantes museus da UE. Deverá ser o acontecimento intelectual mais importante da Espanha e da Europa dos últimos tempos.
terça-feira, 12 de maio de 2009
Agenda da Semana (11 a 17 de maio)
Segunda-feira, 11 de maio: Viagem a Argentina
- Palestra sobre a Crise Atual no CCC (Centro Cultural de Cooperação sindical)- dirigida por Atillo Borón - instalação de rede de ensino à distância.
- entrevista a imprensa: concedida a Telesul e Canal Internacional 7
Terça-feira, 12 de maio: palestra pronunciada sobre a Crise Atual - Rio Cuarto.
Quarta-feira, 13 de maio: retorno ao Brasil
- recepção à delegação oficial em visita ao Brasil da Derrama Magisterial do Peru - órgão que representa os professores primários e secundários e desenvolve ampla atividade de previdência, cultural, cursos e turísticos e nesse momento está montando um instituto de pós-graduação - estabelecer estrutura de cooperação com a Reggen, a UFF, EBAP-FGV, IUPERJ, etc.
- Palestra sobre a Crise Atual no CCC (Centro Cultural de Cooperação sindical)- dirigida por Atillo Borón - instalação de rede de ensino à distância.
- entrevista a imprensa: concedida a Telesul e Canal Internacional 7
Terça-feira, 12 de maio: palestra pronunciada sobre a Crise Atual - Rio Cuarto.
Quarta-feira, 13 de maio: retorno ao Brasil
- recepção à delegação oficial em visita ao Brasil da Derrama Magisterial do Peru - órgão que representa os professores primários e secundários e desenvolve ampla atividade de previdência, cultural, cursos e turísticos e nesse momento está montando um instituto de pós-graduação - estabelecer estrutura de cooperação com a Reggen, a UFF, EBAP-FGV, IUPERJ, etc.
quinta-feira, 7 de maio de 2009
Crise: Crime e Castigo, por Paulo Timm
paulo.
gostei mas leia meu do "terror a esperança".
theotonio
---------- Mensagem encaminhada ----------
Subject: CRISE, CRIME E CASTIGO= Paulo Timm - www.alexania.tv
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Editorial - CRISE: CRIME E CASTIGO
FRASE DO SÉCULO: "Não podemos mais usar Keynes, simplesmente não há recursos para estas fórmulas". : James Callaghan - Primeiro Ministro britânico nos anos 70
A famosa frase do Ex-Ministro britânico foi relembrada no dia 13 passado ,em um artigo do Deputado Fernando Gabeira, na Folha de São Paulo. Já na década de 70, muito antes do que o século XX acabasse e que sobreviesse a grande crise que abala ,desde outubro de 2008 ,o mundo inteiro, dizia ele que não haveria mais chance de usar as ferramentas keynesianas para debelar eventuais recessões econômicas porque já não havia dinheiro (público) suficiente. Imagine-se hoje, depois que a bolha financeira inchou a renda mundial de uma maneira sem precedentes na história , sem deixar sequer rastros de sua voracidade nos cofres públicos por onde passou "voando". O dinheiro virtual , inflado pela telemática, multiplicou-se na forma de renda real para milhares de pessoas que dele se beneficiaram, contribuindo, até, para uma aceleração visível da economia real e do comércio mundial. Mas não se refletiu em paralela capacidade dos Estados Nacionais para fortalecerem suas respectivas receitas públicas. Cumpriu-se o objetivo dos neo-liberias: Os governos se enfraqueceram. E agora, diante da crise, vêem-se em dificuldades para poder cumprir o dever de casa keynesiano que consistiu, desde 1933, no auge da crise de 29, quando a mão invisível do mercado se furtava à retomada do crescimento, na recuperação da Demanda Efetiva. Sim, com letra maiúscula, desde Keynes. Porque substantivada como um princípio básico da Economia Política. Há, aliás, economistas contemporâneos que afirmam haver apenas dois grandes princípios ou leis na Economia: A Demanda Decrescente e a Demanda Efetiva, aí dividindo-se os acadêmicos sobre a primazia da primeira, caso dos ortodoxos, e o da segunda, os heterodoxos, onde se aninham os inspirados em Keynes. Para compensar, pois, de uma forma que poderíamos dizer "plástica", a falência do Consumo e do Investimento Privados , agregados principais da Demanda Efetiva, na crise, o Estado deveria elevar seus gastos , preferencialmente em obras públicas ou investimentos produtivos, até o ponto em que se viesse a sentir recuperação nos níveis de emprego e renda. Esse nível, nos anos 30, chegou a 60% da renda nacional em alguns países. E não foi suficiente para uma adequada recuperação, o que veio a ocorrer somente na segunda metade da década de 30 com a corrida armamentista que desembocaria na Segunda Guerra Mundial. Não há portanto, dinheiro público que dê conta das crises capitalistas. Ele mitiga, ameniza efeitos desastrosos, mas se não conseguiu resolver a crise nos anos 30, muito menos nos dias de hoje. Mas desde que 'a velha toupeira' (capitalismo) cava sua morada na história da humanidade, separando as decisões de investir das decisões de consumir, ainda que dourando a pílula dos produtos oferecidos com as máscaras da sedução capazes de fazê-las "desejadas", não há crescimento sem crise. A crise é da natureza mesma do capitalismo. Ela "limpa" o convés, reconcentra o capital, dá até saltos tecnológicos com vistas à diminuição dos preços dos produtos e cria o ambiente favorável ao "renascimento" da economia. Faz tudo isso com muita "naturalidade", semeando miséria, desemprego, tensões políticas e até guerras, cabendo-nos , como povo, nação, Governo, um olhar atento e preocupado, porém, impotente.
Claro que a existência de um sólido bloco de bancos estatais e de grandes empresas com elevada densidade tecnológica, como fábricas de aviões, sob o controle público, colaboram para um programa de saída da crise. Esse é o caso do Brasil que já deveria, em vez de sustentar obsoletas fábricas de automóveis do ABC, ter nacionalizado a EMBRAER, tal como, aliás, fez a Argentina , ontem, com sua equivalente , também privatizada há alguns anos. Como deveria, também, ter aproveitado a inusitada oportunidade, para baixar drásticamente a absurda taxa de juros que sangra o país e ,particularmente, as receitas públicas (na hora em que elas são mais necessárias para compensar o hiato na Demanda Efetiva). Dizer que a crise é inevitável, enfim, e que somos relativamente impotentes para eliminá-las definitivamente, não quer dizer que fiquemos apenas contemplando o desastre, ou minimizando seus efeitos. Mas embora tenhamos linhas gerais de atuação compensatória, indiscutivelmente ligadas à intervenção do Estado, a melhor indicação ainda é o diálogo nacional , um diálogo franco e profundo, ao qual sejam chamados não os áulicos de sempre, assessores e ministros da conveniência politico-partidária, movimentos sociais mais das vezes comprometidos com o corporativismo cego, mas a inteligência Sim , a inteligência, sem preconceitos, cevada na vasta experiência à frente de empresas e órgãos públicos ou na incansável trajetória da sua vida acadêmica.
Sábias palavras, pois, de Callaghan, nos anos 70. Mas surdas aos que ainda creem possível enfrentar a crise com apenas alguns "bilhões" distribuidos quase aleatoriamente. O neo-liberalismo só agudizou o caráter contraditório da economia capitalista. Foi um crime contra a humanidade. Agora estamos sofrendo seu castigo porque não fomos capazes de impedir sua hegemonia nas políticas governamentais.
PAULO TIMM , Economista - Ex Presidente do Conselho Regional de Economia DF , Professor UnB.
gostei mas leia meu do "terror a esperança".
theotonio
---------- Mensagem encaminhada ----------
Subject: CRISE, CRIME E CASTIGO= Paulo Timm - www.alexania.tv
------------------------------------------------------------
Editorial - CRISE: CRIME E CASTIGO
FRASE DO SÉCULO: "Não podemos mais usar Keynes, simplesmente não há recursos para estas fórmulas". : James Callaghan - Primeiro Ministro britânico nos anos 70
A famosa frase do Ex-Ministro britânico foi relembrada no dia 13 passado ,em um artigo do Deputado Fernando Gabeira, na Folha de São Paulo. Já na década de 70, muito antes do que o século XX acabasse e que sobreviesse a grande crise que abala ,desde outubro de 2008 ,o mundo inteiro, dizia ele que não haveria mais chance de usar as ferramentas keynesianas para debelar eventuais recessões econômicas porque já não havia dinheiro (público) suficiente. Imagine-se hoje, depois que a bolha financeira inchou a renda mundial de uma maneira sem precedentes na história , sem deixar sequer rastros de sua voracidade nos cofres públicos por onde passou "voando". O dinheiro virtual , inflado pela telemática, multiplicou-se na forma de renda real para milhares de pessoas que dele se beneficiaram, contribuindo, até, para uma aceleração visível da economia real e do comércio mundial. Mas não se refletiu em paralela capacidade dos Estados Nacionais para fortalecerem suas respectivas receitas públicas. Cumpriu-se o objetivo dos neo-liberias: Os governos se enfraqueceram. E agora, diante da crise, vêem-se em dificuldades para poder cumprir o dever de casa keynesiano que consistiu, desde 1933, no auge da crise de 29, quando a mão invisível do mercado se furtava à retomada do crescimento, na recuperação da Demanda Efetiva. Sim, com letra maiúscula, desde Keynes. Porque substantivada como um princípio básico da Economia Política. Há, aliás, economistas contemporâneos que afirmam haver apenas dois grandes princípios ou leis na Economia: A Demanda Decrescente e a Demanda Efetiva, aí dividindo-se os acadêmicos sobre a primazia da primeira, caso dos ortodoxos, e o da segunda, os heterodoxos, onde se aninham os inspirados em Keynes. Para compensar, pois, de uma forma que poderíamos dizer "plástica", a falência do Consumo e do Investimento Privados , agregados principais da Demanda Efetiva, na crise, o Estado deveria elevar seus gastos , preferencialmente em obras públicas ou investimentos produtivos, até o ponto em que se viesse a sentir recuperação nos níveis de emprego e renda. Esse nível, nos anos 30, chegou a 60% da renda nacional em alguns países. E não foi suficiente para uma adequada recuperação, o que veio a ocorrer somente na segunda metade da década de 30 com a corrida armamentista que desembocaria na Segunda Guerra Mundial. Não há portanto, dinheiro público que dê conta das crises capitalistas. Ele mitiga, ameniza efeitos desastrosos, mas se não conseguiu resolver a crise nos anos 30, muito menos nos dias de hoje. Mas desde que 'a velha toupeira' (capitalismo) cava sua morada na história da humanidade, separando as decisões de investir das decisões de consumir, ainda que dourando a pílula dos produtos oferecidos com as máscaras da sedução capazes de fazê-las "desejadas", não há crescimento sem crise. A crise é da natureza mesma do capitalismo. Ela "limpa" o convés, reconcentra o capital, dá até saltos tecnológicos com vistas à diminuição dos preços dos produtos e cria o ambiente favorável ao "renascimento" da economia. Faz tudo isso com muita "naturalidade", semeando miséria, desemprego, tensões políticas e até guerras, cabendo-nos , como povo, nação, Governo, um olhar atento e preocupado, porém, impotente.
Claro que a existência de um sólido bloco de bancos estatais e de grandes empresas com elevada densidade tecnológica, como fábricas de aviões, sob o controle público, colaboram para um programa de saída da crise. Esse é o caso do Brasil que já deveria, em vez de sustentar obsoletas fábricas de automóveis do ABC, ter nacionalizado a EMBRAER, tal como, aliás, fez a Argentina , ontem, com sua equivalente , também privatizada há alguns anos. Como deveria, também, ter aproveitado a inusitada oportunidade, para baixar drásticamente a absurda taxa de juros que sangra o país e ,particularmente, as receitas públicas (na hora em que elas são mais necessárias para compensar o hiato na Demanda Efetiva). Dizer que a crise é inevitável, enfim, e que somos relativamente impotentes para eliminá-las definitivamente, não quer dizer que fiquemos apenas contemplando o desastre, ou minimizando seus efeitos. Mas embora tenhamos linhas gerais de atuação compensatória, indiscutivelmente ligadas à intervenção do Estado, a melhor indicação ainda é o diálogo nacional , um diálogo franco e profundo, ao qual sejam chamados não os áulicos de sempre, assessores e ministros da conveniência politico-partidária, movimentos sociais mais das vezes comprometidos com o corporativismo cego, mas a inteligência Sim , a inteligência, sem preconceitos, cevada na vasta experiência à frente de empresas e órgãos públicos ou na incansável trajetória da sua vida acadêmica.
Sábias palavras, pois, de Callaghan, nos anos 70. Mas surdas aos que ainda creem possível enfrentar a crise com apenas alguns "bilhões" distribuidos quase aleatoriamente. O neo-liberalismo só agudizou o caráter contraditório da economia capitalista. Foi um crime contra a humanidade. Agora estamos sofrendo seu castigo porque não fomos capazes de impedir sua hegemonia nas políticas governamentais.
PAULO TIMM , Economista - Ex Presidente do Conselho Regional de Economia DF , Professor UnB.
quarta-feira, 6 de maio de 2009
Mensagem de congratulações - Ordem do Rio Branco
JE NE SAIS PAS QUE C' EST MAIS J'IMAGINE QUE C'EST IMPORTANT
PARABENS MY DEAR PARABENS
AMITIES PIERRE
Pierre Salama
PARABENS MY DEAR PARABENS
AMITIES PIERRE
Pierre Salama
Mensagem de congratulações - Ordem do Rio Branco
Trata-se de Gonzalo Abad, UNESCO - Equador
Ilustre Amigo,
Lamento no poder estar contigo en esa memorable ocasion;
En todo caso:
En Hora buena !!!!
Felicidades
Gonzalo
Ilustre Amigo,
Lamento no poder estar contigo en esa memorable ocasion;
En todo caso:
En Hora buena !!!!
Felicidades
Gonzalo
Mensagem de congratulações - Ordem do Rio Branco
Caro Theotonio en esta etapa de tu vida donde recoges frutos me da mucho gusto
saber de la especial condecoración que te entregará el Presidente Lula,
Un fuerte abrazo,
Leonel
-------------------------------------------------
www.correo.unam.mx
UNAMonos Comunicándonos
saber de la especial condecoración que te entregará el Presidente Lula,
Un fuerte abrazo,
Leonel
-------------------------------------------------
www.correo.unam.mx
UNAMonos Comunicándonos
Mensagem de congratulações
Parabens Theotonio.Merecido
Jose Raymundo
José Raymundo Romêo - secretário municipal de Ciência e Tecnologia de Niterói
Jose Raymundo
José Raymundo Romêo - secretário municipal de Ciência e Tecnologia de Niterói
Mensagem de congratulações
¡Enhorabuena!
JC
________________________________
Juan Carlos Monedero
Departamento de Ciencia Política y de la Administración II
Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología
Campus Complutense de Somosaguas
JC
________________________________
Juan Carlos Monedero
Departamento de Ciencia Política y de la Administración II
Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología
Campus Complutense de Somosaguas
Mensagem de congratulações - Ordem do Rio Branco
Mi muy querido Comendador, mil felicidades por tan alta distinción que enorgullece mucho a sus amigos del mundo y, en particular, a esta bolivariana que lo quiere mucho. Te estaremos pensando en ese día.
Aprovecho para preguntarte si recibiste los libros del Premio y para que me digas de una vez en qué fechas puedes venir a Caracas para la reunión con el resto del jurado. Te propongo como fecha 22 y 23 de junio, o bien los siguientes días de esa misma semana. Por favor, necesito una rápida respuesta, sobre todo porque estoy renunciando al Ministerio de la Cultura y necesito dejar todo lo del Premio bien definido.
Un gran abrazo y todo mi cariño
Carmen
--
Carmen Bohórquez
Directora General de Relaciones Internacionales del
Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Cultura
Coordinadora de la Red de Intelectuales y Artistas en defensa de la Humanidad
http://www.humanidadenred.org/
cabohorquez@gmail.com
Aprovecho para preguntarte si recibiste los libros del Premio y para que me digas de una vez en qué fechas puedes venir a Caracas para la reunión con el resto del jurado. Te propongo como fecha 22 y 23 de junio, o bien los siguientes días de esa misma semana. Por favor, necesito una rápida respuesta, sobre todo porque estoy renunciando al Ministerio de la Cultura y necesito dejar todo lo del Premio bien definido.
Un gran abrazo y todo mi cariño
Carmen
--
Carmen Bohórquez
Directora General de Relaciones Internacionales del
Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Cultura
Coordinadora de la Red de Intelectuales y Artistas en defensa de la Humanidad
http://www.humanidadenred.org/
cabohorquez@gmail.com
Mensagem de congratulações
Mi muy querido Comendador, mil felicidades por tan alta distinción que enorgullece mucho a sus amigos del mundo y, en particular, a esta bolivariana que lo quiere mucho. Te estaremos pensando en ese día.
Aprovecho para preguntarte si recibiste los libros del Premio y para que me digas de una vez en qué fechas puedes venir a Caracas para la reunión con el resto del jurado. Te propongo como fecha 22 y 23 de junio, o bien los siguientes días de esa misma semana. Por favor, necesito una rápida respuesta, sobre todo porque estoy renunciando al Ministerio de la Cultura y necesito dejar todo lo del Premio bien definido.
Un gran abrazo y todo mi cariño
Carmen
--
Carmen Bohórquez
Directora General de Relaciones Internacionales del
Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Cultura
Coordinadora de la Red de Intelectuales y Artistas en defensa de la Humanidad
http://www.humanidadenred.org/
cabohorquez@gmail.com
Aprovecho para preguntarte si recibiste los libros del Premio y para que me digas de una vez en qué fechas puedes venir a Caracas para la reunión con el resto del jurado. Te propongo como fecha 22 y 23 de junio, o bien los siguientes días de esa misma semana. Por favor, necesito una rápida respuesta, sobre todo porque estoy renunciando al Ministerio de la Cultura y necesito dejar todo lo del Premio bien definido.
Un gran abrazo y todo mi cariño
Carmen
--
Carmen Bohórquez
Directora General de Relaciones Internacionales del
Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Cultura
Coordinadora de la Red de Intelectuales y Artistas en defensa de la Humanidad
http://www.humanidadenred.org/
cabohorquez@gmail.com
Mensagens de Congratulações
Estimado Theotonio,
¡Felicitaciones!
A un trabajo de muchas décadas y a las obras de impacto universal, todo reconocimiento es merecido. Los pueblos de la región y quienes luchan en su seno se suman a tu satisfacción. Nos vemos pronto. Saludos,
Marco A. Gandásegui, hijo
Visite la Sala de Estudios Latinoamericanos
http://marcoagandasegui.blogspot.com
¡Felicitaciones!
A un trabajo de muchas décadas y a las obras de impacto universal, todo reconocimiento es merecido. Los pueblos de la región y quienes luchan en su seno se suman a tu satisfacción. Nos vemos pronto. Saludos,
Marco A. Gandásegui, hijo
Visite la Sala de Estudios Latinoamericanos
http://marcoagandasegui.blogspot.com
Mensagens de Congratulações
Parabéns Theo. Todas as homenagens a você são mais que merecidas. Felicitações extensivas a Monica.
Abraço afetuoso.
Gisálio e Gizlene
CPPG Ciência Política UFF
Abraço afetuoso.
Gisálio e Gizlene
CPPG Ciência Política UFF
Convite Condecoração Ordem do Rio Branco
Subject: [Fwd: condecoração.Ordem de Rio Branco.]
> convite para receber a condecoração com o título de comendador da ordem
> de Rio Branco, dia 7 de maio às 11 horas, no Palacio do Itamaraty, com a
> presença do Presidente Lula.
> Abraços
>
> Theotonio Dos Santos
>
> convite para receber a condecoração com o título de comendador da ordem
> de Rio Branco, dia 7 de maio às 11 horas, no Palacio do Itamaraty, com a
> presença do Presidente Lula.
> Abraços
>
> Theotonio Dos Santos
>
Chico Oliveira apoiando as teses de Ruy Mauro Marini
O sociologo Francisco Oliveira durante entrevista apoia teses do finado Ruy Mauro Marini para explicar o Brasil hoje.
Clique aqui para ler
Clique aqui para ler
"América Latina, um continente sem teoria?" - uma resposta a Fiori - por Nildo Ouriques
Maiores detalhes no meu livro ocultado:
Theotonio Dos Santos, Teoria da Dependência: Balanço e Perspectivas, Civilização Brasileira, RJ.
A edição Brasileira está esgotada mas talvez se encontre na Amazon ou outras liv rarias virtuais (alguén quer reeditar? entre em contato comigo.
Ver ediçao em espanhol por Plaza y Janés no México e Sudamericana na Argentina. Foi editado em chines pela Academia Chinesa de Ciencias Sociais.
-------Mensagem original-------
De: Prof. Nildo Ouriques
Data: 4/5/2009 11:20:29
Para: Grupo Economistas
Cc: Fiori
Assunto: resposta ao artigo de José Luis Fiori
Caros amigos,
em anexo uma breve relfexão em função do artigo de Fiori que circulou entre nós.
Abraços
Nildo Ouriques
----------------------------------------------------
América Latina, um continente sem teoria?
Nildo Ouriques*
Em recente artigo – Um continente sem teoria – José Luis Fiori nos oferece uma brevíssima e curiosa história das idéias na América Latina destinada a espetar o liberalismo que sempre se contentou em repetir nos trópicos as teorias “cosmopolitas” que com freqüência colonial aqui se reproduzem. Contudo, neste breve artigo, Fiori adere ao esporte nacional preferido pela intelectualidade paulista: a crítica à interpretação marxista da dependência e o elogio velado “a escola paulista de sociologia”, especialmente aquela vinculada ao nome de Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
No Brasil, o debate acerca da dependência sempre foi mal compreendido. Na verdade, é quase que desconhecido entre nós. Contudo, este desconhecimento não é resultado do acaso, pois tem sido construído como um instrumento de dominação política e de legitimação do capitalismo dependente no país. As ciências sociais paulistas – USP e UNICAMP especialmente, mas não exclusivamente – manufaturaram um consenso sobre a teoria da dependência que rendeu prestígio acadêmico e posições no aparelho de estado para alguns professores, mas é rigorosamente falso.
O principal “argumento” para a manufatura do consenso é agora repetido por Fiori, para quem a vertente marxista da dependência considerava “o desenvolvimento dos países centrais e o imperialismo um obstáculo intransponível para o desenvolvimento capitalista periférico. Por isto, falavam do “desenvolvimento do subdesenvolvimento” e defendiam a necessidade da revolução socialista imediata, inclusive como estratégia de desenvolvimento econômico”. (Cursiva nossa, NDO)
Sabemos que a fórmula “desenvolvimento do subdesenvolvimento” é uma criação do genial André Gunder Frank. O mineiro Ruy Mauro Marini, quem defendeu a necessidade de uma teoria marxista da dependência e deu importante contribuição nesta direção com seu magistral Dialética da dependência, escreveu que a formula frankiana era mesmo “impecável”. Portanto, posso concluir sem medo de errar que a crítica de Fiori – repetindo agora Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Guido Mantega e José Serra – esta dirigida basicamente contra Frank e Marini. Mas esta crítica é essencialmente injusta e não corresponde a história do debate.
André Gunder Frank (1929-2005) jamais disse a asneira de que o capitalismo era inviável na periferia do sistema mundial. Ao contrário, Frank, que pode ser considerado sem dúvida o precursor do debate marxista acerca da dependência, não somente desbancou as teses sobre a feudalidade na América Latina, como foi o principal crítico do capitalismo dependente que se desenvolvia aos olhos de todos. Neste contexto, a crítica recente é injusta porque o próprio Fiori teve o privilégio de assistir aos seminários de Frank no Chile e certamente ouviu não poucas vezes do próprio sua crítica tanto ao reformismo comunista quanto ao estagnacionismo que de certa forma seduziu muita gente antes do chamado “milagre brasileiro”. Mas nao era necessário participar das aulas de Gunder Frank para saber o óbvio sobre sua longa e ainda desconhecida obra; bastaria (re)ler Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin América. Historical studies of Chile and Brazil para entender a posição de Frank e sua notável contribuição ao debate das idéias latino-americanas.
É correto afirmar que em épocas passadas existiam aqueles que defendiam – reciclando idéias cepalinas tingidas de marxismo do Partidão (PCB) – que os “obstáculos externos” ao desenvolvimento representavam uma estratégia imperialista. Postulavam, portanto, que a “nação” deveria se opor ao “imperialismo” o que, obviamente, implicava em uma aliança de classe no interior do país dependente entre o proletariado e a burguesia considerada “nacional”. Mas precisamente contra estes, André Gunder Frank dirigiu suas baterias, destruindo a numa só vez o “mito do feudalismo na agricultura brasileira” e os “obstáculos externos” ao desenvolvimento. Foi uma crítica devastadora e ainda insuperável ao dualismo estruturalista da CEPAL e aliados. A fórmula “desenvolvimento do subdesenvolvimento” capta com precisão esta dinâmica. Ao contrário daqueles que afirmavam os “obstáculos” e/ou o “estagnacionismo” – presentes nos escritos de Furtado em 1965, por exemplo – Gunder Frank e Ruy Mauro Marini afirmavam que o desenvolvimento capitalista efetivamente ocorreria, mas sob a forma do subdesenvolvimento.
Na breve historia narrada por Fiori, existiria uma vertente da teoria da dependência – de filiação a um só tempo marxista e cepalina (!?) – que teve vida mais longa e logrou resultados melhores, num surpreendente e discreto elogio – tanto tardio quanto surrado – à FHC. Contudo, a tipologia construída por este e Enzo Faletto no Dependência e desenvolvimento na América Latina é obviamente de inspiração weberiana e o reconhecimento do conflito de classes no interior da nação que despertou tanta simpatia nos intelectuais progressistas não é, como sabemos, exclusividade de marxistas, porque também existem liberais que valoram a luta de classes sem vacilação, ainda que não tirem as mesmas conclusões que os marxistas.
O “apagão mental” mencionado por Fiori foi produto de uma derrota política que, no Brasil, se consolidou com o golpe militar de 1964. No interior da luta pela democratização, os liberais progressistas fizeram sua parte, caluniando e falsificando a história do pensamento crítico, especialmente da versão marxista da dependência, sem recorrer aos textos de Frank e Marini, muitos ainda sem tradução ao português. O CEBRAP foi um instrumento valioso nesta operação ideológica, mas “respeitáveis figuras” do mundo acadêmico paulista – especialmente nas escolas de economia e sociologia da USP e UNICAMP – aproveitaram a correlação de forças permitida pela ditadura para extirpar a principal contribuição marxista sobre o capitalismo latino-americano da vida intelectual e universitária brasileira. Frank e Marini não foram apenas proscritos: foram também falsificados! Outro tanto ocorreu também com Theotonio dos Santos, autor do imperdível “Socialismo ou fascismo: o dilema latino-americano”, lamentavelmente ainda não traduzido ao português.
Parte daquele “apagão mental” é produto da outrora útil distinção partidária entre tucanos e petistas que sempre ocultou algo importante, cada dia mais difícil de disfarçar: no terreno teórico, tanto uns quanto outros se alinhavam na manufaturação do consenso em favor da versão palatável dos estudos acerca da dependência, representada por Cardoso e Faletto. Não é apenas uma coincidência que a tese doutoral de Guido Mantega, finalmente vertida no livro que adultera completamente as teses de Frank e Marini, foi orientada por Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
Finalmente a questão central. Vivemos num continente sem teoria? É pouco provável. O programa de pesquisa lançado por Frank e Marini não foi superado teoricamente, ainda que sofreu uma derrota política a partir de 1964 pela força do terror de estado. Mas as condições mudaram radicalmente no cenário latino-americano e aquela vertente crítica da dependência, de extração marxista, esta sendo resgatada com muita força em toda a América Latina impulsionada pelos governos do nacionalismo revolucionário existentes na Venezuela, Equador e Bolívia. Mas também no Brasil o interesse pela teoria marxista da dependência voltou e não é mais possível reforçar o coro dominante que anestesiou algumas gerações de estudantes e militantes socialistas.
Enfim, se efetivamente queremos construir um projeto nacional-popular para o Brasil – que eu defendo socialista – a tarefa intelectual decisiva é a superação do “apagão mental” que tantas limitações impôs ao ambiente universitário e político brasileiro. Neste contexto, podemos ou nao compartilhar o ceticismo em relação as insuficiências teóricas nos programas destinados a superar a dependência e o subdesenvolvimento, mas não temos o direito de esquecer e menos ainda alterar os termos do debate de décadas passadas. Daí o caráter surpreendente do artigo de Fiori, pois ele reforça velhos preconceitos e não capta a nova correlação de forças que já esta criando uma nova América Latina sob o lema do “socialismo do século XXI”. Afinal, diante do “desenvolvimento do subdesenvolvimento”, não era o socialismo a única alternativa indicada por Frank e Marini?
Theotonio Dos Santos, Teoria da Dependência: Balanço e Perspectivas, Civilização Brasileira, RJ.
A edição Brasileira está esgotada mas talvez se encontre na Amazon ou outras liv rarias virtuais (alguén quer reeditar? entre em contato comigo.
Ver ediçao em espanhol por Plaza y Janés no México e Sudamericana na Argentina. Foi editado em chines pela Academia Chinesa de Ciencias Sociais.
-------Mensagem original-------
De: Prof. Nildo Ouriques
Data: 4/5/2009 11:20:29
Para: Grupo Economistas
Cc: Fiori
Assunto: resposta ao artigo de José Luis Fiori
Caros amigos,
em anexo uma breve relfexão em função do artigo de Fiori que circulou entre nós.
Abraços
Nildo Ouriques
----------------------------------------------------
América Latina, um continente sem teoria?
Nildo Ouriques*
Em recente artigo – Um continente sem teoria – José Luis Fiori nos oferece uma brevíssima e curiosa história das idéias na América Latina destinada a espetar o liberalismo que sempre se contentou em repetir nos trópicos as teorias “cosmopolitas” que com freqüência colonial aqui se reproduzem. Contudo, neste breve artigo, Fiori adere ao esporte nacional preferido pela intelectualidade paulista: a crítica à interpretação marxista da dependência e o elogio velado “a escola paulista de sociologia”, especialmente aquela vinculada ao nome de Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
No Brasil, o debate acerca da dependência sempre foi mal compreendido. Na verdade, é quase que desconhecido entre nós. Contudo, este desconhecimento não é resultado do acaso, pois tem sido construído como um instrumento de dominação política e de legitimação do capitalismo dependente no país. As ciências sociais paulistas – USP e UNICAMP especialmente, mas não exclusivamente – manufaturaram um consenso sobre a teoria da dependência que rendeu prestígio acadêmico e posições no aparelho de estado para alguns professores, mas é rigorosamente falso.
O principal “argumento” para a manufatura do consenso é agora repetido por Fiori, para quem a vertente marxista da dependência considerava “o desenvolvimento dos países centrais e o imperialismo um obstáculo intransponível para o desenvolvimento capitalista periférico. Por isto, falavam do “desenvolvimento do subdesenvolvimento” e defendiam a necessidade da revolução socialista imediata, inclusive como estratégia de desenvolvimento econômico”. (Cursiva nossa, NDO)
Sabemos que a fórmula “desenvolvimento do subdesenvolvimento” é uma criação do genial André Gunder Frank. O mineiro Ruy Mauro Marini, quem defendeu a necessidade de uma teoria marxista da dependência e deu importante contribuição nesta direção com seu magistral Dialética da dependência, escreveu que a formula frankiana era mesmo “impecável”. Portanto, posso concluir sem medo de errar que a crítica de Fiori – repetindo agora Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Guido Mantega e José Serra – esta dirigida basicamente contra Frank e Marini. Mas esta crítica é essencialmente injusta e não corresponde a história do debate.
André Gunder Frank (1929-2005) jamais disse a asneira de que o capitalismo era inviável na periferia do sistema mundial. Ao contrário, Frank, que pode ser considerado sem dúvida o precursor do debate marxista acerca da dependência, não somente desbancou as teses sobre a feudalidade na América Latina, como foi o principal crítico do capitalismo dependente que se desenvolvia aos olhos de todos. Neste contexto, a crítica recente é injusta porque o próprio Fiori teve o privilégio de assistir aos seminários de Frank no Chile e certamente ouviu não poucas vezes do próprio sua crítica tanto ao reformismo comunista quanto ao estagnacionismo que de certa forma seduziu muita gente antes do chamado “milagre brasileiro”. Mas nao era necessário participar das aulas de Gunder Frank para saber o óbvio sobre sua longa e ainda desconhecida obra; bastaria (re)ler Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin América. Historical studies of Chile and Brazil para entender a posição de Frank e sua notável contribuição ao debate das idéias latino-americanas.
É correto afirmar que em épocas passadas existiam aqueles que defendiam – reciclando idéias cepalinas tingidas de marxismo do Partidão (PCB) – que os “obstáculos externos” ao desenvolvimento representavam uma estratégia imperialista. Postulavam, portanto, que a “nação” deveria se opor ao “imperialismo” o que, obviamente, implicava em uma aliança de classe no interior do país dependente entre o proletariado e a burguesia considerada “nacional”. Mas precisamente contra estes, André Gunder Frank dirigiu suas baterias, destruindo a numa só vez o “mito do feudalismo na agricultura brasileira” e os “obstáculos externos” ao desenvolvimento. Foi uma crítica devastadora e ainda insuperável ao dualismo estruturalista da CEPAL e aliados. A fórmula “desenvolvimento do subdesenvolvimento” capta com precisão esta dinâmica. Ao contrário daqueles que afirmavam os “obstáculos” e/ou o “estagnacionismo” – presentes nos escritos de Furtado em 1965, por exemplo – Gunder Frank e Ruy Mauro Marini afirmavam que o desenvolvimento capitalista efetivamente ocorreria, mas sob a forma do subdesenvolvimento.
Na breve historia narrada por Fiori, existiria uma vertente da teoria da dependência – de filiação a um só tempo marxista e cepalina (!?) – que teve vida mais longa e logrou resultados melhores, num surpreendente e discreto elogio – tanto tardio quanto surrado – à FHC. Contudo, a tipologia construída por este e Enzo Faletto no Dependência e desenvolvimento na América Latina é obviamente de inspiração weberiana e o reconhecimento do conflito de classes no interior da nação que despertou tanta simpatia nos intelectuais progressistas não é, como sabemos, exclusividade de marxistas, porque também existem liberais que valoram a luta de classes sem vacilação, ainda que não tirem as mesmas conclusões que os marxistas.
O “apagão mental” mencionado por Fiori foi produto de uma derrota política que, no Brasil, se consolidou com o golpe militar de 1964. No interior da luta pela democratização, os liberais progressistas fizeram sua parte, caluniando e falsificando a história do pensamento crítico, especialmente da versão marxista da dependência, sem recorrer aos textos de Frank e Marini, muitos ainda sem tradução ao português. O CEBRAP foi um instrumento valioso nesta operação ideológica, mas “respeitáveis figuras” do mundo acadêmico paulista – especialmente nas escolas de economia e sociologia da USP e UNICAMP – aproveitaram a correlação de forças permitida pela ditadura para extirpar a principal contribuição marxista sobre o capitalismo latino-americano da vida intelectual e universitária brasileira. Frank e Marini não foram apenas proscritos: foram também falsificados! Outro tanto ocorreu também com Theotonio dos Santos, autor do imperdível “Socialismo ou fascismo: o dilema latino-americano”, lamentavelmente ainda não traduzido ao português.
Parte daquele “apagão mental” é produto da outrora útil distinção partidária entre tucanos e petistas que sempre ocultou algo importante, cada dia mais difícil de disfarçar: no terreno teórico, tanto uns quanto outros se alinhavam na manufaturação do consenso em favor da versão palatável dos estudos acerca da dependência, representada por Cardoso e Faletto. Não é apenas uma coincidência que a tese doutoral de Guido Mantega, finalmente vertida no livro que adultera completamente as teses de Frank e Marini, foi orientada por Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
Finalmente a questão central. Vivemos num continente sem teoria? É pouco provável. O programa de pesquisa lançado por Frank e Marini não foi superado teoricamente, ainda que sofreu uma derrota política a partir de 1964 pela força do terror de estado. Mas as condições mudaram radicalmente no cenário latino-americano e aquela vertente crítica da dependência, de extração marxista, esta sendo resgatada com muita força em toda a América Latina impulsionada pelos governos do nacionalismo revolucionário existentes na Venezuela, Equador e Bolívia. Mas também no Brasil o interesse pela teoria marxista da dependência voltou e não é mais possível reforçar o coro dominante que anestesiou algumas gerações de estudantes e militantes socialistas.
Enfim, se efetivamente queremos construir um projeto nacional-popular para o Brasil – que eu defendo socialista – a tarefa intelectual decisiva é a superação do “apagão mental” que tantas limitações impôs ao ambiente universitário e político brasileiro. Neste contexto, podemos ou nao compartilhar o ceticismo em relação as insuficiências teóricas nos programas destinados a superar a dependência e o subdesenvolvimento, mas não temos o direito de esquecer e menos ainda alterar os termos do debate de décadas passadas. Daí o caráter surpreendente do artigo de Fiori, pois ele reforça velhos preconceitos e não capta a nova correlação de forças que já esta criando uma nova América Latina sob o lema do “socialismo do século XXI”. Afinal, diante do “desenvolvimento do subdesenvolvimento”, não era o socialismo a única alternativa indicada por Frank e Marini?
terça-feira, 5 de maio de 2009
Condecoração de Comendador
Theotonio Dos Santos escreveu:
Agradeço o convite para a solenidade de recepção da condecoração do grau de Comendador da Ordem a realizar-se no próximo dia 7 de maio às 11 horas com a presença do sr. Presidente da República com o qual me sinto muito honrado. Estarei presente.
Cordialmente,
Theotonio Dos Santos
Agradeço o convite para a solenidade de recepção da condecoração do grau de Comendador da Ordem a realizar-se no próximo dia 7 de maio às 11 horas com a presença do sr. Presidente da República com o qual me sinto muito honrado. Estarei presente.
Cordialmente,
Theotonio Dos Santos
David Harvey entrevista Giovanni Arrighi na New Left Review
David Harvey entrevista Giovanni Arrighi
Entrevista Arrighi New Left Review
New Left Review 56, March-April 2009
GIOVANNI ARRIGHI
THE WINDING PATHS OF CAPITAL
Interview by David Harvey
Could you tell us about your family background and your education?
I was born in Milan in 1937. On my mother’s side, my family background was bourgeois. My grandfather, the son of Swiss immigrants to Italy, had risen from the ranks of the labour aristocracy to establish his own factories in the early twentieth century, manufacturing textile machinery and later, heating and air-conditioning equipment. My father was the son of a railway worker, born in Tuscany. He came to Milan and got a job in my maternal grandfather’s factory—in other words, he ended up marrying the boss’s daughter. There were tensions, which eventually resulted in my father setting up his own business, in competition with his father-in-law. Both shared anti-fascist sentiments, however, and that greatly influenced my early childhood, dominated as it was by the war: the Nazi occupation of Northern Italy after Rome’s surrender in 1943, the Resistance and the arrival of the Allied troops.
My father died suddenly in a car accident, when I was 18. I decided to keep his company going, against my grandfather’s advice, and entered the Università Bocconi to study economics, hoping it would help me understand how to run the firm. The Economics Department was a neo-classical stronghold, untouched by Keynesianism of any kind, and no help at all with my father’s business. I finally realized I would have to close it down. I then spent two years on the shop-floor of one of my grandfather’s firms, collecting data on the organization of the production process. The study convinced me that the elegant general-equilibrium models of neo-classical economics were irrelevant to an understanding of the production and distribution of incomes. This became the basis of my dissertation. Then I was appointed as assistente volontario, or unpaid teaching assistant to my professor—in those days, the first rung on the ladder in Italian universities. To earn my living I got a job with Unilever, as a trainee manager.
How did it come about that you went to Africa in 1963, to work in the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland?
Why I went there was pretty straightforward. I learnt that British universities were actually paying people to teach and do research—unlike the position in Italy, where you had to serve for four or five years as an assistente volontario before there was any hope of a paid job. In the early 1960s the British were setting up universities throughout their former colonial empire, as colleges of British ones. The ucrn was a college of the University of London. I had put in for two positions, one in Rhodesia and one in Singapore. They called me for an interview in London and, because the ucrn was interested, they offered me the job as Lecturer in Economics. So I went.
It was a true intellectual rebirth. The mathematically modelled neo-classical tradition I’d been trained in had nothing to say about the processes I was observing in Rhodesia, or the realities of African life. At ucrn I worked alongside social anthropologists, particularly Clyde Mitchell, who was already doing work on network analysis, and Jaap Van Velsen, who was introducing situational analysis, later reconceptualized as extended case-study analysis. I went to their seminars regularly and was greatly influenced by the two of them. Gradually, I abandoned abstract modelling for the concrete, empirically and historically grounded theory of social anthropology. I began my long march from neo-classical economics to comparative-historical sociology.
This was the context for your 1966 essay, ‘The Political Economy of Rhodesia’, which analysed the forms of capitalist class development there, and their specific contradictions—explaining the dynamics that led to the victory of the settlers’ Rhodesian Front Party in 1962, and to Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. What was the initial impulse behind the essay, and what is its importance for you, looking back?
‘The Political Economy of Rhodesia’ was written at the incitement of Van Velsen, who was relentlessly critical of my use of mathematical models. I had done a review of Colin Leys’s book, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, and Van Velsen suggested I develop it into a longer article. Here, and in ‘Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective’, I analysed the ways in which the full proletarianization of the Rhodesian peasantry created contradictions for capital accumulation—in fact, ended up producing more problems than advantages for the capitalist sector. [1] As long as proletarianization was partial, it created conditions in which the African peasants subsidized capital accumulation, because they produced part of their own subsistence; but the more proletarianized the peasantry became, the more these mechanisms began to break down. Fully proletarianized labour could be exploited only if it was paid a full living wage. Thus, instead of making it easier to exploit labour, proletarianization was actually making it more difficult, and often required the regime to become more repressive. Martin Legassick and Harold Wolpe, for example, maintained that South African Apartheid was primarily due to the fact that the regime had to become more repressive of the African labour force because it was fully proletarianized, and could no longer subsidize capital accumulation as it had done in the past.
The whole southern region of Africa—stretching from South Africa and Botswana through the former Rhodesias, Mozambique, Malawi, which was then Nyasaland, up to Kenya, as the north-east outpost—was characterized by mineral wealth, settler agriculture and extreme dispossession of the peasantry. It is very different from the rest of Africa, including the north. West African economies were essentially peasant-based. But the southern region—what Samir Amin called ‘the Africa of the labour reserves’—was in many ways a paradigm of extreme peasant dispossession, and thus proletarianization. Several of us were pointing out that this process of extreme dispossession was contradictory. Initially it created the conditions for the peasantry to subsidize capitalist agriculture, mining, manufacturing and so on. But increasingly it created difficulties in exploiting, mobilizing, controlling the proletariat that was being created. The work that we were doing then—my ‘Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective’, and related works by Legassick and Wolpe—established what came to be known as the Southern Africa Paradigm on the limits of proletarianization and dispossession.
Contrary to those who still identify capitalist development with proletarianization tout court—Robert Brenner, for example—the southern Africa experience showed that proletarianization, in and by itself, does not favour capitalist development—all kinds of other circumstances are required. For Rhodesia, I identified three stages of proletarianization, only one of which was favourable to capitalist accumulation. In the first stage, the peasants responded to rural capitalist development by supplying agricultural products, and would only supply labour in return for high wages. The whole area thus came to be characterized by a shortage of labour, because whenever capitalist agriculture or mining began developing, it created a demand for local produce which the African peasants were very quick to supply; they could participate in the money economy through the sale of produce rather than the sale of labour. One aim of state support for settler agriculture was to create competition for the African peasants, so that they would be forced to supply labour rather than products. This led to a long-drawn-out process that went from partial proletarianization to full proletarianization; but, as already mentioned it was also a contradictory process. The problem with the simple ‘proletarianization as capitalist development’ model is that it ignores not just the realities of southern Africa’s settler capitalism but also many other cases, such as the United States itself, which was characterized by a totally different pattern—a combination of slavery, genocide of the native population and the immigration of surplus labour from Europe.
You were one of nine lecturers at ucrn arrested for political activities during the Smith government’s July 1966 clampdown?
Yes, we were jailed for a week, and then deported.
You went to Dar es Salaam, which sounded then like a paradise of intellectual interactions, in many ways. Can you tell us about that period, and the collaborative work you did there with John Saul?
It was a very exciting time, both intellectually and politically. When I got to Dar es Salaam in 1966, Tanzania had only been independent for a few years. Nyerere was advocating what he considered to be a form of African socialism. He managed to stay equidistant from both sides during the Sino-Soviet split, and maintained very good relations with the Scandinavians. Dar es Salaam became the outpost of all the exiled national liberation movements of southern Africa—from the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia and South Africa. I spent three years at the University there, and met all kinds of people: activists from the Black Power movement in the us, as well as scholars and intellectuals like Immanuel Wallerstein, David Apter, Walter Rodney, Roger Murray, Sol Picciotto, Catherine Hoskins, Jim Mellon, who later was one of the founders of the Weathermen, Luisa Passerini, who was doing research on Frelimo, and many others; including, of course, John Saul.
At Dar es Salaam, working with John, I shifted my research interests from labour supplies to the issue of national liberation movements and the new regimes that were emerging out of decolonization. We were both sceptical about the capacity of these regimes to emancipate themselves from what was just starting to be called neocolonialism, and actually deliver on their promises of economic development. But there was also a difference between us, which I think has persisted until today, in that I was far less upset by this than John was. For me, these movements were national liberation movements; they were not in any way socialist movements, even when they embraced the rhetoric of socialism. They were populist regimes, and therefore I didn’t expect much beyond national liberation, which we both saw as very important in itself. But whether there were possibilities for political developments beyond this is something that John and I still quarrel about to this day, good-humouredly, whenever we meet. But the essays we wrote together were the critique that we agreed upon.
When you came back to Europe, you found a very different world to the one you’d left six years before?
Yes. I came back to Italy in 1969, and I was immediately plunged into two situations. One was at the University of Trento, where I had been offered a lectureship. Trento was the main centre of student militancy, and the only university in Italy that gave doctorates in Sociology at the time. My appointment was sponsored by the organizing committee of the university, which consisted of the Christian Democrat Nino Andreatta, the liberal socialist Norberto Bobbio, and Francesco Alberoni; it was part of an attempt to tame the student movement through hiring a radical. In the first seminar I gave, I only had four or five students; but in the fall semester, after my book on Africa came out in the summer of 1969, I had almost 1,000 students trying to get into the classroom. [2] My course became the big event of Trento. It even split Lotta Continua: the Boato faction wanted students to come to the class, to hear a radical critique of development theories, whereas the Rostagno faction was trying to disrupt the lectures by throwing stones at the classroom from the courtyard.
The second situation was in Turin, via Luisa Passerini, who was a prominent propagator of the Situationists’ writings, and therefore had a big influence on many of the cadres of Lotta Continua who were picking up on Situationism. I was commuting from Trento to Turin, via Milan—from the centre of the student movement to the centre of the workers’ movement. I felt attracted and at the same time bothered by some aspects of this movement—particularly its rejection of ‘politics’. At some of the assemblies, very militant workers would stand up and say, ‘Enough of politics! Politics is dragging us in the wrong direction. We need unity.’ For me, it was quite a shock, coming from Africa, to discover that the Communist unions were considered reactionary and repressive by the workers in struggle—and there was an important element of truth in this. The reaction against the pci unions became a reaction against all trade unions. Groups like Potere Operaio and Lotta Continua established themselves as alternatives, both to the unions and to the mass parties. With Romano Madera, who was then a student, but also a political cadre and a Gramscian—a rarity in the extra-parliamentary left—we began to develop the idea of finding a Gramscian strategy to relate to the movement.
That’s where the idea of autonomia—of the intellectual autonomy of the working class—first emerged. The creation of this concept is now generally attributed to Antonio Negri. But in fact it originated in the interpretation of Gramsci that we developed in the early 1970s, in the Gruppo Gramsci co-founded by Madera, Passerini and myself. We saw our main contribution to the movement not as providing a substitute for the unions, or for the parties, but as students and intellectuals who were involved in helping the workers’ vanguards to develop their own autonomy—autonomia operaia—through an understanding of the broader processes, both national and global, in which their struggles were taking place. In Gramscian terms, this was conceived as the formation of organic intellectuals of the working class in struggle. To this end we formed the Colletivi Politici Operai (cpos), which became known as the Area dell’Autonomia. As these collectives developed their own autonomous practice, the Gruppo Gramsci would cease to have a function and could disband. When it actually was disbanded in the fall of 1973, Negri came into the picture, and took the cpos and the Area dell’Autonomia in an adventurous direction that was far from what was originally intended.
Were there any common lessons that you took from the African national liberation struggles and Italian working-class struggles?
The two experiences had in common the fact that, in both, I had very good relations with the broader movements. They wanted to know on what basis I was participating in their struggle. My position was: ‘I’m not going to tell you what to do, because you know your situation much better than I ever will. But I am better placed to understand the wider context in which it develops. So our exchange has to be based on the fact that you tell me what your situation is, and I tell you how it relates to the wider context which you cannot see, or can see only partially, from where you operate.’ That was always the basis of excellent relations, both with the liberation movements in southern Africa and with the Italian workers.
The articles on the capitalist crisis originated in an exchange of this kind, in 1972. [3] The workers were being told, ‘Now there is an economic crisis, we have to keep quiet. If we carry on struggling, the factory jobs will go elsewhere.’ So the workers posed the question to us: ‘Are we in a crisis? And if so, what are its implications? Should we just stay quiet now, because of this?’ The articles that comprised ‘Towards a Theory of Capitalist Crisis’ were written within this particular problematic, framed by the workers themselves, who were saying: ‘Tell us about the world out there and what we have to expect.’ The starting-point of the articles was, ‘Look, crises occur whether you struggle or not—they’re not a function of workers’ militancy, or of “mistakes” in economic management, but fundamental to the operations of capitalist accumulation itself.’ That was the initial orientation. It was written at the very beginning of the crisis; before the existence of a crisis was widely recognized. It became important as a framework that I’ve used, over the years, to monitor what is happening. From that point of view, it has worked pretty well.
We’ll come back to the theory of capitalist crises, but I wanted first to ask you about your work in Calabria. In 1973, just as the movement was finally starting to subside, you took up the offer of a teaching position at Cosenza?
One of the attractions of going to Calabria, for me, was to continue in a new location my research on labour supplies. I had already seen in Rhodesia how, when the Africans were fully proletarianized—or, more precisely, when they became conscious that they were now fully proletarianized—this led to struggles to get a living wage in the urban areas. In other words, the fiction that ‘We are single males, our families continue to live peasant lives in the countryside’, cannot hold once they actually have to live in the cities. I had pointed this out in ‘Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective’. It came into clearer focus in Italy, because there was this puzzle: migrants from the south were brought into the northern industrial regions as scabs, in the 1950s and early 1960s. But from the 1960s, and especially the late 1960s, they were transformed into class-struggle vanguards, which is a typical experience of migrants. When I set up a research working group in Calabria, I got them to read the social anthropologists on Africa, particularly on migration, and then we did an analysis of the labour supply from Calabria. The questions were: what was creating the conditions for this migration? And what were its limits—given that, at a certain point, instead of creating a docile labour force that could be used to undermine the bargaining power of the northern working class, the migrants themselves became the militant vanguard?
Two things emerged from the research. First, capitalist development does not necessarily rely on full proletarianization. On the one hand, long-distance labour migration was occurring from places where no dispossession was taking place; where there were even possibilities for the migrants to buy land from the landlords. This was related to the local system of primogeniture, whereby only the eldest son inherited the land. Traditionally, younger sons ended up joining the Church or the Army, until large-scale, long-distance migrations provided an increasingly important alternative way to earn the money necessary to buy land back home and set up their own farms. On the other hand, in the really poor areas, where labour was fully proletarianized, they usually could not afford to migrate at all. The only way in which they could do so was, for example, when the Brazilians abolished slavery in 1888 and needed a substitute cheap labour force. They recruited workers from these deeply impoverished areas of southern Italy, paid their fares and resettled them in Brazil, to replace the emancipated slaves. These are very different patterns of migration. But generally speaking, it is not the very poor who migrate; it is necessary to have some means and connections in order to do so.
The second finding from the Calabrian research had similarities with the results from the research on Africa. Here, too, the migrants’ disposition towards engaging in working-class struggles in the places to which they had moved depended on whether the conditions there were considered as permanently determining their life chances. It’s not enough to say that the situation in the out-migrating areas determines what salaries and conditions the migrants will work for. One has to say at what point the migrants perceive themselves as deriving the bulk of their subsistence from wage employment—it’s a switch that can be detected and monitored. But the main point to emerge was a different kind of critique of the idea of proletarianization as the typical process of capitalist development.
The initial write-up of this research was stolen from a car in Rome, so the final write-up took place in the United States, many years after you moved to Binghamton in 1979, where world-systems analysis was being developed.Was this the first time you explicitly situated your position on the relationship between proletarianization and capitalist development vis-à-vis those of Wallerstein and Brenner?
Yes, although I was not sufficiently explicit about this, even though I mentioned both Wallerstein and Brenner in passing; but the whole piece is, in fact, a critique of both of them. [4] Wallerstein holds the theory that relations of production are determined by their position in a core–periphery structure. According to him, in the periphery, you tend to have relations of production that are coercive; you don’t have full proletarianization, which is a situation that you find in the core. Brenner has, in some respects, the opposite view, but in other ways it is very similar: that relations of production determine position in the core–periphery structure. In both, you have one particular relationship between position in the core–periphery and relations of production. The Calabrian research showed that this is not the case. There, within the same peripheral location, we found three different paths developing simultaneously, and mutually reinforcing each other. Moreover, the three paths strongly resembled developments that had, historically, characterized different core locations. One is very similar to Lenin’s ‘Junker’ route—latifundia with full proletarianization; another to Lenin’s ‘American’ route, of small and medium farms, embedded in the market. Lenin doesn’t have the third one, which we called the Swiss route: long-distance migration, and then investment and retention of property back home. In Switzerland, there is no dispossession of the peasantry but rather a tradition of migration that led to the consolidation of small farming. The interesting thing about Calabria is that all three routes, which elsewhere are associated with a position in the core, are found here in the periphery—which is a critique both of Brenner’s single process of proletarianization, and of Wallerstein’s tracing of relations of production to position.
Your Geometry of Imperialism appeared in 1978, before you went to the us. Re-reading it, I was struck by the mathematical metaphor—the geometry—which you use to construct the understanding of Hobson’s theory of imperialism, and which performs a very useful function. But inside it, there’s an interesting geographical question: when you bring Hobson and capitalism together, the notion of hegemony suddenly emerges, as a geometry-to-geography shift in what you’re doing. What was the initial spur to writing The Geometry, and what is its importance for you?
I was disturbed, at the time, by the terminological confusions that were swirling around the term ‘imperialism’. My aim was to dissipate some of the confusion by creating a topological space in which the different concepts, which were often all confusingly referred to as ‘imperialism’, could be distinguished from one another. But as an exercise on imperialism, yes, it also functioned as a transition to the concept of hegemony for me. I spelled this out explicitly in the Postscript to the 1983 second edition of The Geometry of Imperialism, where I argued that the Gramscian concept of hegemony could be more useful than ‘imperialism’ in analysing contemporary dynamics of the inter-state system. From this point of view, what I—and others—did was simply to re-apply Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to inter-state relations, where it had originally been before Gramsci applied it to an analysis of class relations within a national political jurisdiction. In doing so, of course, Gramsci enriched the concept in many ways that had not been graspable before. Our re-exportation of it to the international sphere benefited enormously from this enrichment.
A central influence in the conception of The Long Twentieth Century, published in 1994, is Braudel. After absorbing it, do you have any significant criticisms of him?
The criticism is fairly easy. Braudel is an incredibly rich source of information about markets and capitalism, but he has no theoretical framework. Or more accurately, as Charles Tilly pointed out, he is so eclectic that he has innumerable partial theories, the sum of which is no theory. You can’t simply rely on Braudel; you have to approach him with a clear idea of what you are looking for, and what you are extracting from him. One thing that I focused on, which differentiates Braudel from Wallerstein and all other world-systems analysts—not to speak of more traditional economic historians, Marxist or otherwise—is the idea that the system of national states, as it emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was preceded by a system of city-states; and that one has to look for the origins of capitalism there, in the city-states. This is the distinguishing feature of the West, or Europe, compared to other parts of the world. But you easily get lost if you just follow Braudel, because he takes you in so many different directions. For example, I had to extract this point and combine it with what I was learning from William McNeill’s Pursuit of Power, which also argues, from a different perspective, that a system of city-states preceded and prepared the emergence of a system of territorial states.
Another idea, to which you provide much greater theoretical depth, but which nevertheless comes from Braudel, is the notion that financial expansion announces the autumn of a particular hegemonic system, and precedes a shift to a new hegemon. This would seem a central insight of The Long Twentieth Century?
Yes. The idea was that the leading capitalist organizations of a particular epoch would also be the leaders of the financial expansion, which always occurs when the material expansion of productive forces reaches its limits. The logic of this process—though again, Braudel doesn’t provide it—is that when competition intensifies, investment in the material economy becomes increasingly risky, and therefore the liquidity preference of accumulators is accentuated, which, in turn, creates the supply conditions of the financial expansion. The next question, of course, is how the demand conditions for financial expansions are created. On this, I relied on Weber’s idea that inter-state competition for mobile capital constitutes the world-historical specificity of the modern era. This competition, I argued, creates the demand conditions for the financial expansion. Braudel’s idea of ‘autumn’—as the concluding phase of a process of leadership in accumulation, which goes from material to financial, and eventually to displacement by another leader—is crucial. But so is Marx’s idea that the autumn of a particular state, experiencing financial expansion, is also the springtime for another location: surpluses that accumulate in Venice go to Holland; those that accumulate in Holland then go to Britain; and those that accumulate in Britain go to the United States. Marx thus enables us to complement what we have in Braudel: autumn becomes a spring elsewhere, producing a series of interconnected developments.
The Long Twentieth Century traces these successive cycles of capitalist expansion and hegemonic power from the Renaissance to the present. In your narrative, phases of material expansion of capital eventually peter out under the pressure of overcompetition, giving way to phases of financial expansion, whose exhaustion then precipitates a time of inter-state chaos which is resolved by the emergence of a new hegemonic power, capable of restoring global order and restarting the cycle of material expansion once again, supported by a new social bloc. Such hegemons have been in turn Genoa, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States. How far do you regard their punctual appearance, each putting an end to a preceding time of troubles, as a set of contingencies?
Good and difficult question! There is always an element of contingency. At the same time, the reason why these transitions take so long, and go through periods of turbulence and chaos, is that the agencies themselves, as they later emerge to organize the system, go through a learning process. This is clear if we look at the most recent case, that of the United States. By the late nineteenth century, the United States already had some characteristics that made it a possible successor to Britain as the hegemonic leader. But it took more than half a century, two world wars and a catastrophic depression before the United States actually developed both the structures and the ideas that, after the Second World War, enabled it to become truly hegemonic. Was the development of the United States as a potential hegemon in the nineteenth century strictly a contingency, or is there something else? I don’t know. Clearly, there was a contingent geographical aspect—North America had a different spatial configuration than Europe, which enabled the formation of a state that could not be created in Europe itself, except on the eastern flank, where Russia was also expanding territorially. But there was also a systemic element: Britain created an international credit system that, after a certain point, favoured the formation of the United States in particular ways.
Certainly, if there had been no United States, with its particular historical-geographical configuration in the late nineteenth century, history would have been very different. Who would have become hegemonic? We can only conjecture. But there was the United States, which was building, in many ways, on the tradition of Holland and Britain. Genoa was a bit different: I never say that it was hegemonic; it was closer to the type of transnational financial organization that occurs in diasporas, including the contemporary Chinese diaspora. But it was not hegemonic in the Gramscian sense that Holland, Britain and the United States were. Geography matters a lot; but even though these are three spatially very different hegemons, each built on organizational characteristics learned from the previous one. There is considerable borrowing by Britain from the Netherlands, and by the United States from Britain; these are an interlinked set of states—there is a kind of snowball effect. So, yes, there is contingency; but there are also systemic links.
The Long Twentieth Century doesn’t cover the fate of the labour movement. Did you omit it because you regarded it, by then, as of lesser importance, or because the architecture of the book—its subtitle is Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times—was already so far-reaching and complex that you felt to include labour would overload it?
More the latter. The Long Twentieth Century was originally supposed to be co-authored with Beverly Silver—whom I first met in Binghamton—and was to be in three parts. One was the hegemonies, which now actually forms the book’s first chapter. The second part was supposed to be capital—the organization of capital, the business enterprise; basically, competition. The third part was supposed to be labour—labour and capital relations, and labour movements. But the discovery of financialization as a recurrent pattern of historical capitalism upset the whole project. It forced me to go back in time, which I never wanted to do, because the book was really supposed to be about the ‘long twentieth century’, meaning from the 1870s Great Depression through to the present. When I discovered the financialization paradigm I was thrown completely off balance, and The Long Twentieth Century became basically a book about the role of finance capital in the historical development of capitalism, from the fourteenth century. So Beverly took over the work on labour, in her Forces of Labour, which came out in 2003. [5]
Co-authored by the two of you in 1999, Chaos and Governance seems to respect the kind of structure you’d initially planned for The Long Twentieth Century?
Yes, in Chaos and Governance there are chapters on geopolitics, business enterprise, social conflict, and so on. [6] So the original project was never abandoned. But it certainly was not adhered to in The Long Twentieth Century, because I could not focus on the cyclical recurrence of financial expansions and material expansions and, at the same time, deal with labour. Once you shift the focus in defining capitalism to an alternation of material and financial expansions, it becomes very difficult to bring labour back in. Not only is there too much to cover, but there is also considerable variation over time and space in the relationship between capital and labour. For one thing, as we point out in Chaos and Governance, there is a speeding up of social history. When you compare transitions from one regime of accumulation to another, you realize that in the transition from Dutch to British hegemony in the eighteenth century, social conflict comes in late, relative to financial expansions and wars. In the transition from British to us hegemony in the early twentieth century, the explosion of social conflict was more or less simultaneous with the take-off of the financial expansion and wars. In the current transition—to an unknown destination—the explosion of social conflict in the late 1960s and early 1970s preceded the financial expansion, and took place without wars among the major powers.
In other words, if you take the first half of the twentieth century, the biggest workers’ struggles occurred on the eve of the world wars, and in their aftermath. This was the basis of Lenin’s theory of revolution: that inter-capitalist rivalries turning into wars would create favourable conditions for revolution, which is something that can be observed empirically up to the Second World War. In a sense one could argue that, in the present transition, the speeding up of social conflict has prevented capitalist states from waging wars on one another. So, to return to your question, in The Long Twentieth Century I chose to focus on elaborating fully the argument about financial expansions, systemic cycles of capital accumulation and world hegemonies; but in Chaos and Governance we returned to the issue of the inter-relations between social conflict, financial expansions and hegemonic transitions.
In his discussion of primitive accumulation, Marx writes about the national debt, the credit system, the bankocracy—in a way, the integration between finance and state that occurred during primitive accumulation—as being absolutely critical to the way in which a capitalist system evolves. But the analysis in Capital refuses to deal with the credit system until you get to Volume Three, because Marx doesn’t want to deal with interest, even though the credit system keeps on coming up as crucial to the centralization of capital, to the organization of fixed capital, and so on. This raises the question of how class struggle actually works around the finance–state nexus, which plays the vital role that you’re pointing to. There seems to be a gap in Marx’s analysis: on the one hand, saying the important dynamic is that between capital and labour; on the other hand, labour doesn’t seem to be crucial to the processes that you’re talking about—transferences of hegemony, jumping of scales. It’s understandable that The Long Twentieth Century had a hard time integrating labour into that story, because in a sense the capital–labour relation is not central to that aspect of the capitalist dynamic. Would you agree with that?
Yes, I agree, with one qualification: the phenomenon I mentioned of the speeding up of social history. The worker struggles of the 1960s and early 1970s, for example, were a major factor in the financialization of the late 1970s and 1980s, and the ways in which it evolved. The relationship between workers’ and subaltern struggles and financialization is something that changes over time, and has recently developed characteristics that it didn’t have before. But if you are trying to explain the recurrence of financial expansions, you cannot focus too much on labour, because then you will be talking only about the latest cycle; you are bound to make the mistake of taking labour as the cause of financial expansions, when earlier ones took off without the intervention of workers’ or subaltern struggles.
Still on the question of labour, then, could we track back to your 1990 essay on the remaking of the world labour movement, ‘Marxist Century, American Century’. [7] You argued there that Marx’s account of the working class in the Manifesto is deeply contradictory, since it stresses at once the increasing collective power of labour, as capitalist development proceeds, and its increasing immiseration, corresponding in effect to an active industrial army and a reserve army. Marx, you pointed out, thought that both tendencies would be united in the same human mass; but you went on to argue that, in the early twentieth century, they in fact became spatially polarized. In Scandinavia and the Anglosphere, the first prevailed, in Russia and further east the second—Bernstein capturing the situation of the former, Lenin of the latter—leading to the split between reformist and revolutionary wings of the labour movement. In Central Europe—Germany, Austria, Italy—on the other hand, you argued that there was a more fluctuating balance between active and reserve, leading to Kautsky’s equivocations, unable to choose between reform or revolution, contributing to the victory of fascism. At the end of the essay you suggested that a recomposition of the labour movement might be coming about—misery reappearing in the West, with the return of widespread unemployment; and collective power of workers, with the rise of Solidarity, in the East, perhaps reuniting what space and history had divided. What is your view of such a prospect today?
Well, the first thing is that, along with this optimistic scenario from the point of view of uniting the conditions of the working class globally, there was a more pessimistic consideration in the essay, pointing to something that I’ve always considered a very serious flaw in Marx and Engels’s Manifesto. There is a logical leap that does not really hold up, intellectually or historically—the idea that, for capital, those things that we would today call gender, ethnicity, nationality, do not matter. That the only thing that matters for capital is the possibility of exploitation; and therefore the most exploitable status group within the working class is the one they will employ, without any discrimination on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity. That’s certainly true. However, it doesn’t follow that the various status groups within the working class will just accept this. In fact, it is precisely at the point when proletarianization becomes generalized, and workers are subjected to this disposition of capital, that they will mobilize whatever status difference they can identify or construct to win a privileged treatment from the capitalists. They will mobilize along gender lines, national lines, ethnicity or whatever, to obtain a privileged treatment from capital.
‘Marxist Century, American Century’ is therefore not as optimistic as it might have seemed, because it pointed to this internal working-class tendency to accentuate status differences, to protect themselves from the disposition of capital to treat labour as an undifferentiated mass that would be employed only to the extent that it enabled capital to reap profits. So the article ended on an optimistic note, that there is a tendency toward levelling; but at the same time one should expect workers to fight to protect themselves through status-group formation or consolidation against this very tendency.
Does this mean that the differentiation between the active army and the industrial reserve army also tends to be status-divided—racialized, if you will?
It depends. If you look at the process globally—where the reserve army is not just the unemployed, but also the disguisedly unemployed and the excluded—then definitely there is a status division between the two. Nationality has been used by segments of the working class, of the active army, to differentiate themselves from the global reserve army. At a national level, this is less clear. If you take the United States or Europe, it’s much less apparent that there is actually a status difference between the active and reserve army. But with immigrants currently coming from countries that are much poorer, anti-immigration sentiments which are a manifestation of this tendency to create status distinctions within the working class have grown. So it’s a very complicated picture, particularly if you look at transnational migration flows, and at the situation where the reserve army is primarily concentrated in the global South rather than the North.
In your 1991 article, ‘World Income Inequalities and the Future of Socialism’, you showed the extraordinary stability of the regional wealth hierarchy in the twentieth century—the extent to which the gap in per capita income between the core North/West and the semi-peripheral and peripheral South/East of the world had remained unchanged, or actually deepened, after half a century of developmentalism. [8] Communism, you pointed out, had failed to close this gap in Russia, Eastern Europe and China, though it had done no worse in this respect than capitalism in Latin America, Southeast Asia or Africa, and in other respects—a more egalitarian distribution of income within society, and greater independence of the state from the North/Western core—it had done significantly better. A couple of decades later, China has obviously broken the pattern you were describing then. How far did this come—or not come—as a surprise to you?
First of all, we should not exaggerate the extent to which China has broken the pattern. The level of per capita income in China was so low—and still is low, compared to the wealthy countries—that even major advances need to be qualified. China has doubled its position relative to the rich world, but still that only means going from 2 per cent of the average per capita income of the wealthy countries to 4 per cent. It is true that China has been decisive in producing a reduction in world income inequalities between countries. If you take China out, the South’s position has worsened since the 1980s; if you keep it in, then the South has improved somewhat, due almost exclusively to China’s advance. But of course, there has been a big growth in inequality within the prc, so China has also contributed to the world-scale increase in inequalities within countries in recent decades. Taking the two measures together—inequality between and within countries—statistically China has brought about a reduction in total global inequality. We should not exaggerate this—the world pattern is still one of huge gaps, which are being reduced in small ways. However, it’s important because it changes relationships of power between countries. If it continues, it may even change the global distribution of income from one that is still very polarized to a more normal, Pareto-type distribution.
Was I surprised at this? To some extent, yes. In fact, that’s why I shifted my interest over the last fifteen years to studying East Asia, because I realized that, although East Asia—except for Japan, clearly—was part of the South, it had some peculiarities that enabled it to generate a kind of development that did not quite fit within that pattern of stable inequality among regions. At the same time, no one ever claimed—I certainly did not—that stability in the global distribution of income also meant immobility of particular countries or regions. A fairly stable structure of inequalities can persist, with some countries going up and others down. And this, to some extent, is what has been happening. From the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, the more important development has been the bifurcation of a highly dynamic and upwardly mobile East Asia and a stagnant and downwardly mobile Africa, and particularly southern Africa—‘the Africa of the labour reserves’, again. This bifurcation is the thing that interests me most: why southern Africa and East Asia have moved in such opposite directions. It’s a very important phenomenon to try to understand, because to do so would also modify our understanding of the underpinnings of successful capitalist development, and the extent to which it relies or not on dispossession—the complete proletarianization of the peasantry—as happened in southern Africa, or on the very partial proletarianization that has taken place in East Asia. So the divergence of these two regions brings up a big theoretical question, which once again challenges Brenner’s identification of capitalist development with the full proletarianization of the labour force.
Chaos and Governance argued early on, in 1999, that American hegemony would decline principally through the rise of East Asia, and above all of China. At the same time it raised the prospect that this would also be the region where labour might in future pose the sharpest challenge to capital, worldwide. It has sometimes been suggested that there’s a tension between these perspectives—the rise of China as a rival power centre to the United States, and mounting unrest among the labouring classes in China. How do you see the relationship between the two?
The relationship is very close, because, first of all, contrary to what many people think, the Chinese peasants and workers have a millennial tradition of unrest that has no parallel anywhere else in the world. In fact, many of the dynastic transitions were driven by rebellions, strikes and demonstrations—not just of workers and peasants, but also shopkeepers. This is a tradition that continues down to the present. When Hu Jintao told Bush, a few years ago, ‘Don’t worry about China trying to challenge us dominance; we have too many preoccupations at home’, he was pointing to one of the chief characteristics of Chinese history: how to counter the combination of internal rebellions by the subordinate classes, and external invasions by so-called barbarians—from the Steppes, up to the nineteenth century, and then, since the Opium Wars, from the sea. These have always been the overwhelming concerns of Chinese governments, and they set narrow limits on China’s role in international relations. The late-eighteenth and nineteenth-century imperial Chinese state was basically a kind of pre-modern welfare state. These characteristics were reproduced throughout its subsequent evolution. During the 1990s, Jiang Zemin let the capitalist genie out of the bottle. Current attempts to put it back again have to be set in the context of this much longer tradition. If rebellions of the Chinese subordinate classes materialize in a new form of welfare state, then that will influence the pattern of international relations over the next twenty, thirty years. But the balance of forces between the classes in China is still up for grabs at the moment.
Is there a contradiction between being a major centre of social unrest and being a rising power? Not necessarily—the United States in the 1930s was in the vanguard of worker struggles, at the same time that it was emerging as hegemonic. The fact that these struggles were successful, in the midst of the Great Depression, was a significant factor in making the us socially hegemonic for the working classes as well. This was certainly the case in Italy, where the American experience became the model for some of the Catholic trade unions.
Recent statements from China suggest a great deal of worry about the levels of unemployment that may result from a global recession, with an array of measures to counteract it. But does this also entail the continuation of the development model in ways that may, in the end, challenge the rest of global capitalism?
The question is whether the measures that Chinese rulers take, in response to the subordinate groups’ struggles, can work in other places where the same conditions do not exist. The issue of whether China can become a model for other states—particularly other big Southern states, like India—is dependent on a lot of historical and geographical specificities that may not be reproducible elsewhere. The Chinese know this, and they do not actually set themselves up as a model to be imitated. So what happens in China will be crucial in terms of the relationship between the prc and the rest of the world, but not in terms of setting up a model for others to follow. Nevertheless there is an interpenetration of struggles there—of worker and peasant struggles against exploitation, but also of struggles against environmental problems and ecological destruction—that you don’t find to the same extent elsewhere. These struggles are escalating at the moment, and it will be important to see how the leadership responds. I think that the change in leadership to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao is related to nervousness, at the least, about abandoning a long-standing welfare tradition. So, we’ll have to monitor the situation and watch for possible outcomes.
To return to the question of capitalist crises. Your 1972 essay, ‘Towards a Theory of Capitalist Crisis’, turns on a comparison between the long downturn of 1873–1896 and the prediction, which proved completely accurate, of another such crisis, which historically started in 1973. You’ve returned to this parallel several times since, pointing out the similarities but also the important differences between the two. But you’ve written less about the crisis of 1929 onwards. Do you regard the Great Depression as continuing to be of less relevance?
Well, not of less relevance, because in fact it is the most serious crisis that historical capitalism has experienced; certainly, it was a decisive turning point. But it also educated the powers-that-be in terms of what they should do so as not to repeat that experience. There are a variety of recognized and less recognized instruments for preventing that type of breakdown from happening again. Even now, though the collapse in the stock exchange is being compared to the 1930s, I think—I may be wrong—that both the monetary authorities and the governments of the states that actually matter in this are going to do all they can to avoid the collapse in the financial markets having similar social effects to the 1930s. They just cannot afford it, politically. And so they will muddle through, do anything they have to. Even Bush—and before him Reagan—for all their free-market ideology, relied on an extreme kind of Keynesian deficit spending. Their ideology is one thing, what they actually do is another, because they are responding to political situations which they cannot allow to deteriorate too much. The financial aspects may be similar to the 1930s, but there is a greater awareness and tighter constraints on the political authorities not to let these processes affect the so-called real economy to the same extent that they did in the 1930s. I’m not saying that the Great Depression is less relevant, but I’m not convinced that it is going to be repeated in the near future. The situation of the world economy is radically different. In the 1930s it was highly segmented, and that may have been a factor in producing the conditions for those breakdowns. Now it’s far more integrated.
In ‘Towards a Theory of Capitalist Crisis’ you describe a deep structural conflict within capitalism, in which you differentiate between crises that are caused by too high a rate of exploitation, which lead to a realization crisis because of insufficient effective demand, and those caused by too low a rate of exploitation, which cuts into demand for means of production. Now, do you still hold to this general distinction, and if so would you say that we are now in an underlying realization crisis, masked by expanding personal indebtedness and financialization, due to the wage repressions that have characterized capitalism over the last thirty years?
Yes. I think that over the last thirty years there has been a change in the nature of the crisis. Up to the early 1980s, the crisis was typically one of falling rate of profits due to intensifying competition among capitalist agencies, and due to circumstances in which labour was much better equipped to protect itself than in the previous depressions—both in the late-nineteenth century and in the 1930s. So that was the situation through the 1970s. The Reagan–Thatcher monetary counter-revolution was actually aimed at undermining this power, this capacity of the working classes to protect themselves—it was not the only objective, but it was one of the main objectives. I think that you quote some adviser of Thatcher, saying that what they did was . . .
. . . to create an industrial reserve army; exactly . . .
. . . what Marx says they should do! That changed the nature of the crisis. In the 1980s and 1990s and now, in the 2000s, we are indeed facing an underlying overproduction crisis, with all its typical characteristics. Incomes have been redistributed in favour of groups and classes that have high liquidity and speculative dispositions; so incomes don’t go back into circulation in the form of effective demand, but they go into speculation, creating bubbles that burst regularly. So, yes, the crisis has been transformed from one of falling rate of profit, due to intensified competition among capitals, to one of overproduction due to a systemic shortage of effective demand, created by the tendencies of capitalist development.
A recent report of the National Intelligence Council predicted the end of us global dominance by 2025, and the emergence of a more fragmented, multi-polar, and potentially conflictual world. Do you think that capitalism as a world system requires, as a condition of possibility, a single hegemonic power? Is the absence of one necessarily equivalent to unstable systemic chaos—is a balance of power between roughly comparable major states impossible?
No, I wouldn’t say that it’s impossible. A lot depends on whether the incumbent hegemonic power accepts accommodation or not. The chaos of the last six, seven years is due to the response of the Bush Administration to 9/11, which has in some respects been a case of great-power suicide. What the declining power does is very important, because they have the ability to create chaos. The whole ‘Project for a New American Century’ was a refusal to accept decline. That has been a catastrophe. There has been the military debacle in Iraq and the related financial strain on the us position in the world economy, transforming the United States from a creditor nation into the biggest debtor nation in world history. As a defeat, Iraq is worse than Vietnam, because in Indo-China there was a long tradition of guerrilla warfare: they had a leader of the calibre of Ho Chi Minh; they had already defeated the French. The tragedy for the Americans in Iraq is that, even in the best possible circumstances, they have a hard time winning the war, and now they are just trying to get out with some face-saving device. Their resistance to accommodation has led, first, to an acceleration of their decline, and second, to a lot of suffering and chaos. Iraq is a disaster. The size of the displaced population there is far bigger than in Darfur.
It is not clear what Obama actually wants to do. If he thinks that he can reverse the decline, he’s going to have some very nasty surprises. What he can do is to manage the decline intelligently—in other words, change the policy from: ‘We are not accommodating. We want another century’, to one of de facto managing decline, devising policies that accommodate the change in power relationships. I don’t know whether he’s going to do so because he’s very ambiguous; whether because in politics you cannot say certain things, or because he doesn’t know what to do, or because he just is ambiguous—I don’t know. But the change from Bush to Obama does open up the possibility of managing and accommodating the decline of the United States in a non-catastrophic way. Bush has had the opposite effect: the credibility of the American military has been further undermined, the financial position has become even more disastrous. So now the task facing Obama, I think, is managing decline intelligently. That’s what he can do. But his idea of escalating us intervention in Afghanistan is worrying, to say the least.
Over the years, while always basing your work on Marx’s conception of capital accumulation, you’ve never hesitated to express a number of leading criticisms of Marx—his underestimation of power struggles between states, his indifference to space, the contradictions in his account of the working class, among others. For a long time you’ve also been fascinated by Adam Smith, who plays a central role in your latest work, Adam Smith in Beijing. What would be your comparable reservations about him?
The comparable reservations about Smith are the same as Marx’s reservations about him. Marx took a lot from Smith—the tendency of the rate of profit to fall under the impact of inter-capitalist competition, for example, is a Smithian idea. Capitalis a critique of political economy: Marx was criticizing Smith for missing what was going on in the hidden abodes of production, as he put it—inter-capitalist competition might drive down the rate of profit, but it was countered by the tendency and ability of capitalists to shift the relationships of power with the working class in their favour. From this point of view, Marx’s critique of Smith’s political economy was making a crucial point. However, one also has to look at the historical evidence, because Marx’s was a theoretical construct, with assumptions that may not correspond to the historical reality of particular periods or places. We cannot infer empirical realities from a theoretical construct. The validity of his critique of Smith has to be assessed on the basis of the historical record; that applies to Smith as much as it applies to Marx, or anybody else.
One of Marx’s conclusions in Capital, particularly Volume One, is that adoption of a Smithian free-market system will lead to increases in class inequality. To what degree does the introduction of a Smithian regime in Beijing carry the risk of even greater class inequalities in China?
My argument in the theoretical chapter on Smith, in Adam Smith in Beijing, is that there is no notion in his work of self-regulating markets as in the neoliberal creed. The invisible hand is that of the state, which should rule in a decentralized way, with minimal bureaucratic interference. Substantively, the action of the government in Smith is pro-labour, not pro-capital. He is quite explicit that he is not in favour of making workers compete to reduce wages, but of making capitalists compete, to reduce profits to a minimum acceptable reward for their risks. Current conceptions turn him completely upside-down. But it’s unclear where China is headed today. In the Jiang Zemin era, in the 1990s, it was certainly headed in the direction of making workers compete for the benefit of capital and profit; there is no question about that. Now there is a reversal, one which as I’ve said takes into account not only the tradition of the Revolution and the Mao period, but also of the welfare aspects of late-imperial China under the Qing in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. I’m not putting bets on any particular outcome in China, but we must have an open mind in terms of seeing where it’s going.
In Adam Smith in Beijing, you also draw on Sugihara Kaoru’s work in contrasting an ‘industrious revolution’, based on intensive labour and husbanding of nature, in early modern East Asia, and an ‘industrial revolution’, based on mechanization and predation of natural resources, and speak of the hope that there could be a convergence of the two for humanity in the future. How would you estimate the balance between them in East Asia today?
Very precarious. I am not as optimistic as Sugihara in thinking that the East Asian tradition of ‘industrious revolution’ is so well entrenched that it may, if not become dominant again, at least play an important role in whatever hybrid formation is going to emerge. These concepts are more important for monitoring what’s happening than saying, East Asia is going this way, or the United States is going the other way. We need to see what they actually do. There is evidence that the Chinese authorities are worried about the environment, as well as about social unrest—but then they do things that are plain stupid. Maybe there is a plan in the works, but I don’t see much awareness of the ecological disasters of car civilizations. The idea of copying the United States from this point of view was already crazy in Europe—it’s even crazier in China. And I’ve always told the Chinese that in the 1990s and 2000s, they went to look at the wrong city. If they want to see how to be wealthy without being ecologically destructive, they should go to Amsterdam rather than Los Angeles. In Amsterdam, everybody goes around on bicycles; there are thousands of bikes parked at the station overnight, because people come in by train, pick up their bicycles in the morning and leave them there again in the evening. Whereas in China, while there were no cars at all the first time I was there in 1970—only a few buses in a sea of bicycles—now, more and more, the bicycles have been crowded out. >From that point of view it’s a very mixed picture, very worrying and contradictory. The ideology of modernization is discredited elsewhere but so far is living on, rather naively, in China.
But the implication of Adam Smith in Beijing seems to be that we might need something of an industrious revolution in the West, and that therefore this is a category that’s not specific to China, but can actually be much broader?
Yes. But Sugihara’s basic point is that the typical development of the industrial revolution, the substitution of machinery and energy for labour, not only has ecological limits, as we know, but it has economic limits as well. In fact, Marxists often forget that Marx’s idea of the increasingly organic composition of capital, driving down the rate of profit, has to do substantively with the fact that the use of more machines and energy intensifies competition among capitalists in such a way that it becomes less profitable, besides being ecologically destructive. Sugihara’s point is that the separation of management and labour, the growing dominance of management over labour, and the fact that labour is deprived of its skills, including those of self-management, which is typical of the industrial revolution, has limits. In the industrious revolution there is a mobilization of all the household’s resources, which develops, or at least preserves, managerial skills among the labourers. Eventually the advantages of these self-management skills become more important than the advantages derived from the separation of conception and execution that was typical of the industrial revolution. I think he has a point, in the sense that this is pretty crucial to understanding the present Chinese rise; that having preserved these self-management skills through serious limitations on the processes of proletarianization in a substantive sense, China now can have an organization of the labour process that is more reliant on the self-management skills of labour than elsewhere. This is probably one of the main sources of the competitive advantage of China, under the new circumstances.
Which would take us back to the politics of the Gramsci Group, in terms of the labour process and autonomia?
Yes and no. They are two different forms of autonomy. What we are talking about now is managerial autonomy, whereas the other was autonomy in struggle, in the workers’ antagonism towards capital. There, the idea of autonomy was: how do we formulate our programme in such a way that we unite workers in the struggle against capital, rather than divide labour and create the conditions for capital to re-establish its authority on the workers in the workplace? The present situation is ambiguous. Many look at Chinese self-management skills and see them as a way of subordinating labour to capital—in other words, capital saves on managerial costs. One has to put these self-management skills in context—where, when, and for what purpose. It is not that easy to classify it in one way or another.
You ended ‘World Income Inequalities’ in 1991 by arguing that, after the collapse of the ussr, deepening and widening conflicts over scarce resources within the South—the Iraq–Iran War or the Gulf War can be taken as emblematic—were forcing the West to create embryonic structures of world government to regulate these: the G7 as an executive committee of the global bourgeoisie, the imf and World Bank as its Ministry of Finance, the Security Council as its Ministry of Defence. These structures, you suggested, might fifteen years hence be taken over by non-conservative forces. In Adam Smith in Beijing you speak rather of a world-market society as a potentially hopeful future, in which no power is any longer a hegemon.
What is the relationship between the two, and your conceptions of them?
First, I didn’t actually say that the structures of world government emerged because of the conflicts within the South. Most of them were Bretton Woods organizations, set up by the United States after the Second World War as mechanisms that were necessary to avoid the pitfalls of self-regulating markets in the global economy, and as instruments of governance. So, from the start of the post-war era there were embryonic structures of world government in place. What happened in the 1980s was an increasing turbulence and instability, of which these conflicts in the South were an aspect, and therefore these institutions were brought in to manage the world economy in a different way than before. Could they be taken over by non-conservative forces? My attitude to these institutions was always ambivalent, because in many ways they reflect a balance of power among the states of the North and the South—within the North, between North and South, and so on. There was nothing in principle that ruled out the possibility that these institutions could actually be put to work to regulate the global economy in ways that might promote a more equal distribution of incomes worldwide. However, what happened is exactly the opposite. In the 1980s, the imf and the World Bank became the instruments of the neoliberal counter-revolution, and therefore promoted a more unequal distribution of income. But even then, as I’ve said, what happened in the end was not so much a more unequal distribution between North and South, but a big bifurcation within the South itself, with East Asia doing very well and southern Africa doing very badly, and other regions somewhere in the middle.
How does that relate to the world-market society concept that I discuss in Adam Smith in Beijing? It is now clear that a world state, even of the most embryonic, confederal type, would be very difficult to bring about. It is not a serious possibility in the near future. There is going to be a world-market society, in the sense that countries will be relating to one another through market mechanisms which are not at all self-regulating, but are regulated. This was also true of the system developed by the United States, which was a highly regulated process whereby the elimination of tariffs, quotas and restrictions on labour mobility was always negotiated by states—most importantly by the United States and Europe, and then between these and the others. The question now is what regulation is going to be introduced to prevent a 1930s-style breakdown of the market. So the relationship between the two concepts is that the organization of the world economy will be primarily market-based, but with an important participation of states in the regulation of this economy.
In The Long Twentieth Century, you sketched three possible outcomes of the systemic chaos into which the long wave of financialization that started in the early 1970s was leading: a world empire controlled by the United States, a world-market society in which no states dominated others, or a new world war that would destroy humanity. In all three eventualities, capitalism, as it has historically developed, would have disappeared. In Adam Smith in Beijing, you conclude that, with the failures of the Bush Administration, the first can now be ruled out, leaving just the last two. But isn’t there, logically at least, one other possibility within your own framework—that China could emerge over time as a new hegemon, replacing the United States, without altering the structures of capitalism and territorialism as you describe them? Do you exclude this possibility?
I don’t exclude that possibility, but let’s begin by putting the record straight about what I actually say. The first of the three scenarios that I envisaged at the end of The Long Twentieth Century was a world empire controlled not only by the United States, but by the United States in cooperation with its European allies. I never thought that the us would be so reckless as to try to go it alone for a New American Century—that was just too crazy a project to contemplate; and, of course, it backfired immediately. In fact, there is a strong current within the us foreign-policy establishment that wants to patch up the relationship with Europe, which was strained by the unilateralism of the Bush Administration. That’s still a possibility, although it’s now less likely than it used to be. The second point is that the world-market society and the greater weight of China in the global economy are not mutually exclusive. If you look at the way in which China has behaved towards its neighbours historically, there has always been a relationship based more on trade and economic exchanges than on military power; this is still the case. People often misunderstand this: they think I am depicting the Chinese as being softer or better than the West; it’s nothing to do with that. It has to do with the problems of governance of a country like China, which we’ve discussed. China has a tradition of rebellions that no other territory of similar size and density of population has faced. Its rulers are also highly conscious of the possibility of new invaders from the sea—in other words, the us. As I point out in Chapter Ten of Adam Smith in Beijing, there are various American plans for how to deal with China, none of which are exactly reassuring for Beijing. Apart from the Kissinger plan, which is one of cooptation, the others envisage either a new Cold War directed against China or getting China involved in wars with its neighbours, while the us plays the role of ‘happy third’. If China does emerge, as I think it will, as a new centre of the global economy, its role will be radically different from that of previous hegemons. Not just because of cultural contrasts, rooted as these are in historical–geographical differences; but precisely because the different history and geography of the East Asian region will have an impact on the new structures of the global economy. If China is going to be hegemonic, it’s going to be hegemonic in very different ways to the others. For one thing, military power will be far less important than cultural and economic power—particularly economic power. They have to play the economic card far more than the us ever did, or the British, or the Dutch.
Do you foresee greater unity within East Asia? There is talk, for example, of a sort of Asian imf facility, unification of currency—do you see China as the centre of an East Asian hegemon, rather than a solo player? And if so, how does that fit with the rising nationalisms in South Korea, Japan and China?
What is most interesting about East Asia is how, in the end, the economy is determinant of states’ dispositions and policies towards one another, in spite of their nationalisms. The nationalisms are very well entrenched, but they are related to a historical fact often forgotten in the West: that Korea, China, Japan, Thailand, Cambodia, all of these were national states long before there was a single nation-state in Europe. They all have histories of nationalist reactions to one another, in a framework that was predominantly economic. Occasionally there were wars, and the attitude of the Vietnamese towards China, or the Koreans towards Japan, is deeply rooted in the memory of these wars. At the same time, the economy seems to rule. It was striking that the nationalist resurgence in Japan, under the Koizumi government, was suddenly checked when it became clear that Japanese business was interested in doing business with China. In China, too, there was a big wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations, but then they stopped. The general picture in East Asia is that there are deep nationalist dispositions, but at the same time they tend to be superseded by economic interests.
The current crisis of the world financial system looks like the most spectacular vindication of your long-standing theoretical predictions that anyone could imagine. Are there any aspects of the crisis that have surprised you?
My prediction was very simple. The recurrent tendency towards financialization was, as Braudel put it, a sign of the autumn of a particular material expansion, centring on a particular state. In The Long Twentieth Century, I called the onset of financialization the signal crisis of a regime of accumulation, and pointed out that over time—usually it was around half a century—the terminal crisis would follow. For previous hegemons, it was possible to identify both the signal crisis and then the terminal crisis. For the United States, I ventured the hypothesis that the 1970s was the signal crisis; the terminal crisis had not yet come—but it would. How would it come? The basic hypothesis is that all these financial expansions were fundamentally unsustainable, because they were drawing into speculation more capital than could actually be managed—in other words, there was a tendency for these financial expansions to develop bubbles of various kinds. I foresaw that this financial expansion would eventually lead to a terminal crisis, because bubbles are as unsustainable today as they have been in the past. But I did not foresee the details of the bubbles: the dot.com boom, or the housing bubble.
Also, I was ambiguous about where we were in the early 1990s, when I wrote The Long Twentieth Century. I thought that in some ways the Belle Epoque of the United States was already over, whereas it was actually only beginning. Reagan prepared it by provoking a major recession, which then created the conditions for the subsequent financial expansion; but it was Clinton who actually oversaw the Belle Epoque, which then ended with the financial collapse of the 2000s, especially of the Nasdaq. With the bursting of the housing bubble, what we are observing now is, quite clearly, the terminal crisis of us financial centrality and hegemony.
What marks your work off from almost everyone else in your field is your appreciation for the flexibility, adaptability and fluidity of capitalist development, within the framework of the inter-state system. Yet in the longue durée, such as the 500, 150 and 50-year framework you adopted for the collective examination of East Asia’s position in the inter-state system, patterns emerge that are astonishingly clear, almost stark in their determinacy and simplicity. [9] How would you characterize the relationship between contingency and necessity in your thinking?
There are two different questions here: one concerns an appreciation of the flexibility of capitalist development and the other is the recurrence of patterns, and the extent to which these are determined by contingency or necessity. On the first, the adaptability of capitalism: this is partly related to my personal experience in business, as a young man. Initially I tried to run my father’s business, which was relatively small; then I did a dissertation on my grandfather’s business, which was bigger—a medium-sized company. Then I quarrelled with my grandfather and went into Unilever, which in terms of employees was the second-largest multinational at the time. So I had the luck—from the point of view of analysing the capitalist business enterprise—of going into successively larger firms, which helped me understand that you cannot talk about capitalist enterprises in general, because the differences between my father’s business, my grandfather’s business and Unilever were incredible. For example, my father spent all his time going to visit customers in the textile districts, and studying the technical problems that they had with their machines. Then he would go back to the factory and discuss the problems with his engineer; they would customize the machine for the client. When I tried to run this business, I was totally lost; the whole thing was based on skills and knowledge that were part of my father’s practice and experience. I could go around and see the customers, but I couldn’t solve their problems—I couldn’t even really understand them. So it was hopeless. In fact, in my youth, when I used to say to my father, ‘If the Communists come, you are going to be in trouble’, he said, ‘No, I’m not going to be in trouble, I’ll continue to do what I’m doing. They need people who do this.’
When I closed my father’s business, and went into my grandfather’s, it was already more of a Fordist organization. They were not studying the customers’ problems, they were producing standardized machines; either the customers wanted them or they didn’t. Their engineers were designing machines on the basis of what they thought there would be a market for, and telling the customers: this is what we have. It was embryonic mass production, with embryonic assembly lines. When I went to Unilever, I barely saw the production side. There were many different factories—one was making margarine, another soap, another perfumes. There were dozens of different products, but the main site of activity was neither the marketing organization nor the place of production, but finance and advertising. So, that taught me that it’s very hard to identify one specific form as ‘typically’ capitalist. Later, studying Braudel, I saw that this idea of the eminently adaptable nature of capitalism was something that you could observe historically.
One of the major problems on the left, but also on the right, is to think that there is only one kind of capitalism that reproduces itself historically; whereas capitalism has transformed itself substantively—particularly on a global basis—in unexpected ways. For several centuries capitalism relied on slavery, and seemed so embedded in slavery from all points of view that it could not survive without it; whereas slavery was abolished, and capitalism not only survived but prospered more than ever, now developing on the basis of colonialism and imperialism. At this point it seemed that colonialism and imperialism were essential to capitalism’s operation—but again, after the Second World War, capitalism managed to discard them, and to survive and prosper. World-historically, capitalism has been continually transforming itself, and this is one of its main characteristics; it would be very short-sighted to try to pin down what capitalism is without looking at these crucial transformations. What remains constant through all these adaptations, and defines the essence of capitalism, is best captured by Marx’s formula of capital M–C–M', to which I refer repeatedly in identifying the alternation of material and financial expansions. Looking at present-day China, one can say, maybe it’s capitalism, maybe not—I think it’s still an open question. But assuming that it is capitalism, it’s not the same as that of previous periods; it’s thoroughly transformed. The issue is to identify its specificities, how it differs from previous capitalisms, whether we call it capitalism or something else.
And the second part of the question—the emergence of such distinct, longue-durée patterns in your work, and the transformations of scale?
One point is that there is a very clear geographical dimension to the recurrent cycles of material and financial expansion, but you can see this aspect only if you do not stay focused on one particular country—because then you see a totally different process. This is what most historians have been doing—they focus on a particular country, and trace developments there. Whereas in Braudel, the idea is precisely that the accumulation of capital jumps; and if you don’t jump with it, if you don’t follow it from place to place, you don’t see it. If you stay focused on England, or on France, you miss what matters most in the development of capitalism world-historically. You have to move with it to understand that the process of capitalist development is essentially this process of jumping from one condition, where what you’ve termed the ‘spatial fix’ has become too constraining, and competition is intensifying, to another one, where a new spatial fix of greater scale and scope enables the system to experience another period of material expansion. And then of course, at a certain point the cycle repeats itself.
When I was first formulating this, inferring the patterns from Braudel and Marx, I had not yet fully appreciated your concept of spatial fix, in the double sense of the word—fixity of invested capital, and a fix for the previous contradictions of capitalist accumulation. There is a built-in necessity to these patterns that derives from the process of accumulation, which mobilizes money and other resources on an increasing scale, which in turn creates problems of intensifying competition and over-accumulation of various kinds. The process of capitalist accumulation of capital—as opposed to non-capitalist accumulation of capital—has this snowball effect, which intensifies competition and drives down the rate of profit. Those who are best positioned to find a new spatial fix do so, each time in a larger ‘container’. From city-states, which accumulated a huge amount of capital in tiny containers, to seventeenth-century Holland, which was more than a city-state, but less than a national state, then to eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Britain, with its world-encompassing empire, and then to the twentieth-century, continent-sized United States.
Now the process cannot continue in the same way, because there is no new, larger container that can displace the United States. There are large national—in fact, civilizational—states, like China and India, which are not bigger than the United States in terms of space, but have four or five times its population. So now we are switching to a new pattern: instead of going from one container to another, spatially larger, one, we are going from a container with a low population density to containers with high population densities. Moreover, previously it was a switch from wealthy to wealthy, in terms of countries. Now we are going from very wealthy to what are still basically poor countries—China’s per capita income is still one-twentieth that of the United States. In one sense, you can say, ‘Okay, now hegemony, if that’s what is happening, is shifting from the rich to the poor.’ But at the same time, these countries have huge internal differences and inequalities. It’s all very mixed. These are contradictory tendencies, and we need to develop additional conceptual tools to understand them.
You end Adam Smith in Beijing with the hope of a commonwealth of civilizations living on equal terms with each other, in a shared respect for the earth and its natural resources. Would you use the term ‘socialism’ to describe this vision, or do you regard it as outdated?
Well, I would have no objections to it being called socialism, except that, unfortunately, socialism has been too much identified with state control of the economy. I never thought that was a good idea. I come from a country where the state is despised and in many ways distrusted. The identification of socialism with the state creates big problems. So, if this world-system was going to be called socialist, it would need to be redefined in terms of a mutual respect between humans and a collective respect for nature. But this may have to be organized through state-regulated market exchanges, so as to empower labour and disempower capital in Smithian fashion, rather than through state ownership and control of the means of production. The problem with the term socialism is that it’s been abused in many different ways, and therefore also discredited. If you ask me what would be a better term, I’ve no idea—I think we should look for one. You are very good at finding new expressions, so you should come up with some suggestions.
Okay, I’ll have to work on that one.
Yes, you have to work on a substitute for the term ‘socialist’ that disentangles it from the historical identification with the state, and brings it closer to the idea of greater equality and mutual respect. So, I’ll leave that task to you!
Entrevista Arrighi New Left Review
New Left Review 56, March-April 2009
GIOVANNI ARRIGHI
THE WINDING PATHS OF CAPITAL
Interview by David Harvey
Could you tell us about your family background and your education?
I was born in Milan in 1937. On my mother’s side, my family background was bourgeois. My grandfather, the son of Swiss immigrants to Italy, had risen from the ranks of the labour aristocracy to establish his own factories in the early twentieth century, manufacturing textile machinery and later, heating and air-conditioning equipment. My father was the son of a railway worker, born in Tuscany. He came to Milan and got a job in my maternal grandfather’s factory—in other words, he ended up marrying the boss’s daughter. There were tensions, which eventually resulted in my father setting up his own business, in competition with his father-in-law. Both shared anti-fascist sentiments, however, and that greatly influenced my early childhood, dominated as it was by the war: the Nazi occupation of Northern Italy after Rome’s surrender in 1943, the Resistance and the arrival of the Allied troops.
My father died suddenly in a car accident, when I was 18. I decided to keep his company going, against my grandfather’s advice, and entered the Università Bocconi to study economics, hoping it would help me understand how to run the firm. The Economics Department was a neo-classical stronghold, untouched by Keynesianism of any kind, and no help at all with my father’s business. I finally realized I would have to close it down. I then spent two years on the shop-floor of one of my grandfather’s firms, collecting data on the organization of the production process. The study convinced me that the elegant general-equilibrium models of neo-classical economics were irrelevant to an understanding of the production and distribution of incomes. This became the basis of my dissertation. Then I was appointed as assistente volontario, or unpaid teaching assistant to my professor—in those days, the first rung on the ladder in Italian universities. To earn my living I got a job with Unilever, as a trainee manager.
How did it come about that you went to Africa in 1963, to work in the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland?
Why I went there was pretty straightforward. I learnt that British universities were actually paying people to teach and do research—unlike the position in Italy, where you had to serve for four or five years as an assistente volontario before there was any hope of a paid job. In the early 1960s the British were setting up universities throughout their former colonial empire, as colleges of British ones. The ucrn was a college of the University of London. I had put in for two positions, one in Rhodesia and one in Singapore. They called me for an interview in London and, because the ucrn was interested, they offered me the job as Lecturer in Economics. So I went.
It was a true intellectual rebirth. The mathematically modelled neo-classical tradition I’d been trained in had nothing to say about the processes I was observing in Rhodesia, or the realities of African life. At ucrn I worked alongside social anthropologists, particularly Clyde Mitchell, who was already doing work on network analysis, and Jaap Van Velsen, who was introducing situational analysis, later reconceptualized as extended case-study analysis. I went to their seminars regularly and was greatly influenced by the two of them. Gradually, I abandoned abstract modelling for the concrete, empirically and historically grounded theory of social anthropology. I began my long march from neo-classical economics to comparative-historical sociology.
This was the context for your 1966 essay, ‘The Political Economy of Rhodesia’, which analysed the forms of capitalist class development there, and their specific contradictions—explaining the dynamics that led to the victory of the settlers’ Rhodesian Front Party in 1962, and to Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. What was the initial impulse behind the essay, and what is its importance for you, looking back?
‘The Political Economy of Rhodesia’ was written at the incitement of Van Velsen, who was relentlessly critical of my use of mathematical models. I had done a review of Colin Leys’s book, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, and Van Velsen suggested I develop it into a longer article. Here, and in ‘Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective’, I analysed the ways in which the full proletarianization of the Rhodesian peasantry created contradictions for capital accumulation—in fact, ended up producing more problems than advantages for the capitalist sector. [1] As long as proletarianization was partial, it created conditions in which the African peasants subsidized capital accumulation, because they produced part of their own subsistence; but the more proletarianized the peasantry became, the more these mechanisms began to break down. Fully proletarianized labour could be exploited only if it was paid a full living wage. Thus, instead of making it easier to exploit labour, proletarianization was actually making it more difficult, and often required the regime to become more repressive. Martin Legassick and Harold Wolpe, for example, maintained that South African Apartheid was primarily due to the fact that the regime had to become more repressive of the African labour force because it was fully proletarianized, and could no longer subsidize capital accumulation as it had done in the past.
The whole southern region of Africa—stretching from South Africa and Botswana through the former Rhodesias, Mozambique, Malawi, which was then Nyasaland, up to Kenya, as the north-east outpost—was characterized by mineral wealth, settler agriculture and extreme dispossession of the peasantry. It is very different from the rest of Africa, including the north. West African economies were essentially peasant-based. But the southern region—what Samir Amin called ‘the Africa of the labour reserves’—was in many ways a paradigm of extreme peasant dispossession, and thus proletarianization. Several of us were pointing out that this process of extreme dispossession was contradictory. Initially it created the conditions for the peasantry to subsidize capitalist agriculture, mining, manufacturing and so on. But increasingly it created difficulties in exploiting, mobilizing, controlling the proletariat that was being created. The work that we were doing then—my ‘Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective’, and related works by Legassick and Wolpe—established what came to be known as the Southern Africa Paradigm on the limits of proletarianization and dispossession.
Contrary to those who still identify capitalist development with proletarianization tout court—Robert Brenner, for example—the southern Africa experience showed that proletarianization, in and by itself, does not favour capitalist development—all kinds of other circumstances are required. For Rhodesia, I identified three stages of proletarianization, only one of which was favourable to capitalist accumulation. In the first stage, the peasants responded to rural capitalist development by supplying agricultural products, and would only supply labour in return for high wages. The whole area thus came to be characterized by a shortage of labour, because whenever capitalist agriculture or mining began developing, it created a demand for local produce which the African peasants were very quick to supply; they could participate in the money economy through the sale of produce rather than the sale of labour. One aim of state support for settler agriculture was to create competition for the African peasants, so that they would be forced to supply labour rather than products. This led to a long-drawn-out process that went from partial proletarianization to full proletarianization; but, as already mentioned it was also a contradictory process. The problem with the simple ‘proletarianization as capitalist development’ model is that it ignores not just the realities of southern Africa’s settler capitalism but also many other cases, such as the United States itself, which was characterized by a totally different pattern—a combination of slavery, genocide of the native population and the immigration of surplus labour from Europe.
You were one of nine lecturers at ucrn arrested for political activities during the Smith government’s July 1966 clampdown?
Yes, we were jailed for a week, and then deported.
You went to Dar es Salaam, which sounded then like a paradise of intellectual interactions, in many ways. Can you tell us about that period, and the collaborative work you did there with John Saul?
It was a very exciting time, both intellectually and politically. When I got to Dar es Salaam in 1966, Tanzania had only been independent for a few years. Nyerere was advocating what he considered to be a form of African socialism. He managed to stay equidistant from both sides during the Sino-Soviet split, and maintained very good relations with the Scandinavians. Dar es Salaam became the outpost of all the exiled national liberation movements of southern Africa—from the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia and South Africa. I spent three years at the University there, and met all kinds of people: activists from the Black Power movement in the us, as well as scholars and intellectuals like Immanuel Wallerstein, David Apter, Walter Rodney, Roger Murray, Sol Picciotto, Catherine Hoskins, Jim Mellon, who later was one of the founders of the Weathermen, Luisa Passerini, who was doing research on Frelimo, and many others; including, of course, John Saul.
At Dar es Salaam, working with John, I shifted my research interests from labour supplies to the issue of national liberation movements and the new regimes that were emerging out of decolonization. We were both sceptical about the capacity of these regimes to emancipate themselves from what was just starting to be called neocolonialism, and actually deliver on their promises of economic development. But there was also a difference between us, which I think has persisted until today, in that I was far less upset by this than John was. For me, these movements were national liberation movements; they were not in any way socialist movements, even when they embraced the rhetoric of socialism. They were populist regimes, and therefore I didn’t expect much beyond national liberation, which we both saw as very important in itself. But whether there were possibilities for political developments beyond this is something that John and I still quarrel about to this day, good-humouredly, whenever we meet. But the essays we wrote together were the critique that we agreed upon.
When you came back to Europe, you found a very different world to the one you’d left six years before?
Yes. I came back to Italy in 1969, and I was immediately plunged into two situations. One was at the University of Trento, where I had been offered a lectureship. Trento was the main centre of student militancy, and the only university in Italy that gave doctorates in Sociology at the time. My appointment was sponsored by the organizing committee of the university, which consisted of the Christian Democrat Nino Andreatta, the liberal socialist Norberto Bobbio, and Francesco Alberoni; it was part of an attempt to tame the student movement through hiring a radical. In the first seminar I gave, I only had four or five students; but in the fall semester, after my book on Africa came out in the summer of 1969, I had almost 1,000 students trying to get into the classroom. [2] My course became the big event of Trento. It even split Lotta Continua: the Boato faction wanted students to come to the class, to hear a radical critique of development theories, whereas the Rostagno faction was trying to disrupt the lectures by throwing stones at the classroom from the courtyard.
The second situation was in Turin, via Luisa Passerini, who was a prominent propagator of the Situationists’ writings, and therefore had a big influence on many of the cadres of Lotta Continua who were picking up on Situationism. I was commuting from Trento to Turin, via Milan—from the centre of the student movement to the centre of the workers’ movement. I felt attracted and at the same time bothered by some aspects of this movement—particularly its rejection of ‘politics’. At some of the assemblies, very militant workers would stand up and say, ‘Enough of politics! Politics is dragging us in the wrong direction. We need unity.’ For me, it was quite a shock, coming from Africa, to discover that the Communist unions were considered reactionary and repressive by the workers in struggle—and there was an important element of truth in this. The reaction against the pci unions became a reaction against all trade unions. Groups like Potere Operaio and Lotta Continua established themselves as alternatives, both to the unions and to the mass parties. With Romano Madera, who was then a student, but also a political cadre and a Gramscian—a rarity in the extra-parliamentary left—we began to develop the idea of finding a Gramscian strategy to relate to the movement.
That’s where the idea of autonomia—of the intellectual autonomy of the working class—first emerged. The creation of this concept is now generally attributed to Antonio Negri. But in fact it originated in the interpretation of Gramsci that we developed in the early 1970s, in the Gruppo Gramsci co-founded by Madera, Passerini and myself. We saw our main contribution to the movement not as providing a substitute for the unions, or for the parties, but as students and intellectuals who were involved in helping the workers’ vanguards to develop their own autonomy—autonomia operaia—through an understanding of the broader processes, both national and global, in which their struggles were taking place. In Gramscian terms, this was conceived as the formation of organic intellectuals of the working class in struggle. To this end we formed the Colletivi Politici Operai (cpos), which became known as the Area dell’Autonomia. As these collectives developed their own autonomous practice, the Gruppo Gramsci would cease to have a function and could disband. When it actually was disbanded in the fall of 1973, Negri came into the picture, and took the cpos and the Area dell’Autonomia in an adventurous direction that was far from what was originally intended.
Were there any common lessons that you took from the African national liberation struggles and Italian working-class struggles?
The two experiences had in common the fact that, in both, I had very good relations with the broader movements. They wanted to know on what basis I was participating in their struggle. My position was: ‘I’m not going to tell you what to do, because you know your situation much better than I ever will. But I am better placed to understand the wider context in which it develops. So our exchange has to be based on the fact that you tell me what your situation is, and I tell you how it relates to the wider context which you cannot see, or can see only partially, from where you operate.’ That was always the basis of excellent relations, both with the liberation movements in southern Africa and with the Italian workers.
The articles on the capitalist crisis originated in an exchange of this kind, in 1972. [3] The workers were being told, ‘Now there is an economic crisis, we have to keep quiet. If we carry on struggling, the factory jobs will go elsewhere.’ So the workers posed the question to us: ‘Are we in a crisis? And if so, what are its implications? Should we just stay quiet now, because of this?’ The articles that comprised ‘Towards a Theory of Capitalist Crisis’ were written within this particular problematic, framed by the workers themselves, who were saying: ‘Tell us about the world out there and what we have to expect.’ The starting-point of the articles was, ‘Look, crises occur whether you struggle or not—they’re not a function of workers’ militancy, or of “mistakes” in economic management, but fundamental to the operations of capitalist accumulation itself.’ That was the initial orientation. It was written at the very beginning of the crisis; before the existence of a crisis was widely recognized. It became important as a framework that I’ve used, over the years, to monitor what is happening. From that point of view, it has worked pretty well.
We’ll come back to the theory of capitalist crises, but I wanted first to ask you about your work in Calabria. In 1973, just as the movement was finally starting to subside, you took up the offer of a teaching position at Cosenza?
One of the attractions of going to Calabria, for me, was to continue in a new location my research on labour supplies. I had already seen in Rhodesia how, when the Africans were fully proletarianized—or, more precisely, when they became conscious that they were now fully proletarianized—this led to struggles to get a living wage in the urban areas. In other words, the fiction that ‘We are single males, our families continue to live peasant lives in the countryside’, cannot hold once they actually have to live in the cities. I had pointed this out in ‘Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective’. It came into clearer focus in Italy, because there was this puzzle: migrants from the south were brought into the northern industrial regions as scabs, in the 1950s and early 1960s. But from the 1960s, and especially the late 1960s, they were transformed into class-struggle vanguards, which is a typical experience of migrants. When I set up a research working group in Calabria, I got them to read the social anthropologists on Africa, particularly on migration, and then we did an analysis of the labour supply from Calabria. The questions were: what was creating the conditions for this migration? And what were its limits—given that, at a certain point, instead of creating a docile labour force that could be used to undermine the bargaining power of the northern working class, the migrants themselves became the militant vanguard?
Two things emerged from the research. First, capitalist development does not necessarily rely on full proletarianization. On the one hand, long-distance labour migration was occurring from places where no dispossession was taking place; where there were even possibilities for the migrants to buy land from the landlords. This was related to the local system of primogeniture, whereby only the eldest son inherited the land. Traditionally, younger sons ended up joining the Church or the Army, until large-scale, long-distance migrations provided an increasingly important alternative way to earn the money necessary to buy land back home and set up their own farms. On the other hand, in the really poor areas, where labour was fully proletarianized, they usually could not afford to migrate at all. The only way in which they could do so was, for example, when the Brazilians abolished slavery in 1888 and needed a substitute cheap labour force. They recruited workers from these deeply impoverished areas of southern Italy, paid their fares and resettled them in Brazil, to replace the emancipated slaves. These are very different patterns of migration. But generally speaking, it is not the very poor who migrate; it is necessary to have some means and connections in order to do so.
The second finding from the Calabrian research had similarities with the results from the research on Africa. Here, too, the migrants’ disposition towards engaging in working-class struggles in the places to which they had moved depended on whether the conditions there were considered as permanently determining their life chances. It’s not enough to say that the situation in the out-migrating areas determines what salaries and conditions the migrants will work for. One has to say at what point the migrants perceive themselves as deriving the bulk of their subsistence from wage employment—it’s a switch that can be detected and monitored. But the main point to emerge was a different kind of critique of the idea of proletarianization as the typical process of capitalist development.
The initial write-up of this research was stolen from a car in Rome, so the final write-up took place in the United States, many years after you moved to Binghamton in 1979, where world-systems analysis was being developed.Was this the first time you explicitly situated your position on the relationship between proletarianization and capitalist development vis-à-vis those of Wallerstein and Brenner?
Yes, although I was not sufficiently explicit about this, even though I mentioned both Wallerstein and Brenner in passing; but the whole piece is, in fact, a critique of both of them. [4] Wallerstein holds the theory that relations of production are determined by their position in a core–periphery structure. According to him, in the periphery, you tend to have relations of production that are coercive; you don’t have full proletarianization, which is a situation that you find in the core. Brenner has, in some respects, the opposite view, but in other ways it is very similar: that relations of production determine position in the core–periphery structure. In both, you have one particular relationship between position in the core–periphery and relations of production. The Calabrian research showed that this is not the case. There, within the same peripheral location, we found three different paths developing simultaneously, and mutually reinforcing each other. Moreover, the three paths strongly resembled developments that had, historically, characterized different core locations. One is very similar to Lenin’s ‘Junker’ route—latifundia with full proletarianization; another to Lenin’s ‘American’ route, of small and medium farms, embedded in the market. Lenin doesn’t have the third one, which we called the Swiss route: long-distance migration, and then investment and retention of property back home. In Switzerland, there is no dispossession of the peasantry but rather a tradition of migration that led to the consolidation of small farming. The interesting thing about Calabria is that all three routes, which elsewhere are associated with a position in the core, are found here in the periphery—which is a critique both of Brenner’s single process of proletarianization, and of Wallerstein’s tracing of relations of production to position.
Your Geometry of Imperialism appeared in 1978, before you went to the us. Re-reading it, I was struck by the mathematical metaphor—the geometry—which you use to construct the understanding of Hobson’s theory of imperialism, and which performs a very useful function. But inside it, there’s an interesting geographical question: when you bring Hobson and capitalism together, the notion of hegemony suddenly emerges, as a geometry-to-geography shift in what you’re doing. What was the initial spur to writing The Geometry, and what is its importance for you?
I was disturbed, at the time, by the terminological confusions that were swirling around the term ‘imperialism’. My aim was to dissipate some of the confusion by creating a topological space in which the different concepts, which were often all confusingly referred to as ‘imperialism’, could be distinguished from one another. But as an exercise on imperialism, yes, it also functioned as a transition to the concept of hegemony for me. I spelled this out explicitly in the Postscript to the 1983 second edition of The Geometry of Imperialism, where I argued that the Gramscian concept of hegemony could be more useful than ‘imperialism’ in analysing contemporary dynamics of the inter-state system. From this point of view, what I—and others—did was simply to re-apply Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to inter-state relations, where it had originally been before Gramsci applied it to an analysis of class relations within a national political jurisdiction. In doing so, of course, Gramsci enriched the concept in many ways that had not been graspable before. Our re-exportation of it to the international sphere benefited enormously from this enrichment.
A central influence in the conception of The Long Twentieth Century, published in 1994, is Braudel. After absorbing it, do you have any significant criticisms of him?
The criticism is fairly easy. Braudel is an incredibly rich source of information about markets and capitalism, but he has no theoretical framework. Or more accurately, as Charles Tilly pointed out, he is so eclectic that he has innumerable partial theories, the sum of which is no theory. You can’t simply rely on Braudel; you have to approach him with a clear idea of what you are looking for, and what you are extracting from him. One thing that I focused on, which differentiates Braudel from Wallerstein and all other world-systems analysts—not to speak of more traditional economic historians, Marxist or otherwise—is the idea that the system of national states, as it emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was preceded by a system of city-states; and that one has to look for the origins of capitalism there, in the city-states. This is the distinguishing feature of the West, or Europe, compared to other parts of the world. But you easily get lost if you just follow Braudel, because he takes you in so many different directions. For example, I had to extract this point and combine it with what I was learning from William McNeill’s Pursuit of Power, which also argues, from a different perspective, that a system of city-states preceded and prepared the emergence of a system of territorial states.
Another idea, to which you provide much greater theoretical depth, but which nevertheless comes from Braudel, is the notion that financial expansion announces the autumn of a particular hegemonic system, and precedes a shift to a new hegemon. This would seem a central insight of The Long Twentieth Century?
Yes. The idea was that the leading capitalist organizations of a particular epoch would also be the leaders of the financial expansion, which always occurs when the material expansion of productive forces reaches its limits. The logic of this process—though again, Braudel doesn’t provide it—is that when competition intensifies, investment in the material economy becomes increasingly risky, and therefore the liquidity preference of accumulators is accentuated, which, in turn, creates the supply conditions of the financial expansion. The next question, of course, is how the demand conditions for financial expansions are created. On this, I relied on Weber’s idea that inter-state competition for mobile capital constitutes the world-historical specificity of the modern era. This competition, I argued, creates the demand conditions for the financial expansion. Braudel’s idea of ‘autumn’—as the concluding phase of a process of leadership in accumulation, which goes from material to financial, and eventually to displacement by another leader—is crucial. But so is Marx’s idea that the autumn of a particular state, experiencing financial expansion, is also the springtime for another location: surpluses that accumulate in Venice go to Holland; those that accumulate in Holland then go to Britain; and those that accumulate in Britain go to the United States. Marx thus enables us to complement what we have in Braudel: autumn becomes a spring elsewhere, producing a series of interconnected developments.
The Long Twentieth Century traces these successive cycles of capitalist expansion and hegemonic power from the Renaissance to the present. In your narrative, phases of material expansion of capital eventually peter out under the pressure of overcompetition, giving way to phases of financial expansion, whose exhaustion then precipitates a time of inter-state chaos which is resolved by the emergence of a new hegemonic power, capable of restoring global order and restarting the cycle of material expansion once again, supported by a new social bloc. Such hegemons have been in turn Genoa, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States. How far do you regard their punctual appearance, each putting an end to a preceding time of troubles, as a set of contingencies?
Good and difficult question! There is always an element of contingency. At the same time, the reason why these transitions take so long, and go through periods of turbulence and chaos, is that the agencies themselves, as they later emerge to organize the system, go through a learning process. This is clear if we look at the most recent case, that of the United States. By the late nineteenth century, the United States already had some characteristics that made it a possible successor to Britain as the hegemonic leader. But it took more than half a century, two world wars and a catastrophic depression before the United States actually developed both the structures and the ideas that, after the Second World War, enabled it to become truly hegemonic. Was the development of the United States as a potential hegemon in the nineteenth century strictly a contingency, or is there something else? I don’t know. Clearly, there was a contingent geographical aspect—North America had a different spatial configuration than Europe, which enabled the formation of a state that could not be created in Europe itself, except on the eastern flank, where Russia was also expanding territorially. But there was also a systemic element: Britain created an international credit system that, after a certain point, favoured the formation of the United States in particular ways.
Certainly, if there had been no United States, with its particular historical-geographical configuration in the late nineteenth century, history would have been very different. Who would have become hegemonic? We can only conjecture. But there was the United States, which was building, in many ways, on the tradition of Holland and Britain. Genoa was a bit different: I never say that it was hegemonic; it was closer to the type of transnational financial organization that occurs in diasporas, including the contemporary Chinese diaspora. But it was not hegemonic in the Gramscian sense that Holland, Britain and the United States were. Geography matters a lot; but even though these are three spatially very different hegemons, each built on organizational characteristics learned from the previous one. There is considerable borrowing by Britain from the Netherlands, and by the United States from Britain; these are an interlinked set of states—there is a kind of snowball effect. So, yes, there is contingency; but there are also systemic links.
The Long Twentieth Century doesn’t cover the fate of the labour movement. Did you omit it because you regarded it, by then, as of lesser importance, or because the architecture of the book—its subtitle is Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times—was already so far-reaching and complex that you felt to include labour would overload it?
More the latter. The Long Twentieth Century was originally supposed to be co-authored with Beverly Silver—whom I first met in Binghamton—and was to be in three parts. One was the hegemonies, which now actually forms the book’s first chapter. The second part was supposed to be capital—the organization of capital, the business enterprise; basically, competition. The third part was supposed to be labour—labour and capital relations, and labour movements. But the discovery of financialization as a recurrent pattern of historical capitalism upset the whole project. It forced me to go back in time, which I never wanted to do, because the book was really supposed to be about the ‘long twentieth century’, meaning from the 1870s Great Depression through to the present. When I discovered the financialization paradigm I was thrown completely off balance, and The Long Twentieth Century became basically a book about the role of finance capital in the historical development of capitalism, from the fourteenth century. So Beverly took over the work on labour, in her Forces of Labour, which came out in 2003. [5]
Co-authored by the two of you in 1999, Chaos and Governance seems to respect the kind of structure you’d initially planned for The Long Twentieth Century?
Yes, in Chaos and Governance there are chapters on geopolitics, business enterprise, social conflict, and so on. [6] So the original project was never abandoned. But it certainly was not adhered to in The Long Twentieth Century, because I could not focus on the cyclical recurrence of financial expansions and material expansions and, at the same time, deal with labour. Once you shift the focus in defining capitalism to an alternation of material and financial expansions, it becomes very difficult to bring labour back in. Not only is there too much to cover, but there is also considerable variation over time and space in the relationship between capital and labour. For one thing, as we point out in Chaos and Governance, there is a speeding up of social history. When you compare transitions from one regime of accumulation to another, you realize that in the transition from Dutch to British hegemony in the eighteenth century, social conflict comes in late, relative to financial expansions and wars. In the transition from British to us hegemony in the early twentieth century, the explosion of social conflict was more or less simultaneous with the take-off of the financial expansion and wars. In the current transition—to an unknown destination—the explosion of social conflict in the late 1960s and early 1970s preceded the financial expansion, and took place without wars among the major powers.
In other words, if you take the first half of the twentieth century, the biggest workers’ struggles occurred on the eve of the world wars, and in their aftermath. This was the basis of Lenin’s theory of revolution: that inter-capitalist rivalries turning into wars would create favourable conditions for revolution, which is something that can be observed empirically up to the Second World War. In a sense one could argue that, in the present transition, the speeding up of social conflict has prevented capitalist states from waging wars on one another. So, to return to your question, in The Long Twentieth Century I chose to focus on elaborating fully the argument about financial expansions, systemic cycles of capital accumulation and world hegemonies; but in Chaos and Governance we returned to the issue of the inter-relations between social conflict, financial expansions and hegemonic transitions.
In his discussion of primitive accumulation, Marx writes about the national debt, the credit system, the bankocracy—in a way, the integration between finance and state that occurred during primitive accumulation—as being absolutely critical to the way in which a capitalist system evolves. But the analysis in Capital refuses to deal with the credit system until you get to Volume Three, because Marx doesn’t want to deal with interest, even though the credit system keeps on coming up as crucial to the centralization of capital, to the organization of fixed capital, and so on. This raises the question of how class struggle actually works around the finance–state nexus, which plays the vital role that you’re pointing to. There seems to be a gap in Marx’s analysis: on the one hand, saying the important dynamic is that between capital and labour; on the other hand, labour doesn’t seem to be crucial to the processes that you’re talking about—transferences of hegemony, jumping of scales. It’s understandable that The Long Twentieth Century had a hard time integrating labour into that story, because in a sense the capital–labour relation is not central to that aspect of the capitalist dynamic. Would you agree with that?
Yes, I agree, with one qualification: the phenomenon I mentioned of the speeding up of social history. The worker struggles of the 1960s and early 1970s, for example, were a major factor in the financialization of the late 1970s and 1980s, and the ways in which it evolved. The relationship between workers’ and subaltern struggles and financialization is something that changes over time, and has recently developed characteristics that it didn’t have before. But if you are trying to explain the recurrence of financial expansions, you cannot focus too much on labour, because then you will be talking only about the latest cycle; you are bound to make the mistake of taking labour as the cause of financial expansions, when earlier ones took off without the intervention of workers’ or subaltern struggles.
Still on the question of labour, then, could we track back to your 1990 essay on the remaking of the world labour movement, ‘Marxist Century, American Century’. [7] You argued there that Marx’s account of the working class in the Manifesto is deeply contradictory, since it stresses at once the increasing collective power of labour, as capitalist development proceeds, and its increasing immiseration, corresponding in effect to an active industrial army and a reserve army. Marx, you pointed out, thought that both tendencies would be united in the same human mass; but you went on to argue that, in the early twentieth century, they in fact became spatially polarized. In Scandinavia and the Anglosphere, the first prevailed, in Russia and further east the second—Bernstein capturing the situation of the former, Lenin of the latter—leading to the split between reformist and revolutionary wings of the labour movement. In Central Europe—Germany, Austria, Italy—on the other hand, you argued that there was a more fluctuating balance between active and reserve, leading to Kautsky’s equivocations, unable to choose between reform or revolution, contributing to the victory of fascism. At the end of the essay you suggested that a recomposition of the labour movement might be coming about—misery reappearing in the West, with the return of widespread unemployment; and collective power of workers, with the rise of Solidarity, in the East, perhaps reuniting what space and history had divided. What is your view of such a prospect today?
Well, the first thing is that, along with this optimistic scenario from the point of view of uniting the conditions of the working class globally, there was a more pessimistic consideration in the essay, pointing to something that I’ve always considered a very serious flaw in Marx and Engels’s Manifesto. There is a logical leap that does not really hold up, intellectually or historically—the idea that, for capital, those things that we would today call gender, ethnicity, nationality, do not matter. That the only thing that matters for capital is the possibility of exploitation; and therefore the most exploitable status group within the working class is the one they will employ, without any discrimination on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity. That’s certainly true. However, it doesn’t follow that the various status groups within the working class will just accept this. In fact, it is precisely at the point when proletarianization becomes generalized, and workers are subjected to this disposition of capital, that they will mobilize whatever status difference they can identify or construct to win a privileged treatment from the capitalists. They will mobilize along gender lines, national lines, ethnicity or whatever, to obtain a privileged treatment from capital.
‘Marxist Century, American Century’ is therefore not as optimistic as it might have seemed, because it pointed to this internal working-class tendency to accentuate status differences, to protect themselves from the disposition of capital to treat labour as an undifferentiated mass that would be employed only to the extent that it enabled capital to reap profits. So the article ended on an optimistic note, that there is a tendency toward levelling; but at the same time one should expect workers to fight to protect themselves through status-group formation or consolidation against this very tendency.
Does this mean that the differentiation between the active army and the industrial reserve army also tends to be status-divided—racialized, if you will?
It depends. If you look at the process globally—where the reserve army is not just the unemployed, but also the disguisedly unemployed and the excluded—then definitely there is a status division between the two. Nationality has been used by segments of the working class, of the active army, to differentiate themselves from the global reserve army. At a national level, this is less clear. If you take the United States or Europe, it’s much less apparent that there is actually a status difference between the active and reserve army. But with immigrants currently coming from countries that are much poorer, anti-immigration sentiments which are a manifestation of this tendency to create status distinctions within the working class have grown. So it’s a very complicated picture, particularly if you look at transnational migration flows, and at the situation where the reserve army is primarily concentrated in the global South rather than the North.
In your 1991 article, ‘World Income Inequalities and the Future of Socialism’, you showed the extraordinary stability of the regional wealth hierarchy in the twentieth century—the extent to which the gap in per capita income between the core North/West and the semi-peripheral and peripheral South/East of the world had remained unchanged, or actually deepened, after half a century of developmentalism. [8] Communism, you pointed out, had failed to close this gap in Russia, Eastern Europe and China, though it had done no worse in this respect than capitalism in Latin America, Southeast Asia or Africa, and in other respects—a more egalitarian distribution of income within society, and greater independence of the state from the North/Western core—it had done significantly better. A couple of decades later, China has obviously broken the pattern you were describing then. How far did this come—or not come—as a surprise to you?
First of all, we should not exaggerate the extent to which China has broken the pattern. The level of per capita income in China was so low—and still is low, compared to the wealthy countries—that even major advances need to be qualified. China has doubled its position relative to the rich world, but still that only means going from 2 per cent of the average per capita income of the wealthy countries to 4 per cent. It is true that China has been decisive in producing a reduction in world income inequalities between countries. If you take China out, the South’s position has worsened since the 1980s; if you keep it in, then the South has improved somewhat, due almost exclusively to China’s advance. But of course, there has been a big growth in inequality within the prc, so China has also contributed to the world-scale increase in inequalities within countries in recent decades. Taking the two measures together—inequality between and within countries—statistically China has brought about a reduction in total global inequality. We should not exaggerate this—the world pattern is still one of huge gaps, which are being reduced in small ways. However, it’s important because it changes relationships of power between countries. If it continues, it may even change the global distribution of income from one that is still very polarized to a more normal, Pareto-type distribution.
Was I surprised at this? To some extent, yes. In fact, that’s why I shifted my interest over the last fifteen years to studying East Asia, because I realized that, although East Asia—except for Japan, clearly—was part of the South, it had some peculiarities that enabled it to generate a kind of development that did not quite fit within that pattern of stable inequality among regions. At the same time, no one ever claimed—I certainly did not—that stability in the global distribution of income also meant immobility of particular countries or regions. A fairly stable structure of inequalities can persist, with some countries going up and others down. And this, to some extent, is what has been happening. From the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, the more important development has been the bifurcation of a highly dynamic and upwardly mobile East Asia and a stagnant and downwardly mobile Africa, and particularly southern Africa—‘the Africa of the labour reserves’, again. This bifurcation is the thing that interests me most: why southern Africa and East Asia have moved in such opposite directions. It’s a very important phenomenon to try to understand, because to do so would also modify our understanding of the underpinnings of successful capitalist development, and the extent to which it relies or not on dispossession—the complete proletarianization of the peasantry—as happened in southern Africa, or on the very partial proletarianization that has taken place in East Asia. So the divergence of these two regions brings up a big theoretical question, which once again challenges Brenner’s identification of capitalist development with the full proletarianization of the labour force.
Chaos and Governance argued early on, in 1999, that American hegemony would decline principally through the rise of East Asia, and above all of China. At the same time it raised the prospect that this would also be the region where labour might in future pose the sharpest challenge to capital, worldwide. It has sometimes been suggested that there’s a tension between these perspectives—the rise of China as a rival power centre to the United States, and mounting unrest among the labouring classes in China. How do you see the relationship between the two?
The relationship is very close, because, first of all, contrary to what many people think, the Chinese peasants and workers have a millennial tradition of unrest that has no parallel anywhere else in the world. In fact, many of the dynastic transitions were driven by rebellions, strikes and demonstrations—not just of workers and peasants, but also shopkeepers. This is a tradition that continues down to the present. When Hu Jintao told Bush, a few years ago, ‘Don’t worry about China trying to challenge us dominance; we have too many preoccupations at home’, he was pointing to one of the chief characteristics of Chinese history: how to counter the combination of internal rebellions by the subordinate classes, and external invasions by so-called barbarians—from the Steppes, up to the nineteenth century, and then, since the Opium Wars, from the sea. These have always been the overwhelming concerns of Chinese governments, and they set narrow limits on China’s role in international relations. The late-eighteenth and nineteenth-century imperial Chinese state was basically a kind of pre-modern welfare state. These characteristics were reproduced throughout its subsequent evolution. During the 1990s, Jiang Zemin let the capitalist genie out of the bottle. Current attempts to put it back again have to be set in the context of this much longer tradition. If rebellions of the Chinese subordinate classes materialize in a new form of welfare state, then that will influence the pattern of international relations over the next twenty, thirty years. But the balance of forces between the classes in China is still up for grabs at the moment.
Is there a contradiction between being a major centre of social unrest and being a rising power? Not necessarily—the United States in the 1930s was in the vanguard of worker struggles, at the same time that it was emerging as hegemonic. The fact that these struggles were successful, in the midst of the Great Depression, was a significant factor in making the us socially hegemonic for the working classes as well. This was certainly the case in Italy, where the American experience became the model for some of the Catholic trade unions.
Recent statements from China suggest a great deal of worry about the levels of unemployment that may result from a global recession, with an array of measures to counteract it. But does this also entail the continuation of the development model in ways that may, in the end, challenge the rest of global capitalism?
The question is whether the measures that Chinese rulers take, in response to the subordinate groups’ struggles, can work in other places where the same conditions do not exist. The issue of whether China can become a model for other states—particularly other big Southern states, like India—is dependent on a lot of historical and geographical specificities that may not be reproducible elsewhere. The Chinese know this, and they do not actually set themselves up as a model to be imitated. So what happens in China will be crucial in terms of the relationship between the prc and the rest of the world, but not in terms of setting up a model for others to follow. Nevertheless there is an interpenetration of struggles there—of worker and peasant struggles against exploitation, but also of struggles against environmental problems and ecological destruction—that you don’t find to the same extent elsewhere. These struggles are escalating at the moment, and it will be important to see how the leadership responds. I think that the change in leadership to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao is related to nervousness, at the least, about abandoning a long-standing welfare tradition. So, we’ll have to monitor the situation and watch for possible outcomes.
To return to the question of capitalist crises. Your 1972 essay, ‘Towards a Theory of Capitalist Crisis’, turns on a comparison between the long downturn of 1873–1896 and the prediction, which proved completely accurate, of another such crisis, which historically started in 1973. You’ve returned to this parallel several times since, pointing out the similarities but also the important differences between the two. But you’ve written less about the crisis of 1929 onwards. Do you regard the Great Depression as continuing to be of less relevance?
Well, not of less relevance, because in fact it is the most serious crisis that historical capitalism has experienced; certainly, it was a decisive turning point. But it also educated the powers-that-be in terms of what they should do so as not to repeat that experience. There are a variety of recognized and less recognized instruments for preventing that type of breakdown from happening again. Even now, though the collapse in the stock exchange is being compared to the 1930s, I think—I may be wrong—that both the monetary authorities and the governments of the states that actually matter in this are going to do all they can to avoid the collapse in the financial markets having similar social effects to the 1930s. They just cannot afford it, politically. And so they will muddle through, do anything they have to. Even Bush—and before him Reagan—for all their free-market ideology, relied on an extreme kind of Keynesian deficit spending. Their ideology is one thing, what they actually do is another, because they are responding to political situations which they cannot allow to deteriorate too much. The financial aspects may be similar to the 1930s, but there is a greater awareness and tighter constraints on the political authorities not to let these processes affect the so-called real economy to the same extent that they did in the 1930s. I’m not saying that the Great Depression is less relevant, but I’m not convinced that it is going to be repeated in the near future. The situation of the world economy is radically different. In the 1930s it was highly segmented, and that may have been a factor in producing the conditions for those breakdowns. Now it’s far more integrated.
In ‘Towards a Theory of Capitalist Crisis’ you describe a deep structural conflict within capitalism, in which you differentiate between crises that are caused by too high a rate of exploitation, which lead to a realization crisis because of insufficient effective demand, and those caused by too low a rate of exploitation, which cuts into demand for means of production. Now, do you still hold to this general distinction, and if so would you say that we are now in an underlying realization crisis, masked by expanding personal indebtedness and financialization, due to the wage repressions that have characterized capitalism over the last thirty years?
Yes. I think that over the last thirty years there has been a change in the nature of the crisis. Up to the early 1980s, the crisis was typically one of falling rate of profits due to intensifying competition among capitalist agencies, and due to circumstances in which labour was much better equipped to protect itself than in the previous depressions—both in the late-nineteenth century and in the 1930s. So that was the situation through the 1970s. The Reagan–Thatcher monetary counter-revolution was actually aimed at undermining this power, this capacity of the working classes to protect themselves—it was not the only objective, but it was one of the main objectives. I think that you quote some adviser of Thatcher, saying that what they did was . . .
. . . to create an industrial reserve army; exactly . . .
. . . what Marx says they should do! That changed the nature of the crisis. In the 1980s and 1990s and now, in the 2000s, we are indeed facing an underlying overproduction crisis, with all its typical characteristics. Incomes have been redistributed in favour of groups and classes that have high liquidity and speculative dispositions; so incomes don’t go back into circulation in the form of effective demand, but they go into speculation, creating bubbles that burst regularly. So, yes, the crisis has been transformed from one of falling rate of profit, due to intensified competition among capitals, to one of overproduction due to a systemic shortage of effective demand, created by the tendencies of capitalist development.
A recent report of the National Intelligence Council predicted the end of us global dominance by 2025, and the emergence of a more fragmented, multi-polar, and potentially conflictual world. Do you think that capitalism as a world system requires, as a condition of possibility, a single hegemonic power? Is the absence of one necessarily equivalent to unstable systemic chaos—is a balance of power between roughly comparable major states impossible?
No, I wouldn’t say that it’s impossible. A lot depends on whether the incumbent hegemonic power accepts accommodation or not. The chaos of the last six, seven years is due to the response of the Bush Administration to 9/11, which has in some respects been a case of great-power suicide. What the declining power does is very important, because they have the ability to create chaos. The whole ‘Project for a New American Century’ was a refusal to accept decline. That has been a catastrophe. There has been the military debacle in Iraq and the related financial strain on the us position in the world economy, transforming the United States from a creditor nation into the biggest debtor nation in world history. As a defeat, Iraq is worse than Vietnam, because in Indo-China there was a long tradition of guerrilla warfare: they had a leader of the calibre of Ho Chi Minh; they had already defeated the French. The tragedy for the Americans in Iraq is that, even in the best possible circumstances, they have a hard time winning the war, and now they are just trying to get out with some face-saving device. Their resistance to accommodation has led, first, to an acceleration of their decline, and second, to a lot of suffering and chaos. Iraq is a disaster. The size of the displaced population there is far bigger than in Darfur.
It is not clear what Obama actually wants to do. If he thinks that he can reverse the decline, he’s going to have some very nasty surprises. What he can do is to manage the decline intelligently—in other words, change the policy from: ‘We are not accommodating. We want another century’, to one of de facto managing decline, devising policies that accommodate the change in power relationships. I don’t know whether he’s going to do so because he’s very ambiguous; whether because in politics you cannot say certain things, or because he doesn’t know what to do, or because he just is ambiguous—I don’t know. But the change from Bush to Obama does open up the possibility of managing and accommodating the decline of the United States in a non-catastrophic way. Bush has had the opposite effect: the credibility of the American military has been further undermined, the financial position has become even more disastrous. So now the task facing Obama, I think, is managing decline intelligently. That’s what he can do. But his idea of escalating us intervention in Afghanistan is worrying, to say the least.
Over the years, while always basing your work on Marx’s conception of capital accumulation, you’ve never hesitated to express a number of leading criticisms of Marx—his underestimation of power struggles between states, his indifference to space, the contradictions in his account of the working class, among others. For a long time you’ve also been fascinated by Adam Smith, who plays a central role in your latest work, Adam Smith in Beijing. What would be your comparable reservations about him?
The comparable reservations about Smith are the same as Marx’s reservations about him. Marx took a lot from Smith—the tendency of the rate of profit to fall under the impact of inter-capitalist competition, for example, is a Smithian idea. Capitalis a critique of political economy: Marx was criticizing Smith for missing what was going on in the hidden abodes of production, as he put it—inter-capitalist competition might drive down the rate of profit, but it was countered by the tendency and ability of capitalists to shift the relationships of power with the working class in their favour. From this point of view, Marx’s critique of Smith’s political economy was making a crucial point. However, one also has to look at the historical evidence, because Marx’s was a theoretical construct, with assumptions that may not correspond to the historical reality of particular periods or places. We cannot infer empirical realities from a theoretical construct. The validity of his critique of Smith has to be assessed on the basis of the historical record; that applies to Smith as much as it applies to Marx, or anybody else.
One of Marx’s conclusions in Capital, particularly Volume One, is that adoption of a Smithian free-market system will lead to increases in class inequality. To what degree does the introduction of a Smithian regime in Beijing carry the risk of even greater class inequalities in China?
My argument in the theoretical chapter on Smith, in Adam Smith in Beijing, is that there is no notion in his work of self-regulating markets as in the neoliberal creed. The invisible hand is that of the state, which should rule in a decentralized way, with minimal bureaucratic interference. Substantively, the action of the government in Smith is pro-labour, not pro-capital. He is quite explicit that he is not in favour of making workers compete to reduce wages, but of making capitalists compete, to reduce profits to a minimum acceptable reward for their risks. Current conceptions turn him completely upside-down. But it’s unclear where China is headed today. In the Jiang Zemin era, in the 1990s, it was certainly headed in the direction of making workers compete for the benefit of capital and profit; there is no question about that. Now there is a reversal, one which as I’ve said takes into account not only the tradition of the Revolution and the Mao period, but also of the welfare aspects of late-imperial China under the Qing in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. I’m not putting bets on any particular outcome in China, but we must have an open mind in terms of seeing where it’s going.
In Adam Smith in Beijing, you also draw on Sugihara Kaoru’s work in contrasting an ‘industrious revolution’, based on intensive labour and husbanding of nature, in early modern East Asia, and an ‘industrial revolution’, based on mechanization and predation of natural resources, and speak of the hope that there could be a convergence of the two for humanity in the future. How would you estimate the balance between them in East Asia today?
Very precarious. I am not as optimistic as Sugihara in thinking that the East Asian tradition of ‘industrious revolution’ is so well entrenched that it may, if not become dominant again, at least play an important role in whatever hybrid formation is going to emerge. These concepts are more important for monitoring what’s happening than saying, East Asia is going this way, or the United States is going the other way. We need to see what they actually do. There is evidence that the Chinese authorities are worried about the environment, as well as about social unrest—but then they do things that are plain stupid. Maybe there is a plan in the works, but I don’t see much awareness of the ecological disasters of car civilizations. The idea of copying the United States from this point of view was already crazy in Europe—it’s even crazier in China. And I’ve always told the Chinese that in the 1990s and 2000s, they went to look at the wrong city. If they want to see how to be wealthy without being ecologically destructive, they should go to Amsterdam rather than Los Angeles. In Amsterdam, everybody goes around on bicycles; there are thousands of bikes parked at the station overnight, because people come in by train, pick up their bicycles in the morning and leave them there again in the evening. Whereas in China, while there were no cars at all the first time I was there in 1970—only a few buses in a sea of bicycles—now, more and more, the bicycles have been crowded out. >From that point of view it’s a very mixed picture, very worrying and contradictory. The ideology of modernization is discredited elsewhere but so far is living on, rather naively, in China.
But the implication of Adam Smith in Beijing seems to be that we might need something of an industrious revolution in the West, and that therefore this is a category that’s not specific to China, but can actually be much broader?
Yes. But Sugihara’s basic point is that the typical development of the industrial revolution, the substitution of machinery and energy for labour, not only has ecological limits, as we know, but it has economic limits as well. In fact, Marxists often forget that Marx’s idea of the increasingly organic composition of capital, driving down the rate of profit, has to do substantively with the fact that the use of more machines and energy intensifies competition among capitalists in such a way that it becomes less profitable, besides being ecologically destructive. Sugihara’s point is that the separation of management and labour, the growing dominance of management over labour, and the fact that labour is deprived of its skills, including those of self-management, which is typical of the industrial revolution, has limits. In the industrious revolution there is a mobilization of all the household’s resources, which develops, or at least preserves, managerial skills among the labourers. Eventually the advantages of these self-management skills become more important than the advantages derived from the separation of conception and execution that was typical of the industrial revolution. I think he has a point, in the sense that this is pretty crucial to understanding the present Chinese rise; that having preserved these self-management skills through serious limitations on the processes of proletarianization in a substantive sense, China now can have an organization of the labour process that is more reliant on the self-management skills of labour than elsewhere. This is probably one of the main sources of the competitive advantage of China, under the new circumstances.
Which would take us back to the politics of the Gramsci Group, in terms of the labour process and autonomia?
Yes and no. They are two different forms of autonomy. What we are talking about now is managerial autonomy, whereas the other was autonomy in struggle, in the workers’ antagonism towards capital. There, the idea of autonomy was: how do we formulate our programme in such a way that we unite workers in the struggle against capital, rather than divide labour and create the conditions for capital to re-establish its authority on the workers in the workplace? The present situation is ambiguous. Many look at Chinese self-management skills and see them as a way of subordinating labour to capital—in other words, capital saves on managerial costs. One has to put these self-management skills in context—where, when, and for what purpose. It is not that easy to classify it in one way or another.
You ended ‘World Income Inequalities’ in 1991 by arguing that, after the collapse of the ussr, deepening and widening conflicts over scarce resources within the South—the Iraq–Iran War or the Gulf War can be taken as emblematic—were forcing the West to create embryonic structures of world government to regulate these: the G7 as an executive committee of the global bourgeoisie, the imf and World Bank as its Ministry of Finance, the Security Council as its Ministry of Defence. These structures, you suggested, might fifteen years hence be taken over by non-conservative forces. In Adam Smith in Beijing you speak rather of a world-market society as a potentially hopeful future, in which no power is any longer a hegemon.
What is the relationship between the two, and your conceptions of them?
First, I didn’t actually say that the structures of world government emerged because of the conflicts within the South. Most of them were Bretton Woods organizations, set up by the United States after the Second World War as mechanisms that were necessary to avoid the pitfalls of self-regulating markets in the global economy, and as instruments of governance. So, from the start of the post-war era there were embryonic structures of world government in place. What happened in the 1980s was an increasing turbulence and instability, of which these conflicts in the South were an aspect, and therefore these institutions were brought in to manage the world economy in a different way than before. Could they be taken over by non-conservative forces? My attitude to these institutions was always ambivalent, because in many ways they reflect a balance of power among the states of the North and the South—within the North, between North and South, and so on. There was nothing in principle that ruled out the possibility that these institutions could actually be put to work to regulate the global economy in ways that might promote a more equal distribution of incomes worldwide. However, what happened is exactly the opposite. In the 1980s, the imf and the World Bank became the instruments of the neoliberal counter-revolution, and therefore promoted a more unequal distribution of income. But even then, as I’ve said, what happened in the end was not so much a more unequal distribution between North and South, but a big bifurcation within the South itself, with East Asia doing very well and southern Africa doing very badly, and other regions somewhere in the middle.
How does that relate to the world-market society concept that I discuss in Adam Smith in Beijing? It is now clear that a world state, even of the most embryonic, confederal type, would be very difficult to bring about. It is not a serious possibility in the near future. There is going to be a world-market society, in the sense that countries will be relating to one another through market mechanisms which are not at all self-regulating, but are regulated. This was also true of the system developed by the United States, which was a highly regulated process whereby the elimination of tariffs, quotas and restrictions on labour mobility was always negotiated by states—most importantly by the United States and Europe, and then between these and the others. The question now is what regulation is going to be introduced to prevent a 1930s-style breakdown of the market. So the relationship between the two concepts is that the organization of the world economy will be primarily market-based, but with an important participation of states in the regulation of this economy.
In The Long Twentieth Century, you sketched three possible outcomes of the systemic chaos into which the long wave of financialization that started in the early 1970s was leading: a world empire controlled by the United States, a world-market society in which no states dominated others, or a new world war that would destroy humanity. In all three eventualities, capitalism, as it has historically developed, would have disappeared. In Adam Smith in Beijing, you conclude that, with the failures of the Bush Administration, the first can now be ruled out, leaving just the last two. But isn’t there, logically at least, one other possibility within your own framework—that China could emerge over time as a new hegemon, replacing the United States, without altering the structures of capitalism and territorialism as you describe them? Do you exclude this possibility?
I don’t exclude that possibility, but let’s begin by putting the record straight about what I actually say. The first of the three scenarios that I envisaged at the end of The Long Twentieth Century was a world empire controlled not only by the United States, but by the United States in cooperation with its European allies. I never thought that the us would be so reckless as to try to go it alone for a New American Century—that was just too crazy a project to contemplate; and, of course, it backfired immediately. In fact, there is a strong current within the us foreign-policy establishment that wants to patch up the relationship with Europe, which was strained by the unilateralism of the Bush Administration. That’s still a possibility, although it’s now less likely than it used to be. The second point is that the world-market society and the greater weight of China in the global economy are not mutually exclusive. If you look at the way in which China has behaved towards its neighbours historically, there has always been a relationship based more on trade and economic exchanges than on military power; this is still the case. People often misunderstand this: they think I am depicting the Chinese as being softer or better than the West; it’s nothing to do with that. It has to do with the problems of governance of a country like China, which we’ve discussed. China has a tradition of rebellions that no other territory of similar size and density of population has faced. Its rulers are also highly conscious of the possibility of new invaders from the sea—in other words, the us. As I point out in Chapter Ten of Adam Smith in Beijing, there are various American plans for how to deal with China, none of which are exactly reassuring for Beijing. Apart from the Kissinger plan, which is one of cooptation, the others envisage either a new Cold War directed against China or getting China involved in wars with its neighbours, while the us plays the role of ‘happy third’. If China does emerge, as I think it will, as a new centre of the global economy, its role will be radically different from that of previous hegemons. Not just because of cultural contrasts, rooted as these are in historical–geographical differences; but precisely because the different history and geography of the East Asian region will have an impact on the new structures of the global economy. If China is going to be hegemonic, it’s going to be hegemonic in very different ways to the others. For one thing, military power will be far less important than cultural and economic power—particularly economic power. They have to play the economic card far more than the us ever did, or the British, or the Dutch.
Do you foresee greater unity within East Asia? There is talk, for example, of a sort of Asian imf facility, unification of currency—do you see China as the centre of an East Asian hegemon, rather than a solo player? And if so, how does that fit with the rising nationalisms in South Korea, Japan and China?
What is most interesting about East Asia is how, in the end, the economy is determinant of states’ dispositions and policies towards one another, in spite of their nationalisms. The nationalisms are very well entrenched, but they are related to a historical fact often forgotten in the West: that Korea, China, Japan, Thailand, Cambodia, all of these were national states long before there was a single nation-state in Europe. They all have histories of nationalist reactions to one another, in a framework that was predominantly economic. Occasionally there were wars, and the attitude of the Vietnamese towards China, or the Koreans towards Japan, is deeply rooted in the memory of these wars. At the same time, the economy seems to rule. It was striking that the nationalist resurgence in Japan, under the Koizumi government, was suddenly checked when it became clear that Japanese business was interested in doing business with China. In China, too, there was a big wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations, but then they stopped. The general picture in East Asia is that there are deep nationalist dispositions, but at the same time they tend to be superseded by economic interests.
The current crisis of the world financial system looks like the most spectacular vindication of your long-standing theoretical predictions that anyone could imagine. Are there any aspects of the crisis that have surprised you?
My prediction was very simple. The recurrent tendency towards financialization was, as Braudel put it, a sign of the autumn of a particular material expansion, centring on a particular state. In The Long Twentieth Century, I called the onset of financialization the signal crisis of a regime of accumulation, and pointed out that over time—usually it was around half a century—the terminal crisis would follow. For previous hegemons, it was possible to identify both the signal crisis and then the terminal crisis. For the United States, I ventured the hypothesis that the 1970s was the signal crisis; the terminal crisis had not yet come—but it would. How would it come? The basic hypothesis is that all these financial expansions were fundamentally unsustainable, because they were drawing into speculation more capital than could actually be managed—in other words, there was a tendency for these financial expansions to develop bubbles of various kinds. I foresaw that this financial expansion would eventually lead to a terminal crisis, because bubbles are as unsustainable today as they have been in the past. But I did not foresee the details of the bubbles: the dot.com boom, or the housing bubble.
Also, I was ambiguous about where we were in the early 1990s, when I wrote The Long Twentieth Century. I thought that in some ways the Belle Epoque of the United States was already over, whereas it was actually only beginning. Reagan prepared it by provoking a major recession, which then created the conditions for the subsequent financial expansion; but it was Clinton who actually oversaw the Belle Epoque, which then ended with the financial collapse of the 2000s, especially of the Nasdaq. With the bursting of the housing bubble, what we are observing now is, quite clearly, the terminal crisis of us financial centrality and hegemony.
What marks your work off from almost everyone else in your field is your appreciation for the flexibility, adaptability and fluidity of capitalist development, within the framework of the inter-state system. Yet in the longue durée, such as the 500, 150 and 50-year framework you adopted for the collective examination of East Asia’s position in the inter-state system, patterns emerge that are astonishingly clear, almost stark in their determinacy and simplicity. [9] How would you characterize the relationship between contingency and necessity in your thinking?
There are two different questions here: one concerns an appreciation of the flexibility of capitalist development and the other is the recurrence of patterns, and the extent to which these are determined by contingency or necessity. On the first, the adaptability of capitalism: this is partly related to my personal experience in business, as a young man. Initially I tried to run my father’s business, which was relatively small; then I did a dissertation on my grandfather’s business, which was bigger—a medium-sized company. Then I quarrelled with my grandfather and went into Unilever, which in terms of employees was the second-largest multinational at the time. So I had the luck—from the point of view of analysing the capitalist business enterprise—of going into successively larger firms, which helped me understand that you cannot talk about capitalist enterprises in general, because the differences between my father’s business, my grandfather’s business and Unilever were incredible. For example, my father spent all his time going to visit customers in the textile districts, and studying the technical problems that they had with their machines. Then he would go back to the factory and discuss the problems with his engineer; they would customize the machine for the client. When I tried to run this business, I was totally lost; the whole thing was based on skills and knowledge that were part of my father’s practice and experience. I could go around and see the customers, but I couldn’t solve their problems—I couldn’t even really understand them. So it was hopeless. In fact, in my youth, when I used to say to my father, ‘If the Communists come, you are going to be in trouble’, he said, ‘No, I’m not going to be in trouble, I’ll continue to do what I’m doing. They need people who do this.’
When I closed my father’s business, and went into my grandfather’s, it was already more of a Fordist organization. They were not studying the customers’ problems, they were producing standardized machines; either the customers wanted them or they didn’t. Their engineers were designing machines on the basis of what they thought there would be a market for, and telling the customers: this is what we have. It was embryonic mass production, with embryonic assembly lines. When I went to Unilever, I barely saw the production side. There were many different factories—one was making margarine, another soap, another perfumes. There were dozens of different products, but the main site of activity was neither the marketing organization nor the place of production, but finance and advertising. So, that taught me that it’s very hard to identify one specific form as ‘typically’ capitalist. Later, studying Braudel, I saw that this idea of the eminently adaptable nature of capitalism was something that you could observe historically.
One of the major problems on the left, but also on the right, is to think that there is only one kind of capitalism that reproduces itself historically; whereas capitalism has transformed itself substantively—particularly on a global basis—in unexpected ways. For several centuries capitalism relied on slavery, and seemed so embedded in slavery from all points of view that it could not survive without it; whereas slavery was abolished, and capitalism not only survived but prospered more than ever, now developing on the basis of colonialism and imperialism. At this point it seemed that colonialism and imperialism were essential to capitalism’s operation—but again, after the Second World War, capitalism managed to discard them, and to survive and prosper. World-historically, capitalism has been continually transforming itself, and this is one of its main characteristics; it would be very short-sighted to try to pin down what capitalism is without looking at these crucial transformations. What remains constant through all these adaptations, and defines the essence of capitalism, is best captured by Marx’s formula of capital M–C–M', to which I refer repeatedly in identifying the alternation of material and financial expansions. Looking at present-day China, one can say, maybe it’s capitalism, maybe not—I think it’s still an open question. But assuming that it is capitalism, it’s not the same as that of previous periods; it’s thoroughly transformed. The issue is to identify its specificities, how it differs from previous capitalisms, whether we call it capitalism or something else.
And the second part of the question—the emergence of such distinct, longue-durée patterns in your work, and the transformations of scale?
One point is that there is a very clear geographical dimension to the recurrent cycles of material and financial expansion, but you can see this aspect only if you do not stay focused on one particular country—because then you see a totally different process. This is what most historians have been doing—they focus on a particular country, and trace developments there. Whereas in Braudel, the idea is precisely that the accumulation of capital jumps; and if you don’t jump with it, if you don’t follow it from place to place, you don’t see it. If you stay focused on England, or on France, you miss what matters most in the development of capitalism world-historically. You have to move with it to understand that the process of capitalist development is essentially this process of jumping from one condition, where what you’ve termed the ‘spatial fix’ has become too constraining, and competition is intensifying, to another one, where a new spatial fix of greater scale and scope enables the system to experience another period of material expansion. And then of course, at a certain point the cycle repeats itself.
When I was first formulating this, inferring the patterns from Braudel and Marx, I had not yet fully appreciated your concept of spatial fix, in the double sense of the word—fixity of invested capital, and a fix for the previous contradictions of capitalist accumulation. There is a built-in necessity to these patterns that derives from the process of accumulation, which mobilizes money and other resources on an increasing scale, which in turn creates problems of intensifying competition and over-accumulation of various kinds. The process of capitalist accumulation of capital—as opposed to non-capitalist accumulation of capital—has this snowball effect, which intensifies competition and drives down the rate of profit. Those who are best positioned to find a new spatial fix do so, each time in a larger ‘container’. From city-states, which accumulated a huge amount of capital in tiny containers, to seventeenth-century Holland, which was more than a city-state, but less than a national state, then to eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Britain, with its world-encompassing empire, and then to the twentieth-century, continent-sized United States.
Now the process cannot continue in the same way, because there is no new, larger container that can displace the United States. There are large national—in fact, civilizational—states, like China and India, which are not bigger than the United States in terms of space, but have four or five times its population. So now we are switching to a new pattern: instead of going from one container to another, spatially larger, one, we are going from a container with a low population density to containers with high population densities. Moreover, previously it was a switch from wealthy to wealthy, in terms of countries. Now we are going from very wealthy to what are still basically poor countries—China’s per capita income is still one-twentieth that of the United States. In one sense, you can say, ‘Okay, now hegemony, if that’s what is happening, is shifting from the rich to the poor.’ But at the same time, these countries have huge internal differences and inequalities. It’s all very mixed. These are contradictory tendencies, and we need to develop additional conceptual tools to understand them.
You end Adam Smith in Beijing with the hope of a commonwealth of civilizations living on equal terms with each other, in a shared respect for the earth and its natural resources. Would you use the term ‘socialism’ to describe this vision, or do you regard it as outdated?
Well, I would have no objections to it being called socialism, except that, unfortunately, socialism has been too much identified with state control of the economy. I never thought that was a good idea. I come from a country where the state is despised and in many ways distrusted. The identification of socialism with the state creates big problems. So, if this world-system was going to be called socialist, it would need to be redefined in terms of a mutual respect between humans and a collective respect for nature. But this may have to be organized through state-regulated market exchanges, so as to empower labour and disempower capital in Smithian fashion, rather than through state ownership and control of the means of production. The problem with the term socialism is that it’s been abused in many different ways, and therefore also discredited. If you ask me what would be a better term, I’ve no idea—I think we should look for one. You are very good at finding new expressions, so you should come up with some suggestions.
Okay, I’ll have to work on that one.
Yes, you have to work on a substitute for the term ‘socialist’ that disentangles it from the historical identification with the state, and brings it closer to the idea of greater equality and mutual respect. So, I’ll leave that task to you!